

TELEVISION

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THE JOURNAL OF THE
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
TELEVISION ARTS
AND SCIENCES

Published by The National Academy
of Television Arts and Sciences with
the cooperation of the Television and
Radio Department, Newhouse Commu-
nications Center, Syracuse University



CBS NEWS CAMPAIGN '68

This has been a hazardous year for political prophecy. No campaign in recent memory has been so full of incident—from the surprising outcome of the New Hampshire Primary in March to the tragedy in Los Angeles in June. No campaign has been so subject to the influence of issues outside the control of the contenders—from the complex issue of peace in Vietnam to the unpredictable course of race relations in America.

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TELEVISION QUARTERLY

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TELEVISION NEWS AND WORLD UNDERSTANDING

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At no period in their brief history have television's journalists been so pressed and challenged. TV newsmen are asked to probe and examine at new levels, to "tell it the way it is," and otherwise to produce new levels of knowledge and understanding among men and nations.

Yet most who take their journalistic function seriously must sometimes wonder whether the game is worth the candle-power. Explorations by both commercial and educational networks often earn public castigation and threats of political reprisal. Reasonable editorials bring unreasonable response, and no TV journalist is safe from extremists of right and left.

It is argued by some that TV supports an "establishment view," thus "avoiding the issues" in our domestic confrontations. Others argue that TV's concentration upon violence and its failure to show the positive aspects of our efforts have made it difficult, if not impossible, to unify the nation and create a positive will and spirit.

Yet each time reasonable men consider the prospects for mankind on this shrinking globe they turn once more to the medium. Technological change offers wider and deeper opportunities to tell us not only about ourselves, but about others who share this planet with us. For many, this is television's ultimate function. In this regard, sufficient concern has been expressed to justify the devotion of a full issue of *Television Quarterly* to explorations of TV's capacity to increase international understanding.

The framework for discussion is set here by USIA Director *Leonard H. Marks*, who describes the emergence of a world-wide "information-grid" in which America must actively maintain interest if it is to continue its leadership in world affairs.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND A CHANGING TECHNOLOGY

LEONARD H. MARKS

When the first telegram was delivered to the British Foreign Office in the 1840's the Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, read it and declared: "My God, this is the end of diplomacy." Hyperbole aside, his reaction was sound. He recognized, with the instinct of a threatened man, the impending influence of mass communications on his world of personal statecraft.

Today, looking towards the 1970's, another change in communications patterns, as influential as the one which dismayed Palmerston, may have a comparable effect on present-day diplomacy.

Granted it is a long leap between Palmerston's telegram and today's satellites, in comparison the communications leap during the next dozen years will be even longer and more dramatic. In the 1970's, by conservative estimate, communications facilities will double. Paced by satellites, for the first time, a network will connect all parts of the globe with all types of communication—telephone, telegraph, radio, television, facsimile, or information storage and retrieval.

LEONARD H. MARKS is a 1935 graduate of the University of Pittsburgh, where he later took a law degree and served as a Faculty Fellow and Assistant Professor in the Law School. In 1946 he became a partner in a Washington law firm where he continued to specialize in communications law. In October, 1962 President Kennedy appointed him as an Incorporator of the Communications Satellite Corporation. He later was named to the Comsat Board of Directors, where he served until he was named Director of the United States Information Agency by President Johnson in September, 1965.

But this is only part of the story. The many communications links of satellites will be spectacular, but they are only the passive framework for transferring information. Beyond the mechanics of the network, there is a larger prospect opened to everyone. This prospect, until very recently a Utopian one, is the creation of a world-information-grid which will make possible the transfer of man's accumulated knowledge throughout the globe.

This development coincides with that tremendous expansion in knowledge resources which is known as the information explosion. Between now and 1980 the amount of *additional* information to be collected, stored, and distributed will be equal in volume to all the data produced in the 2000 years of prior human history.

Despite the present electronic sophistication, information links with the rest of the world have been sporadic. Until now books and periodicals have been the major transmitters of information. Overseas electronic circuits—telephone, teletype, and radio—have been limited largely to the North Atlantic area. Except for radio, the United States has not had circuits connecting it directly with over 70 per cent of the world's population in Africa, South America or (until early this year) the Asian mainland. In fact, these three continents have had few direct telecommunications links among themselves.

The new information grid will overcome such limitations dramatically. The grid will be "anchored" to the high-flying communications satellites that can transmit voice, visual, or printed information in any amount to anyplace.

The most highly publicized aspect of the new grid has been the potential of world-wide television. Although it has glamorous appeal, television will play a relatively insignificant part in the grid's activities; essentially television will transmit such occasional "world events" as Olympics, the election of a Pope, or an American presidential inauguration.

The grid's day-to-day chores will involve less spectacular transmissions. Many of these will involve the commonplace telephone. Today, most of the world's telephones are in the United States; during the next decade, the balance will shift abroad. The telephone will become the most important single medium in the new world communications grid, followed by telex networks. These networks, capable of high-speed transmissions, will be able to handle any kind of printed data, from today's stock quotations to entire books. In one 1962 experiment, the "primitive" Telstar satellite handled data

at the rate of 1.5 million words a minute, or the equivalent of transmitting the entire 66 books of the Bible every 30 seconds.

Over the long term, however, the greatest impact on the new world-information-grid may be made by the computer and related information-retrieval devices. The grid will be most efficient when it is transferring information at high speeds from one electronic storage source to another. Since computers offer the only hope of storing the flood of new information data produced every year, they promise to emerge as the libraries of the world-information-grid—making their information available instantaneously to other computer libraries throughout the earth. Computers will be, in their way, the new Library of Congress, Vatican Library, British Museum and all our hometown Carnegie libraries rolled into one, serving a world-wide clientele.

The popular-science writers have made us generally aware of these prospects. However, we have only recently begun to consider the effect of making the world's recorded knowledge available to everyone. This revolutionary prospect for the information grid will be an important (perhaps decisive) new element in our world as we approach the next century. The grid is not a far-off, science-fiction fantasy; it is being formed now, and it will be substantially in place by 1975. Moreover, the United States is linked inextricably to its success—or its failure. American technology is creating the grid; American sources will provide a large part of the information flowing through it.

With all of its capabilities, the grid can play a vital role in creating a more viable world order. Properly utilized, it could:

- strengthen the advanced economics of Western Europe and Japan through an efficient sharing of scientific and other information. It will modify, in part, the divisive effects of the so-called technological gap.
- speed up the development process throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America through the programmed input of a wide range of technical information tailored to local problems.
- be a powerful instrument for encouraging “bridge-building” contacts with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
- strengthen American society through the more efficient transmittal and storage of information from abroad.

Underlying each of these specific applications is the thought that no one will begin to master such global problems as education, food production, population control, and urbanization without the large-scale controlled application of informational resources at all levels, from literacy training to computer exchanges. The idea of putting these resources to work on the world's problems, as a public policy, is hardly a new one. A similar idea motivated the Point Four proposals two decades ago by President Harry S. Truman, and it underlies the battery of public and private aid programs initiated since then. What is new is the opportunity the information grid offers us to do this in a *massive* way.

Until the satellites came on the scene in 1962, submarine cables provided the major links between continents. These cables were concentrated largely in the North Atlantic area, with an extension to Japan, and had a total capacity of less than 500 circuits. By 1968, three commercial communications satellites have more than doubled this capacity. Within a very few years, the worldwide satellite network will be served by satellites with 10,000 or more circuits apiece. (Cables will also have significantly greater capacities by that time but, unlike the satellites, they can connect only two points at a time.) The result is not only a satellite-based grid which could not be reproduced by other means for decades, but also a grid with circuit capacities that can handle any information load, present and future.

The grid's greatest weakness is the present critical shortage of domestic communications facilities throughout the world. For example, it often takes several years to get a new telephone installed in countries such as France or Brazil; in small and less-developed countries, a telephone is frequently just a status symbol and an object of great curiosity. There will be no advantage in having satellites relay long-distance calls if these calls cannot be connected to circuits within the country receiving the message. The problem is, of course, most acute in the developing countries of Asia and Africa where the need for communications is greater.

To understand the American role in the grid's development, it is necessary to consider the changes that communications are having on our own national style at home. Increasingly, the United States is a society oriented to the collection, storage and distribution of knowledge—from the evening news by radio or TV to the computer facility at MIT. This phenomenon was first described by Princeton's Dr. Fritz Machlup several years ago in his book, *The Production*

and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States. Dr. Machlup's rough measure of the U. S. economy as an information-servicing mechanism was startling.

He estimated that, in 1958, the measurable U. S. "knowledge industry" spent \$136 billion, or nearly 30 per cent of the Gross National Product. This is impressive enough; but his more important finding was that the production and distribution of information of all kinds—from schoolhouse to Random House—was growing at twice the rate of the overall economy. In 1965, the editors of *Fortune* confirmed this in a study updating Professor Machlup's figures, and estimated that, by 1963, the nation's total outlay for knowledge had reached \$195 billion, up 43 per cent in five years. The effort accounted for the employment of 24 million persons, or 36 per cent of the non-farm labor force.

The "knowledge industry" is even bigger and more booming these days, with no signs of a letup, and the nature of the industry is changing radically. When Professor Machlup made his original estimates, he defined the knowledge industry in traditional terms—the educational system, the mass media, book publishing, libraries, and so forth. Today's knowledge industry is being reshaped by the possibilities of electronic storage and retrieval of information, using computers and other automated devices. Information-grids linking these devices are being formed every day; within the next half-dozen years a national information-grid, integrating these small grids, will be in place.

More and more, as a nation of fact-gatherers and distributors, the United States spills out this enthusiasm over its borders. The American share in the world's knowledge industry assures it a special role which is too big to ignore. Sixty-five per cent of all world communications originate in this country. This is matched by a long lead in the production of information. A rough but useful indicator of this, of course, is the well-documented disparity in research spending throughout the world. In dollar terms, the American effort is twice that of the Soviet Union, three times that of all of Western Europe and, in most of the rest of the world, the gap becomes a chasm.

This, in summary, is the environment in which America's role in the development of the world-information-grid will be played. The conditions which brought it to this long lead are varied, but they are largely the result of the increasingly sophisticated national com-

mitment to the "knowledge industry," reflecting the vision of the United States as a problem-solving society.

Nevertheless, our information lead has created problems overseas. A preview of this is found in the current debate over the "technological gap" between Europe and this country. This subject has many facets, but the one of most concern has been the heavy political overtone of the debate. The facts are shoved aside by the emotionally-charged image of an American technological monolith, moving in on "poor but honest" European hand-crafters. It is a caricature which combines political, economic, and cultural imperialism in one neat, unattractive package. More of it will be seen in the coming years, stirring up fear of American "domination" not only in Europe but in less affluent areas which are just beginning to grapple with this century's technology.

The output of our national knowledge industry is, of course, a tremendous resource. A problem occurs as this resource produces at a rate that is disparate with that of the rest of the world. If anything, the gap can be expected to widen in the coming years. America must examine this prospect and decide on a strategy to deal with it.

What, in fact, are the alternatives? The answer does not lie, in slowing down. With unresolved economic and social problems here at home and abroad, conscientious thinking should plan the role that United States information resources can play in strengthening the prospects for world stability.

This strategy will have to be adapted to a great variety of situations abroad. Information-transfer arrangements with an African country that has 90 per cent illiteracy, 200 college graduates, and almost no domestic communications will be quite different from those with Sweden and its total literacy and well-developed higher education system.

Western Europe and Japan present the most immediate opportunities for the world-information-grid. The Europeans and the Japanese are both increasingly sensitive to the importance of information storage and transfer network, similar to the one now evolving in this country.

The Europeans' success in this project will depend, in part, on their ability to modify a number of present restrictive attitudes. One is the lingering tradition of secretiveness in their research-and-development work. Another is the nationalistic inhibition in sharing regional information resources. It would be unfortunate if these

attitudes held up formation of the network, since Europeans, over the long run, cannot think in terms of "Italian research" or "Norwegian research" any more than they are able to make a distinction between research done in California or New Jersey.

There is every reason to encourage the Europeans to overcome these problems. The American information-transfer network should be linked directly into their regional system, permitting a broader exchange of information. This will not completely eradicate the mutual "technology gap" problems, which are based on other factors besides information transfer. It should, however, take everyone a long way towards equalizing the present imbalance of information resources, and certainly to lower the present level of tension on this subject.

If the Europeans and Japanese are strong in this area it will insure their continued domestic economic health, and make available their informational resources in the common effort to step up the developmental pace in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The most immediate prospects are in those developing countries which are approaching the point of economic and social take-off, ready to move from a subsistence economy towards full development. Success in this field depends largely on the skill with which they can apply information resources supplied by the grid to their local problems, whether it involves building an oil refinery or an elementary-school system. There has never been an opportunity to explore the role that full access to data resources could play in situations like this. The new grid opens up this possibility in ways that could dramatically affect development prospects in these take-off countries.

The situation is more complex in those countries which have no immediate hope for a take-off of any kind. It begins with a critical lack of managers and technicians trained to use information to handle the problems, from undercapitalization to overpopulation, in which they are enmeshed. Flooding them with facts and figures from the information grid could be worse than useless. They need telephones before they can use satellites; they need adding machines before they can use computers. And yet the grid has a role to play in these situations, if its facilities are used flexibly to supply data directly relevant to local conditions. Information systems can be adapted around these needs, with the ability to step up their capacity as the development process gains greater momentum.

Communist countries present another interesting challenge as the information grid develops. It is doubtful that the largest of them,

mainland China, will join the grid soon. The Soviet and the East European regimes will probably view the grid in a different light. There is no question that they will be interested in its benefits, but it is doubtful that they will want to contribute usefully to an exchange of data. The difficulty comes in their desire to pick-and-choose. They will want to share the technological data that will flow through the grid, but they will be less enthusiastic about making available to their people the grid's other products such as uncensored news and information about the outside world. The United States, in turn, needs to make it clear that it is prepared to share its information resources with them on the basis of reciprocity. The result could be a major contribution to our "bridge-building" efforts with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

These are some of the possibilities. Each deserves careful attention. However, the information grid does not give the chance to score easy international points. America's foreign prospects are not going to be magically improved by accelerated information-transfer techniques. The grid does not promise instant Utopia. What it does offer is the opportunity to bring human intelligence more directly to bear on major world problems.

During the next half-dozen years, the grid will be taking shape. How will it affect the ways in which America deals with the rest of mankind? The answer does not come easily, since this is both a quantum jump which is not merely an expansion in mechanical communications but an expansion in the psychological horizons of individuals all over the world.

Nevertheless, some effects of the information grid can be anticipated. One of them will involve America's diplomacy. Lord Palmerston may have been dismayed by the introduction of the telegram into diplomacy, but he might take some posthumous comfort in the fact that, over a century later, there has not been much progress beyond the telegram in our own diplomatic communications. Diplomatic information, as in Palmerston's time, is still stored on individual pieces of paper stuffed into files—or in the errant memories of men.

The information grid promises transformation of traditional diplomacy. At one level, it will make practical a system for collecting and storing all of the bits of factual information which form the raw material of diplomacy into computers for retrieval on command. The foreign-affairs expert's time can be devoted more profitably to

value judgments of the information at hand, rather than on time-consuming effort in collecting the information itself.

At another level, the information grid opens the possibility of direct sight-and-sound consultation between the State Department and its embassies. The prospect is no panacea: instantaneous communications do not guarantee instantaneous wisdom. But there are equal dangers in maintaining the pretense of leisurely diplomacy in today's world. Thomas Jefferson could complain mildly that he had not heard from one of his ambassadors for a year, but he lived in an era where only a half-dozen countries were important to America and where 90 per cent of the world's population had no influence on its interests. Today, any political event abroad has its seismic influence on American interests, and it is better knowing about it sooner than later.

Diplomatic traffic will be only a small part of the new grid's traffic. The grid will have an even greater effect on our foreign relations through its tremendous capability for allowing more men to trade more ideas across national boundaries than has ever been possible. The effects of this people-to-people contact are literally incalculable. If one lesson has been learned, it is the invincible tendency of the experts to underestimate peoples' desire to communicate, once the channels are open, for all kinds of purposes—from business deals to exchanging birthday greetings.

Although the United States will be only one of 100 or more nations in the grid, it has a special role in seeing that it develops in ways that serve these needs. One of these roles should be to insure that the grid is available to all nations and their citizens. In proposing the satellite communications network, the United States declared that it should be open to every nation belonging to International Telecommunications Union—58 nations share the ownership and operation of that satellite system. The same spirit of openness should pervade the information-grid.

The idea that the grid needs to be protected from censorship or "management" of information seems obvious to us. But there is a definite danger that other countries—not all of them Communist—may press for arrangements to screen unpleasant facts and ideas from the grid. The United States has had to argue against similar restrictions in international "freedom-of-information" agreements for many years. The new information grid should be rid of such censorship attempts.

The second area where the United States has an interest is in

assuring everyone that the grid serves public as well as private information needs. Most of the messages sent through the grid will be private, and most of these will be commercial. This is, of course, an important function of the grid. It will have a major influence on world commerce, and it will insure the economic health of the grid itself. But the grid should also be used to connect non-commercial information sources throughout the world. These include universities, libraries, and research institutes. The effectiveness of these institutions depends largely upon adequate access to information beyond their walls. No longer can any one school or library be a repository for more than a fraction of the data its students and researchers need. The new grid can give them this access on a world-wide scale through electronic interchanges with similar institutions.

This will not happen quickly, however, unless positive steps are taken to make it happen. The barriers involved are formidable, but the rewards are potentially too great to ignore. In the United States, it represents a challenge to its 2,000 universities and their allied institutions. The challenge is nothing less than expanding the spectrum of their scholarship to the entire world by receiving as well as contributing knowledge—a commonwealth of universities linked by electronics.

All of these prospects will affect America's world role in the 1970's in ways that one can only dimly perceive now. It is, however, clear that the United States' past tradition and future interests call for active American initiatives, both public and private, to assure the success of the world-information-grid. It could be one of our most innovative steps in strengthening the prospects of a peaceful world community during the next decade.

If governments grow more and more aware of the need for electronic bridge-building, TV's journalists have hardly neglected the need for international cooperation and understanding within their own profession. Since 1964, the Time-Life Broadcast Company and the Radio Television News Directors Association have cooperated in the planning and conduct of a series of meetings devoted to examining and establishing TV news standards. The involvement of Canadian newsmen gave the conferences an international cast from the outset, and the success of these earlier projects led to the First International Television News Directors Conference, held in Paris in October.

The aims of the Paris Conference, writes RTNDA Special Projects Committee member *Richard Krolik*

...were intentionally modest: to bring together for the first time on a semi-formal basis the responsible news executives from television systems and stations on both sides of the Atlantic; to compare the operations of their television news organizations, and to establish the basis for continuing discussions, designed to pave the way for possible exchanges of programs and ideas in the future. The objective was understanding.

After a keynote address by conference Chairman *Sig Mickelson*, various U.S. and European representatives to the conference delivered a series of papers describing the problems and practices of TV news presentation in their own lands. Excerpts from three of these statements are recorded below.

A 1935 graduate of Oxford, with a degree from Otago University in his native New Zealand, *GEOFFREY COX* served as a foreign correspondent with the *London News Chronicle* before joining the New Zealand Army in World War II. After the war he served as First Secretary to the New Zealand Legation in Washington. Later, he returned to the *News Chronicle* and rose to become assistant editor. When the Independent Television Corporation was formed in 1956, he was named Editor of its news bureau, ITN.

JEAN-LOUIS GUILLAUD has been Editor-in-Chief of television news in France since 1963. He began his journalistic career in 1953 as a reporter for *Paris-Jour*, and he worked for *France-Soir* and *le Nouveau Candide* before joining O.R.T.F. Mr. Guillaud was the producer of a series of historical films for television, *The Great Battles*.

DICK G. SIMONS is Chief Editor of Netherlands Television News. He has been a journalist since 1938, when he began as a staff reporter for the Amsterdam national newspaper, *Trouw*. In 1949 he shifted to broadcasting as editor for a radio current affairs program, and in 1951 he became Director of Television Programs for the Netherlands Christian Broadcasting Society. He has been Chief Editor of NTS since 1963.

TV NEWS IN EUROPE— THE STATE OF THE ART

GEOFFREY COX, JEAN-LOUIS GUILLAUD,
DICK G. SIMONS

BRITAIN

GEOFFREY COX

There are a number of distinct differences between British and American commercial television operations, and these influence the range and nature of our news activity.

It should be understood that the British commercial TV channel which I represent is entitled to broadcast only 50 hours a week. Since there is no morning and virtually no lunch-time TV in the United Kingdom, the time available for total news operation is evening time only. This limitation, of course, affects the economics of our operation, for we must meet the costs of news programming out of revenue derived from an extremely limited period of time.

Our networking arrangements, covering 13 areas in the United Kingdom, are better understood if one pictures 13 American states, each with a television station having a monopoly in that area. The main networking companies provide 32½ of the 50 hours of programming a week, and this is sold to the smaller regional companies. While the latter provide a few programs to the network, the bulk of the networking of the main programs is done by the four biggest contractors.

Independent Television News (ITN) is a specific program company owned by all the other program companies, and it carries prime responsibility for providing national and international news service. ITN's news programs are broadcast twice a day on weekdays: at five minutes to six in the evening and for half an hour at ten o'clock in the evening. Of course, in each area the regional companies

provide their own regional news, and ITN draws extensively on them for material for the national news. The regional companies have their own news-rooms, their own film crews, and their own video tape operations. And since—by tradition—the British viewer is greatly interested in United Kingdom news and less interested in foreign news, ITN draws heavily on the different regions.

A major similarity in British and American television news coverage is the absence of major integrated operations covering both hard news and news-in-depth in current affairs. The BBC has adopted the idea that a separate organization should handle hard daily news and instant news analysis. The news-in-depth programs—the type of program like *Twentieth Century*—has traditionally been done by distinct units within the organization which are closely co-ordinated with the BBC.

Within Independent Television, the main news-in-depth in current affairs and documentary programs are done by the program companies—that is by the contractors in different areas and not by ITN. ITN is responsible for providing the hard news and such immediate analysis and commentaries that fit into the half-hour, and it also covers major special occasions, such as the General Elections. The regional news is done by regional companies, each of whom puts on its program either immediately following the ITN in the early evening or at different times in the evening. One of the great successes of Independent Television has been the degree to which these regional newsrooms have proved successful, and have sunk deep roots in their communities. One of the main regions is Southern Television, which has been very active in news.

ITN is, I think, the only television news service in the world established by law—in this case an Act of Parliament. The Television Act of 1964 contains a ruling which stipulates that not only shall there be a sufficient amount of time for news, but that news must be given with due accuracy and impartiality. Clearly, this directive is a result of the great controversy over the establishment of commercial television in Britain in the 1950's. At that time Britain had no commercial radio. Commercial broadcasting came into being at one stride with the establishment of commercial television. It came into being at a time when it was resisted—as all such commercial enterprises are resisted—by the newspapers. Very rightly, the newspapers fought hard because they have taken a heavy hammering from the diversion of advertising to television.

One of the main arguments expressed by those who opposed the

advent of commercial TV was that news would automatically be distorted by commercial interests—that it would be given a biased slant in the interests of the advertisers and the people who own the stations. Therefore, it was thought necessary that proper restrictive measures be written into the Act, and in all program contracts is included the dictum that all news must be presented with due accuracy and impartiality. In practice there have been very few occasions in which the Independent Television Authority (the controlling body) has raised any question related to this restriction, for the obvious reason that any stricture which states, in effect, that one should produce one's news in accordance with decent journalistic principles is already incorporated into any journalist's code and purpose.

From the outset, ITN was up against very powerful competition from the BBC and its great prestige in the news field. ITN had to establish, above all, a reputation for accuracy and responsibility. It had to make sure that the viewer who listened and watched didn't do so simply with the feeling that he might get a good show. This kind of viewer would simply desert ITN for the big news nights on BBC. Our goal, then, was to establish a reputation for responsibility.

Although it is a separate company, ITN is also subsidiary company of the other program companies, and it has seven directors nominated by the companies in each area. I serve not only as Editor of ITN, but as a member of the board of the ITA. The ITA is like the American FCC, but has more power. It has the power, for example, to give detailed programming directions. Indeed it was as a result of programming directions from the ITA that the news was placed at ten o'clock at night. The Director General of the ITA normally attends the ITN board meetings, which is a sign of the importance which has always been given to news within the independent television channel.

Having heard the accounts of the lengthy amount of news which is broadcast in the United States—and the fact that a half-hour is regarded as a minimum for the major news report of the day—it may seem strange to think that until ITN came on the air there were certainly grave doubts as to whether the British viewer would take a half-hour of news in prime time.

There were two problems that ITN had to overcome in presenting a half-hour news program. There had to be more time on the air for the actual reporting and immediate analysis of news. There had been a great proliferation over the years in British television,

both in the BBC and ITV, of programs of analysis and programs of reporting-in-depth on the news not done by the daily news reports. When the matter came up for decision earlier this year, it was learned there were actually two minutes *less* than was devoted to the reporting of daily news in 1955. In fact, in 1955, there was a quarter hour of news at 10:45 P.M. and ten minutes of news earlier in the evening. Now it was down to just over 13 minutes of news at 8:55 P.M. and ten minutes at 5:55 P.M.

There seemed to be two ways to break out of this situation, which was hampering the entire operation of Independent Television News. Having no news-in-depth programs of our own in which people might stretch their wings a bit, ITN found it impossible to hold the kind of people of real calibre needed to make the report strong and effective. We suffered a drain of talent over the years, and one can now see among the number of major figures in British independent television many who started as newscasters with ITN. Seven or eight of these men are important figures today on BBC current affairs programs. We had to face this terrible problem of being unable to hold with us the kind of men who alone can give a news bulletin its real quality.

One of two things could be done. First there was the possibility of a second later news program to be put out at eleven o'clock at night. This was the line along which the BBC proceeded. They developed a very good program, *Twenty-four Hours*, which is designed to analyze and report in depth on major news stories that are running—not necessarily on that day but in that general time—and which they place in the evening ten-to-eleven o'clock time segment. ITN rejected this course of action on the grounds that it cut across the programs which the regional companies were doing—a very powerful argument against such a course of action.

We also considered the possibility of extending our main news to half an hour—to go on not at nine, but at ten o'clock. To go at nine P.M. was not advisable because it could not have held the audience at that very peak viewing hour for entertainment programs. We did decide to go at ten o'clock and extended the existing thirteen-minute bulletin to half an hour. In English commercial television terms, this means twenty-six-and-a-half minutes of news.

In order to attain our goal, we had to overcome two British viewing habits. The British viewer had for years been accustomed to getting his main news in mid-evening at either eight or nine—eight before the war, nine during the war. From the war onwards was

the great time for the BBC radio news. As television came along, radio took over the central role as the news provider for the country. Then radio went back to ten o'clock and television took over—both on the BBC and ITN—at around nine o'clock. So there was a strong viewing habit associated with mid-evening presentation of news. Second, the British viewer holds to the belief that you can get all the news you needed in a quarter of an hour. So if ITN was to break through into half an hour of news, it had to do something more than to just make a good program. It had to change the ingrained viewing habits of a large section of the population. Very few people inside Independent Television and in the press believed that this was possible. But ITN, contrary to all the expert advice that was available, went ahead.

I think we have proved our point. In fact, the half-hour news is simply the first stage on the way, and the hour news will be with us in the United Kingdom within three years. Astonished as some will be to hear that, this is the speed at which things will go. In spite of different sets of audience measurement, the BBC would not quarrel with the fact that the ITN news at ten has held the majority of the viewers. But whether it has the majority of the audience or not, what is important is that—taking the figures available to Independent Television—the audience for news at ten has been larger on the average than the audience for the entertainment programs that it replaced at that time. This is not as strong a statement as it seems, of course, because after ten o'clock in the evening in Britain, the main entertainment programming has ended. By 10:30 P.M. a lot of current affairs programs are carried. The period from 10:00 P.M. to 10:30 P.M. often held the lesser entertainment shows—vaudeville and light comedy shows—which were not the best of audience holders. The only thing that has licked the news in audience attraction are films that started at 10:00 P.M. Now this reveals a significant fact: there had been in existence a real public appetite for a longer news program. And whether done well or whether done badly, the public wanted this extra news time.

In production, ITN deliberately sought to make some link with viewer habits by using as a title the hackneyed picture of Big Ben—zooming in on the clock as Big Ben struck and giving headlines in between the strokes. We are going to give it up fairly soon because it is rather portentous and ominous. It is a fine opening if there is big, heavy news going, but when the news is not so heavy it gives the viewer the feeling that we are announcing the day of doom.

Whether or not it has been a factor in keeping the audience, it certainly has been valuable. Ten o'clock news also uses a two man newscasting team. It did not require the presentation of news from two cities, as with the *Huntley-Brinkley show*, but this two-man method was found very good for speeding up the delivery of the material. We also introduced into this program something that is not seen commonly in American network news shows—the studio interview. We have a conveniently-located Central studio in London, and are able to bring in people who are in the news. Politicians or public figures will come in and do a quick two-minute or three-minute interview which gives an extra dimension to our film coverage.

Altogether, there are 13 sound camera teams of our own based in London. There is one camera team operating out of Rome—working closely with our partners in UPITN in order to take advantage of their coverage over the world. The establishment of our half-hour news coincided, incidentally, with the merger of the syndication services of ITN and UPI. This gave us a very powerful weapon in getting the program underway, because we could draw on the worldwide resources which UPI employed. A very considerable flow of film has been coming into our building since the merger. In general, our film runs longer than on the average American network news shows. If there is a bit of good natural sound or natural film coverage, we let it roll.

Our work in presenting a half-hour program has taught us two lessons. The first is that the one thing that can kill part of any half-hour program is the “featurette.” News has to be, if anything, harder in a half-hour program. Everything must be pegged to hard news more than in the shorter bulletin program. When we did a 15-minute bulletin a piece of “soft” film of an animal at the zoo, or any light story, could be presented even without a hard-news edge. But the one element that produced a real deadness in the half-hour show was a carefully-prepared little featurette dealing with the effects of the Israeli-Arab war on the Jordan tourist trade. It was a beautifully-done report, but it didn't belong in a news program. The second thing we discovered was that there never seemed to be enough time on the air—especially in the first week—to fit in all the news. We intended to let some stories run too long, and discovered that our news values were getting terribly distorted. We were dropping stories and losing stories. The amount of material being cut at the last moment was catastrophic.

By the third or fourth day of our first week on the air, there was a feeling of having completely lost the way. Was it a news program, a feature program, or what? Many people who were giving advice on the sidelines said that one couldn't simply extend the news over half an hour. One must have a news segment and then a news-in-depth segment. Or one must have a news segment and then a discussion segment. Even some staff members held this view. But the only thing to do was to say each night: "there are now 26 and a half minutes of time here—a blank canvas—and it is our duty to produce the best possible news program we can." In doing this, we were forced to do very short stories of the kind that we never did before. We initiated two regular wrap-ups of about six or eight items each, all illustrated and all single sentence stories. Each one was illustrated with maps or stills, and the newscaster was not seen at all. In this way, we learned, the main volume of the news is covered and the big stories can still run. We have, in short, developed a formula that doesn't make every night a nightmare.

FRANCE

JEAN-LOUIS GUILLAUD

The *Office de Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française* has two important characteristics which are linked to each other.

First, it is a monopoly. In France there is only one television system. Second, the Government in France has retained, since the very outset, the right of monopoly for radio transmissions. This right has become relatively theoretical in view of peripheral stations—the radio stations set up at our borders. The government retains, however, an effective monopoly on television. Nevertheless, the O.R.T.F., which is the public office to which the monopoly is entrusted, has a fairly great independence—probably greater than is generally thought. Actually, apart from the fact that all the capital of O.R.T.F. belongs to the Government, the Government represents all of the shareholders and furnishes a royalty—that is, a tax which provides the major part of our revenues. The O.R.T.F. is organized as an industrial firm, with a Board of Directors, a President of the Board, a Director General—M. Dupont—and a certain number of responsible Directors representing different departments.

The O.R.T.F. was created by a law which allocated three main public service functions to it—the functions of news, education, and of entertainment. This is the first time the word "entertainment"

appears in legislation, at least in France. To execute its mission, the O.R.T.F. adopted an organization with four principal branches: television, radio (which, incidentally, represents 40,000 hours of broadcasting a year), technical services (which, for understandable financial reasons, are used by the two branches), and a totally original organization called the Delegation to Provincial Stations. This organization controls France's two TV channels. The first channel covers all of France and is received by all French viewers. The second, which is newer, is received by 60 per cent of the viewers in roughly 75 per cent of the nation.

Even though a monopoly exists, the fact that France is bounded by numerous countries enables all viewers in the frontier regions to see foreign television. Roughly ten per cent of our viewers can see television from Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Monte Carlo and Spain, plus television from the Anglo-Norman Isles of the English Channel. For 90 per cent of French viewers, however, only the program of the O.R.T.F. is available. This creates problems, because one cannot say that there are only advantages in operating a monopoly.

There are several interesting prospects in development in French television. The first prospect is the development of color. Since the first of October, the televised newsreel has been in color, and there are 15 minutes of color news broadcasting each day. France is the first of many nations in Western Europe to engage in color telecasting experiment. The main prospect, after the development of color, is the creation of a third channel which will be devoted primarily to cultural and educational programs. This will also be a 625-line channel, and it will carry both black-and-white and color programs. In a number of years, all three national channels will be on 625 lines, and all three will carry both black-and-white and color. At that time between 12,000 and 15,000 hours of television a year will be available for French viewers.

Newscasts on French television constitute exactly one quarter of program time—not including weather and sports. This represents a significant amount of time devoted exclusively to news. According to a French custom, responsibility for news at the O.R.T.F. is centralized; that is to say, all transmissions which are in general called News and Current Affairs are the final responsibility of only one person—M. Sablier.

Placing the responsibility for broadcasts so varied as daily bulletins, weekly magazines, special shows, discussions of all kinds, and

so on with the same organization has presented a certain number of problems. In the long run, however, we learned that the best way to use the relatively limited resources which have been granted to O.R.T.F. was to allow for versatility. As a result, both journalists and techniques are actually interchangeable, and are used for news, as well as, for example, current affairs. We consider such versatility as a real advantage.

Television news produces roughly 1,250 hours of programs a year, a quarter of which are done by the first and second channels. Each day French television produces two hours of news broadcasting in various bulletin forms. To this is added 15 minutes of provincial news, which is produced by 23 different provincial sections. The two hours which are nationally produced is designed to include 15 minutes in color, but at the moment, only seven to eight minutes of news are transmitted in color each day. The national staff is comprised of 300 people, half of which are journalists and cameramen, because in France the cameramen are journalists—with the same rights and the same duties as journalists. Some 150 technicians are permanently attached to the national news unit. When the need arises, other technical services from the general services of French television are called upon since our technicians are essentially film technicians, the supplemental specialists are in video.

The main problem created by this structure and concept is a tendency to reflect this central concentration in our news, which is both a strength and a great weakness. We do not want to be, simply because we are in Paris, the *Journal des Parisiens*. It is difficult to avoid this, however, because it is much more convenient to work at home than to work in a country which is 1,000 kilometers long and 1,000 kilometers wide. Nevertheless, O.R.T.F. tries to present the news bulletin for all Frenchmen. And it is obliged, on another level, to be the journal of all Frenchmen—since there is only one television system. We take in all classes, social classes, and levels of public opinion. The News program must appeal to everyone. And this presents problems for which there are no perfect solutions.

Each of our newscasts attempts to achieve balance and variety in terms of news sources. Our principal bulletin, aired at 8:00 P.M., lasts 30 minutes and includes 20 minutes of film. An average of eight subjects is covered, and the treatment of each is relatively long. The treatment will include slides, photographs, and maps, but the principal visual treatment is by film. Normally, three stories are shot in Paris or by the Paris staff. Two more stories are taken from

Eurovision or Intervision. One story comes from one of our provincial stations, for which they function as correspondents. One story comes from the agencies, and one communication is taken from one of our foreign bureaus, or from someone sent on a mission abroad. These are the sources we usually draw upon for our 8:00 P.M. newscast, which is France's principal news program. In relation to their content, stories selected normally follow this pattern: one on domestic politics, one on domestic social or economic matters, two on foreign politics, one on regional affairs, a sport news item, a sports story, and one on entertainment.

In order to bring all this together in Paris, we must deal with problems of liaison. For the future, these liaisons that are of greatest interest are satellite services. O.R.T.F. now uses as much as possible—and as much as it can afford—of the services of Early Bird. We also use the services of the Soviet satellite, Molnia, from time to time. In co-operation with other countries, some projects are in progress. French television is eagerly awaiting all the developments which could come about in the field of satellites. We employ extensive ground links with all the European countries of Eurovision, and are members of that system of exchanges which is a very original creation of Eurovision. Since elements of the Eurovision system to the east of France are in contact with Intervision, we are also offered maximum use of these possibilities as well.

Finally, we maintain a very close contact with our provinces, thanks to the radio relay systems which, like our railroad lines, all end in Paris. O.R.T.F. uses these resources a great deal in its newscasts at 1:00 P.M., 8:00 P.M., at midnight, and in all special circumstances. The sports people use them, too. This network is permanent, but it can be added in case of a need for temporary networks. This is done fairly frequently, and we can draw upon mobile units which are also used fairly easily. Consequently, O.R.T.F. circulates very widely within French borders, and even outside of France.

THE NETHERLANDS

DICK G. SIMONS

Europe, including the Western part of Russia, is approximately the same size as the United States, but with 680 million people, it has a much denser population. The population of the Netherlands, therefore, is also very dense in contrast to its land area. 12,600,000

inhabitants occupy 32,000 square kilometers, and half of those live in the small Western part.

In terms of telecasting time, television in the Netherlands also covers a small area. Even though the Netherlands Television Service is in its 17th year, it is still broadcasting in evening hours only—from 7 P.M. to 10:30 P.M. plus Saturday and Sunday afternoons. It is clear that its coverage must be as intense as the population of the Netherlands is compact.

N.T.S. operates studios and personnel for all broadcasters, and it also produces an important part of the programs. The news, of course, must strive for thoroughness and conciseness within this limited schedule. News transmissions occur for three minutes at 7 P.M., 16 minutes at 8 P.M. and five minutes between 10:15 and 10:45 P.M. The first two telecasts are carried simultaneously over two chains. About half of the news is home news, and this will involve stories of immediate day-to-day concern. The other half is foreign news, which may be a little dated if the film is interesting enough. Home news covers events of national importance only.

N.T.S. tries to visualize as much as possible since it feels that television news has its own place in the field of instantaneous mass communication. Seen from that angle, the product is imperfect for moving pictures do not always arrive as fast as news tapes. Since N.T.S. can also use satellites and the Eurovision News Exchange, this situation is improving every year. But we have a long way to go before we will be making complete use of both sources. Happily, the Dutch public is not too dissatisfied with this product. A recent audience survey revealed that 96 per cent of all viewers who can receive N.T.S. news watch it. This means that there is an audience of 50 per cent of all television viewers, or about five million people, for the main bulletin. No other program reaches such an audience size on average.

N.T.S. news is well-organized and, we believe, extremely efficient. Our sub-editors work on newstape, newsfilm and photographs, supervise the cutting of film, and write the news—both home and foreign. They also act as copy-editors for foreign news. The reporters go out with the camera crews to film news, conduct interviews, and so forth. They cut, write and narrate their own stories. They also act as news readers in the studio. The newsroom staff takes care of the information about all home news, distributes this to sub-editors and reporters and keeps the supervising editor informed. The directors

are responsible for transmission of the bulletin and advise the final editor about visualizing and technical possibilities.

The network is made up of 60 news correspondents, 146 still photographers, and 39 film-stringers. A continuous flow of written news-information scripts and production information is disseminated to everyone concerned each day. The studio floor (150 square meters) contains three Orthicon cameras, background projection, microphones and extensive lighting equipment. The video control room is staffed by a director, technical director and script girl. The sound engineer is in a separate booth. The camera control room has a lighting console and sub-titling equipment. It uses the double-band system with picture and sound reel with 16mm tape. N.T.S. prefers this double-band system, because it is faster to work on than striped material. Two Ampex 1100 Videotape machines enable us to assemble videotapes, especially those from the Eurovision News Exchange.

N.T.S. news operation includes neither film camera crews nor a lab. This work is covered by contract with a large company in Hilversum, called Telefilm. They make available an average of five film crews a day for our needs, at least three of these have lighting and sound equipment, as well as a film-processing unit. In the event there is need for more camera crews, ten or more are readily available. The record for one day is 15 crews in action. Our goal is to give the Netherlands the best possible news coverage, but our department receives only about five per cent of the overall N.T.S. budget. Therefore, it must deploy these funds as wisely as possible.

In attempting to reach our goal, N.T.S. has tried to match the current news programming standards of other European countries, and we attempt, along with other nations, to engage in critical editorializing. Germany, for example, has had for many years a Sunday morning program in which various foreign journalists debate a number of issues. They are completely free to say what they think, without interference. In the Netherlands a current affairs program regularly invites ministers, politicians and members of Parliament to a press center in the Hague for a live discussion program, lasting three-quarters of an hour. Journalists put rather critical—even unfriendly—questions to those who are willing to come and answer them. This is a program in which people trust. Anybody who is willing can state his case, and somebody is apt to lose, of course—especially at the time when we are trying to form a Cabinet, which is a very complicated business in our country.

Viewers can see this process in action, and are allowed to ask why various steps are being taken. After the Cabinet has been formed, the man who has formed it appears on television that same night and explains what he has been doing.

Another of our provocative programs deals with consumer goods—and reports the results of tests on value and prices. This is a very critical field, of course, because big things are at stake. Goods are tested as carefully as possible (a special organization does the testing) and in many cases they simply state a particular article—and they name it—is just no good, or too expensive. There have been a lot of pressures on this program, but somehow it manages to go on. One can understand that many people are not happy about it, but the format has not changed even though advertisements are now on television.

This is the system followed in the Netherlands. Since a number of broadcasters from different political and religious groups participate in our system, there is a fair chance that different opinions on most important matters will be expressed. It is up to the public to hear all views and make up their own minds. This is one of the great advantages of this system. Just as many Netherland newspapers have different opinions, so are different opinions expressed on radio and television. It is a good system, I think, even though there is no right of rebuttal in radio and television. But a new law is being framed. When it comes into effect next year, there will be some right of rebuttal.

In the long run, exchange between nations can be no more important than the depth and range of internal communications about the world within any single country. Many have raised hard questions over the level of American understanding of the outside world, and those who are most concerned about this matter feel that in this regard television has not done all it can. For this reason three organizations combined forces during the past winter to conduct a special conference on ways in which U. S. TV coverage of world affairs—particularly the role of emerging nations—might be improved.

Sponsors of the conference, held at Endicott House, in Dedham, Massachusetts, were the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Foreign Policy Association, and the World Peace Foundation. The aims and recommendations of the Conference are set forth in a report prepared by World Peace Foundation President, Max Millikan, and Stephen White. Their statement, together with some of the preliminary papers prepared for the discussions, are included herewith. Readers who would like to receive copies of the other nine preliminary papers may write to the World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston, Mass., 02108.

Conference participants were Robert E. Asher, the Brookings Institution; Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Davis B. Bobrow, Oak Ridge National Laboratory; Leo Bogart, American Newspaper Publishers Association; The Hon. Frank M. Coffin, US Court of Appeals; Lester Cooper, American Broadcasting Company; W. Phillips Davison, Columbia University; Fred Freed, National Broadcasting Company; David C. Fulton, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Theodore Geiger, National Planning Association; James Grant, Agency for International Development; Hartford N. Gunn, Jr., WGBH; Samuel Hayes, Foreign Policy Association; Alfred O. Hero, Jr., World Peace Foundation; Harold Isaacs, M.I.T.; Eugene I. Johnson, Adult Education Association; Joseph Johnson, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Milton Katz, Harvard Law School; John W. Kiermaier, WNDT; William Kobin, National Educational Television; Richard Krolik, Time-Life Broadcast, Inc.; Elmer W. Lower, ABC; Louis Lyons, WGBH; Robert E. McDonald, Foreign Policy Association; Sig Mickelson, Time-Life Broadcast, Inc.; Max F. Millikan, M.I.T.; Henry Morgenthau III, WGBH; Arthur D. Morse, International Broadcast Institute; Ithiel de Sola Pool, M.I.T.; Robert C. Richter, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; John P. Robinson, University of Michigan; Arthur Singer, Education Development Center; James W. Swinehart, University of Michigan; Stephen White, Education Development Center; Carroll L. Wilson, M.I.T., and Frederick Yu, Columbia University.

TV AND EMERGING NATIONS

MAX F. MILLIKAN, STEPHEN WHITE

What goes on within the emerging nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America, where two-thirds of the world's population is to be found, is of enormous consequence to the people of the United States. The struggle for power and influence that is mounting throughout the low-income world will affect us profoundly. We may be able to avoid future military commitments on the scale and intensity of our Vietnam involvement. But there will be repeated grave risks of Soviet-American confrontation, and in time as China gathers military and industrial strength there will be equally grave risks of hostilities with this new force. And perhaps even more often the consequences will be not so much the dangers of global warfare as interruptions of the orderly relations among states upon which the economic, social, and moral welfare of all of us increasingly depends.

MAX F. MILLIKAN received a Ph.D. in Economics from Yale in 1941. He has written and edited three books on economics of emerging nations, and on United States foreign policy toward these nations. Presently he is Director of the Center for International Studies at M.I.T. and the President of the World Peace Foundation.

STEPHEN WHITE has had a long and varied career in television—at CBS, as author of the report on the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television, and as TV specialist at the Educational Development Center.

Simply by reason of our own military and economic power, decisions taken by the United States will have some real influence, for better or for worse, upon the manner in which relationships among the emerging and the developed nations take shape. In this country, committed as it is to the democratic process and to some degree of popular participation in major decisions, effective public policy on these issues requires a general awareness of the problems that are brought into being by the emergence of the under-privileged nations, and of the range of actions that can be advanced toward the solution of those problems. A certain large part of the general public must be prepared to support the White House and the Congress before either of those two branches of government can move ahead freely and sapiently. This is all the more true in time of turmoil, when almost any decision will be in its immediate consequences a distasteful decision, to be borne only if its long-term consequences are also appreciated.

In television, there is at hand such an instrument which appears to possess the required power to meet with wisdom and with restraint the recurrent crisis. Yet television, at this time, plays almost no part in informing the public with regard to such matters. The story that is told is almost always the story of catastrophe, real or impending, relieved now and then by an occasional story of victory over catastrophe. This is not a peculiarity of television, for it applies to almost all the daily press. The difference, however, is that the daily press is only one small portion of the total press, as with only a few significant exceptions it is practically all there is of commercial television journalism: one either "makes" one of the major news programs on the three commercial networks or one has made no entry into commercial television journalism. Educational television has been making an increasingly valiant effort to provide deeper and more interpretive news treatment, but it has not possessed the funds to begin to explore the potential of this medium especially in the foreign affairs field, and its audience remains limited.

So far as the general public is concerned, and even so far as thoughtful students of political and social trends are concerned, television provides little useful information with regard to international affairs. The underlying causes of the recurring crises are rarely explored in that medium; the forces building up toward future crises are rarely exposed so that the public may be prepared for the next shock; no account is given of what might be done to avoid or alleviate those crises, or of what in fact is being done or

left undone, nor what the significance of one event or another may ultimately be for our own country and for the world.

Considerations such as these have for some time concerned the various academically linked institutions concerned with foreign affairs. The concern was particularly healthy in that we all recognized that the shortcomings were not entirely attributable to television, for if the television journalist did not appear overly anxious to meet what we considered the pressing needs of our own small community (and hence of the nation), it was demonstrable that academics did not commonly exert themselves to meet the equally real and equally pressing needs of the television journalist (and hence of the nation). Since we did recognize a kind of rough symmetry in the situation, it appeared to some of us that a direct confrontation of the two parties might be most useful and perhaps highly productive. That is what the Endicott House Conference was designed to achieve.

It is well worth stating at the outset that the meeting was a harmonious one. That was by no means confidently predictable. Academics are presumed to be wedded to the truth, but what appears to the academic to be the "truth" may well appear to the non-specialist to be a highly partisan viewpoint; what the scholar regards as "disseminating knowledge" can be viewed from the outside as "naked propagandizing." This kind of thing is at its most critical when the other party to a dialogue is a journalist, for he will be quick to resent any pressure he may feel exerted upon him to act as errand boy for a single and a particular point of view.

The possibility of this kind of disharmony was high, for the academic participants appeared to believe almost unanimously (or perhaps unanimously—no poll was taken) that the best interests of the United States call for massive and continuing economic assistance to the emerging nations; journalists are well aware that no such unanimity is to be found outside the academic community.

Nor did the journalists, for their part, devote any great effort to a defense of their past activities in the field under discussion. All the parties were quite willing to concede that there were grave basic problems involved in any attempt to make widespread use of material from emerging countries on television newscasts: the academics did not feel aggressive about the matter, nor the journalists defensive. A sampling of relevant documentaries from all three major networks and from National Educational Television was viewed during one of the sessions, and it was agreed that as one

might expect there was much to praise and much to criticize in each. It was evident that the real problem was elsewhere, epitomized in the fact that the networks were obliged to ransack their libraries to provide the extremely small sample that was made available.

At Endicott House, the problem of dis-harmony between the academics and the journalists was seen not as one of conflict between academics and journalists but as one of neglect of each group by the other. The television journalists complained not that academics were hostile but rather that they did not take television journalism as professionally serious. Many professors do not even watch such serious programs that relate directly to their expert concerns. The academics, for their part, felt that while their advice was occasionally sought on specific programs, they were seldom if ever consulted on television news strategy or broad issues of programming.

Some of the reasons for this lack of intimate contact emerged from such elements of dissidence as appeared within the fine structure of the association. These were not peculiar to the matter of the emerging nations. The journalists went to some pains to point out, not without some pleasurable malice, that their principal problem in dealing with academics lay in the general sense of disrespect that academics display in regard to one another, expert advice frequently being accompanied with the adjuration that it was unreasonable to expect anyone else's advice to be quite as expert, or even reasonably correct. The journalist, by the nature of his responsibility, feels an obligation to seek out counter-opinions; the academic who has been first consulted looks upon this as unnecessary at best, and a betrayal at worst. This is, of course, something of a caricature, but not so much so as to leave the academic entirely comfortable.

The general complaint of the academics was somewhat less *ad hominem*. It referred to the manner in which television journalism tends to be arrayed. With few exceptions (most of those being television's equivalent of *belles lettres*), television news falls into three classes. The first of these is represented at its best by the evening programs such as those presided over by Walter Cronkite and Huntley-Brinkley. Another kind of "hard news" program is the "instant special," which is essentially a 30-minute or one-hour expansion of a story of such importance or interest that the regularly scheduled program clearly was unable to do justice to it in its constricted time period. Finally, there is the documentary, a major set-piece which is likely to take months or even years in production and which therefore ordinarily deals with large subjects on a large scale.

The notion was advanced that the gap between hard news in its two forms and the documentary was so wide that it eliminated much useful information and much illuminating coverage. It did not leave room for a television equivalent to the "backgrounder" or the news analysis in reasonable depth. Thus the hard news might carry a few minutes on the gold drain upon the day when Treasury announced a large loss of gold and, if the loss was staggering in extent, an "instant special" might devote 15 minutes to the subject. At the other extreme, a documentary is no doubt even now in progress on the intricacies of balance of payments equilibria. But there is little attempt to provide a kind of running account of the whole problem, in which from time to time an attempt might be made to state what it all means, how it is all going, and what its implications might be.

To the specialists in emerging nations, this news gap proved to be extremely trying. It meant that the heart and soul of the American relationship with emerging nations was unrepresented on television, and that the American people were left simply unaware of its steady, day-to-day progress, and its cumulative effect in those countries where it could be demonstrated to be effective.

To this complaint the response of the television journalists was straightforward. They were candid enough to concede that it would at all times be difficult to get such programs on the air, for these programs carry neither the mass appeal of the instant special nor the prestige of the set-piece documentary. Within limits, however, such programming was not to be entirely ruled out. But it would require a far closer association between the academic world and the television world than any that now generally existed. It would be necessary, on the one hand, to set up some kind of formal mechanism by means of which the television journalist would recognize the opportunities for such programming and would be able to embark upon the preproduction stage with some kind of confidence. It would be necessary, on the other hand, to set up a different formal mechanism by means of which there would grow up within television itself a body of journalists who would themselves be alert to opportunities and possibilities for such programming.

Most of the conclusions reached at the conference were directly relevant to these two principal themes. The journalists asked the formation of an "expert service" by the academics within the particular disciplines represented at the conference, to which the television journalist could turn whenever he was called upon to produce

judgments that bore upon the emerging nations. Such an expert service would have to possess certain characteristics if it was to be serviceable. It would have to possess, above all, the capacity for instant response at any hour of night and day, for unless it was plugged into the hard news it would lack status within television itself. It would have to be reliable, not in the sense that it always provided the right answers, but in the more important sense that it made it known when there was no "right" answer, or when there was dispute about the nature of the "right" answer. Above all, it could not be condescending. It would have to recognize that the world of television exists within its own special environment, to which it is obliged to conform. The conference agreed also on the desirability of formal and informal seminars, and even upon the creation of fellowships, after the pattern of the Nieman fellowships, for television journalists.

Somewhat more interesting was the agreement among network journalists that production of acceptable programs would constitute only part of the battle; the rest would be the struggle to get them on the air. Networks produce programs, but so far as program use is concerned their writ runs only as far as the handful of stations each network is empowered to own and operate. Affiliated stations are free to use or to reject the programs. At present documentaries that are produced with somewhat more attention to popular demand (real or fancied) than those the conference envisaged are likely to be rejected by one-half the network. Programs of the sort under consideration here, low in television audience appeal and almost always unsponsored, would have a far higher rejection rate and would in all likelihood be simply ignored by most independent stations and even by operating groups of stations which by and large have higher standards of performance.

The journalists therefore urged the academics to give more attention to their relations with local stations. In a college or university city, the professor has a certain amount of prestige which he can usefully exploit by calling the attention of the local station manager to his desires and the possibility of his support. In a discreet sort of way, this mildly stated challenge constituted an invitation to the academics to put up or shut up; since academics are naturally reluctant to shut up, it may be that the challenge will bear fruit.

There were other matters in which the participants expressed interest: the initiation of joint audience-research ventures by the

academic and the television worlds, the assistance of the academic world in helping gather audience for meritorious public affairs programming, and analysis of television coverage and content in professional periodicals. It was a matter of some surprise to the academics that the journalists were so eager that their efforts be subjected to academic comment and criticism. But it is surely comprehensible enough when it is recognized that the journalists themselves are serious men and women aware that they are engaged in a serious pursuit, reaching incredibly large audiences and rarely hearing from any of them. It is curious that the television journalist is at once the most exposed and the most isolated of all journalists; he does not possess even the instrument of feedback that is represented for the print journalist by captious letters to the editor.

On the whole, there was relatively little discussion of technology. Recognition was accorded the fact that developments in storage and retrieval systems for television signals might well relieve television of its dependence upon the huge one-shot audience, leaving it free for the first time to build its audiences for a given program over time, as books, movies, and the legitimate theater ordinarily do. The program producer will, thus, be able to benefit from the gradual spread of critical information to the various elements of the audience most likely to be interested in the subject matter of the program. But the technology of television was not fully explored.

Before the conference came to an end, non-commercial television had begun to concern the participants more and more deeply. So far as the past is concerned, there was general recognition of the efforts that have been made by educational television to produce and circulate documentaries of the sort envisaged by the conference. There was little feeling, however, that the academic world had played any significant role in the preparation of such programs. They had rather been involved as actors performing accustomed classroom roles or as rather casual consultants on specific topics. The kind of relationship was absent in which a qualified expert was able to share in the planning of a program, or was called in as a serious critic of content. Perhaps more seriously, the entry of the expert was inserted after most decisions about the program had been taken; he was seldom concerned with the establishment of program priorities, or with long-term design of program policy. It was only by means of those more ample relationships that a significant symbiosis between academic and television worlds could be established—so, at least, most of the participants appeared to believe.

This ambivalence toward TV—a general feeling of respect for its efforts coupled with broad qualifications concerning its past performance—led the participants to converge on an expression of great hopes for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. It was felt that through some formal association between the academics and the Corporation the documentary gap might be filled. Above all, it was the Corporation that was most likely to have the air time that would permit serious subjects to be attended to on a regular basis, without necessarily awaiting catastrophe as a spur to coverage.

But the participants from the commercial networks made it clear that there was no intention to throw the burden for this kind of journalism entirely upon Public Television. For one thing, it was abundantly clear that the pride of craft that existed among television journalists would not permit them to give over this journalistic field of enterprise or any other to non-commercial television. They clearly believed that they too, would benefit substantively from the closer association of the academic world with Public Television, since this would also be a closer association with television *tout court*.

There was, of course, some fear that the networks would be only too happy to see public affairs television pre-empted by the non-commercial system, leaving them free to abandon that field of enterprise in favor of cultivating more profitable territories. One working group went so far as to state explicitly that support for Public Television was not intended to imply any relief of the pressure on commercial television for quality journalism.

From all these positions regarding Public Television, there was not a single dissent expressed. The feeling of the participants was as clear as it could be made: Public Television in itself is likely to become (under the proper circumstances) the best means of informing a general public concerning the verities and the dubieties of the emerging nations, foreign economic assistance, American foreign policy, and a great deal else of moment within that area of present-day political affairs. Public Television is, moreover, likely to be a most useful and perhaps an essential intermediary in any dialogue between experts in this field and commercial television. No participant, when the meeting convened, would have dared make either of those statements; they took shape during the discussion and ended by impressing themselves upon all of us.

Our own field of vision, during the meeting, was by design a narrow one: we had our eyes fixed upon those matters which fell

within our own areas of expertise. It seems that in a sense we transcended our own purposes. The potential in a close association between scholars and Public Television extends far beyond the bounds of foreign economic affairs; it is something that might be taken seriously within any discipline that deals directly with matters in which a public awareness is necessary. One hopes, in short, that real links between the academic world and the Corporation for Public Television can be forged, hoping also that Public Television will, as it develops, take on a form that makes such links possible. In this context closer links of a somewhat different sort also appear both feasible and inviting to both parties—that is, between university people and the commercial networks. So far as the meeting itself was concerned, the prospects could hardly be more encouraging.

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WORLD AFFAIRS AND THE TV AUDIENCE

JOHN P. ROBINSON, JAMES W. SWINEHART

INTRODUCTION

The first section of this paper reviews some general notions about mass audiences derived from findings of previous research on mass communications. We then review some quantitative data on the size of typical audiences for news content in the various mass media and the extent to which such audiences are stratified by educational level. From this, we turn to the kinds of news material that may or may not reach various segments of the public. The roles that personal sources of influence (e.g., friends, family) and future developments in the mass media will likely play in this picture are then examined. Finally, we summarize some implications of all the previous material for the uses of television in the diffusion of world affairs material.

In its 30 years of existence, the field of mass communications research has hardly had time to develop into a fully integrated area of scientific inquiry. Nevertheless, some findings have appeared with enough consistency and regularity to be accorded serious consideration. Five of these seem particularly relevant to the topic of this paper:

The personal contacts within a person's immediate milieu generally have more influence on his beliefs and attitudes (especially deep-rooted attitudes) than do the mass media.

Historically speaking, the quality that has moved any communication medium into the "mass" category is its conveyance of superficial rather than serious news matter.

Subtlety and implicit arguments are less effective than straightforward explicit appeals in changing audience attitudes and beliefs.

Those members of a mass audience who are already best informed and most interested in a topic are most likely to pick up information on that topic conveyed through the mass media. But just as

important is the reverse: those people who are relatively uninformed and uninterested (usually the vast majority for any given topic, such as foreign affairs) are likely not to encounter such information in the media or, if they do, are likely to "tune out."

The content of prime-time television programs reflects the mentality of the average American better than any other mass medium. The typical citizen finds bread-and-butter issues far more relevant than almost any news about national or international affairs.

It would be inaccurate to give the impression that such findings do not require considerable qualification. Not one of them is known at a level of detail sufficient to adequately explain the processes through which media information is absorbed (or perhaps more appropriately, not absorbed) by the public. Some of the above findings are derived from studies of captive audiences, usually college students, far brighter and better informed than the average American.

We should make clear at the outset that this paper is concerned not with the effects of day-to-day presentations of news events (on which the present media do a remarkable job, given their practical constraints) but with their cumulative impact on mass audiences over time. Our primary assumption is that adequate comprehension of international events requires an understanding of the abstract and complex concepts employed by the media to convey news most efficiently. While television has made tremendous strides in giving international events more visual impact on the public, it is impossible for a TV broadcast to fill in the large information gaps that still exist in public perceptions of the world. Consider the difficulty of trying to convey an understanding of a shift in cold-war alliances, such as has happened between Russia and China, to an audience only half of whom know that China has a Communist government and that the current Chinese seat in the United Nations is held by the government of Taiwan—or at least of quarter of whom were unaware in 1964, after three years of U.S. aid to Vietnam, that we had armed forces there.

Thus when we note that the *New York Times* devotes five times as many words to a major international news story as does a TV network news broadcast, we are trying to make the point that, while "a picture may be worth a thousand words," no number of pictures can provide an adequate context for understanding international news to the uninformed viewer. The individual viewer may see the King of Greece arrive at the Rome airport but have no idea what he really represents or even why he's there. Nor can the TV news

program afford to alienate its more interested and knowledgeable audience by repeating information needed by its less aware viewers.

Most available research fails us badly with regard to long-range considerations of media impact. Many studies on mass communications deal with the impact of a single film or program about a topic of little importance to the audience. Almost nothing is known about the long-range or in-depth effects of the media, and in this state of near-vacuum the pronouncements of a Marshall McLuhan can often gain unwarranted acceptance.

MASS MEDIA CONTENT AND AUDIENCES

Our focus is on the information conveyed by television. However, TV functions in an informational environment with other media, which both supplement and compete with information conveyed on television. On an average day television reaches the same proportion of Americans as do newspapers (about 80 per cent of the U.S. population); about 65 per cent listen to radio sometime on an average day, but only 16 per cent read a magazine.

However, as a news medium, television's role is far less impressive. While news is a prominent feature of good (but not prime) TV time, TV as a news source falls to third place on the average day, behind newspapers and radio. Less than half of the population watches a TV news program on an average day. Moreover, TV functions mostly as a headliner; a hot news story on television is given 175 words perhaps one-fifth the length given to the same story on the front page of the *New York Times*. TV news producers and editors have to assume that the viewer interested in more detail or background can find this in the printed media.

Studies of media usage generally find that the best-educated and most literate segments of the population rely far more on the printed media than on the broadcast media. However, in magazines—the most “demanding” of the media in terms of reading skill, personal effort, and news content—only a small proportion of the total non-advertising space is devoted to news of any kind; and of course, not all news deals with foreign affairs. Even within a news magazine such as *Time* or *Newsweek*, where world affairs articles constitute less than one-fifth of the magazine's news content, such articles comprise probably the least engrossing reading for the average subscriber. Nevertheless, magazines (or in some cases, books) are the most likely source of the background material for the person interested in an interpretation of world events.

Newspapers devote a much smaller proportion of their space to world events than do news magazines, although there is wide variation between the *New York Times* and the *Decatur Democrat*. Most of the space given to foreign affairs in the average newspaper concerns actual hostilities or potential armed conflict between nations, with little interpretive treatment or background. Consistently, readership studies show that the public would not mind if even less space were devoted to international matters. A parallel finding holds true for actual readership of foreign affairs stories in the paper, i.e., the per centage of newspaper space devoted to world affairs is far larger than the per centage of readers who read these articles. People who do read newspaper stories about international affairs are likely to read about them in magazines as well.

The medium most affected by television is now approaching the end of its initial period of readjustment. Radio is still popular among the TV isolates, those few who are too poor to have access to TV and those fewer still who feel too sophisticated to own one. Like television, however, its major news function is to provide headlines which, unlike television, it does at almost any time of the day or night. Radio's major non-advertising function is now as background, especially musical background.

Television, the latest and largest medium (in terms of time the average American spends with it), devotes precious little time to critical examination and analysis of world events. However, when it does focus on serious matters, TV appears to score highly. A prime-time interview with Walter Lippman—which may draw only ten per cent of the available audience—appears in the same number of living rooms as an average issue of *Time*, and many of these viewers probably don't read news magazines.

On the other hand, exposure does not constitute communication. News stories which receive prominent attention on prime-time television may be scarcely perceived by the public at large. Even Presidential addresses on television, preempting prime-time shows on all networks and dealing with as vital a topic as nuclear disarmament, are recognized or recalled by only about half of the adult population a month after they are given.

Educational television was instituted to more fully realize the informational potential of the television medium. Unfortunately, educational television (ETV) has limited reach outside major urban areas, and even in the cities its programs do not fare well in terms of audience size (usually well under five per cent of the total TV

audience for programs broadcast in prime time). Data from a Harris Survey indicate that in New York, where ETV is on a standard VHF channel, regular viewers of educational TV (the approximately 20 per cent who use it at least once a week) tend to be highly educated. These regular ETV viewers are seven times as likely to watch a program on ETV as the average commercial TV viewer. It is estimated that the Public Broadcast Laboratory is currently drawing only about one per cent of the total Sunday evening viewing audience.¹

We have sketched the approximate numbers of people who may use the various media and the likelihood that they will encounter material dealing with international affairs. Two further elements are needed to put these data into proper perspective. The first deals with the educational background and attitudes of those who use the medium; these are discussed in some detail below.

The second consideration may be just as important: how does one become involved in the use of a medium? Some communications researchers feel that TV and newspaper use involves casual choice of content whereas magazine or book reading reflects a more deliberate choice. We suggest a different division, with book reading and TV viewing in the category of deliberate choice of content, and magazines and newspapers in the category of casual choice of content. With books and TV, the consumer knows what he's getting into; the magazine reader may also, to a lesser extent, and the newspaper reader to a still lesser extent. However, we still need to know how much TV viewing is planned by the viewer in advance on the basis of *TV Guide* listings, newspaper TV listings, ads for specific programs, or simple recall of the times at which certain regular programs are broadcast. An individual may actively seek programs of interest,² may just tolerate those which happen to appear on a channel he is watching, or may actively avoid certain kinds of programs. We feel this choice-vs.-chance viewing distinction is extremely important in trying to set realistic expectations for enlarging the audience for foreign affairs programs. If any sizable proportion of viewing is unplanned, this will obviously limit the payoff one might expect from listings and ads and "promos" used in advance of specific programs.

EDUCATIONAL COMPOSITION OF MEDIA AUDIENCES

One common rule of thumb about mass media audiences is that the educational composition of the audience is directly reflected in

the size of the audience. The smaller the audience, the more likely its members are to be relatively well educated. Thus the relatively small audience for general news magazines is indicative of their appeal to the better-educated; this proposition is equally true when applied to the less popular TV network documentaries and panel discussions. People who have not attended college comprise the large majority that greatly determines television content. When exceptions occur, they are obvious. For example, the idea of extending daily network news programs to 30 minutes came from network executives, not from audience demand. Attempts to extend such coverage to a full hour have apparently been blocked by fear that this would diminish audience size and advertising revenue.

It seems that not much further can be said about mass media audiences without first dividing the population into at least four segments:

The *mass majority* comprises one-half to two-thirds of the population, mainly those with less than a high school education. There appears to be no plausible way to significantly raise the information levels of this group. They have minimal interest in world affairs, an interest that becomes active only during war or threat of war. Their views on international matters, to the degree that they are articulated, are probably quite isolationist, perhaps in response to their own relatively unfavorable position in society. In terms of the distinction made in the previous section, they are most likely to be "avoiders" of international news in the media. Only a very few read news magazines or actively seek out such items in the newspaper. More of them would rather see their newspaper devote less (rather than more) space to foreign affairs. While they say that television provides them with most of their information about what is going on in the world, they are no more likely to watch TV news than their more affluent fellow citizens who watch far less TV. Moreover, few of them say that news programs are among their favorite television fare. The chief reason for this is clear: the emphasis in their lives is on the problem of just getting by from one day to the next.

The relatively better educated *peripheral mass*, comprising 20-40 per cent of the population, are largely free of the economic and other personal burdens of the mass majority. They are more likely than the majority to become aware of certain non-crucial world events but not many. Thus information related to a specific topic of interest, such as foreign aid, may be absorbed; a news item's chance is considerably less if it does not concern such a topic. The peripheral mass favor foreign aid to the extent that it represents anti-Communism. They are definitely more interested in foreign affairs than the mass majority, and this is reflected in their media habits. However, they are far less aware of the full international situation than the two groups described below. They might be characterized as "tolerators" of international news programs.

The *non-elite educated* audience—mainly college graduates comprising about 10 to 25 per cent of the population—has the intellectual background to gather in the background of most international news events and to absorb them. For example, this group probably understood the Sino-Soviet split within a month of the first related news stories, whereas many in the previous groups may have perceived only dimly that Russia and Red China were active partners in the first place. The non-elite educated are most likely to be aware of and *support* the administration's position on an international issue (e.g., they were more likely to back both the Korean and Vietnam wars than the less-educated). Unlike the next group, they are unlikely to question seriously the government's interpretation of news events or to see poverty as a more important world problem than Communism. They are far more likely than the previous groups to supplement broadcast news with printed media information and to consider printed media sources as more important to them. In fact they (and the following elite group) comprise just about the only news magazine audiences and the only segments wanting more stories dealing with foreign affairs in the newspaper. In general, although they watch considerably less television, they are as likely to view a daily TV news show as the less-educated heavy viewers. They also are more likely to claim television news shows among their favorite programs, but their program preferences remain, for the most part, lightweight.

The *educated elite* comprise less than one per cent of the population, but account for almost all of the relevant foreign affairs "activity" in this country. This group is likely to get first-hand information from foreign travel, to be voracious consumers of high brow printed information about world affairs, to have friends who are influential in some phase of government policy-making, and to write letters to magazines and newspapers regarding foreign affairs. Specifically included under this heading are professors, social commentators, journalists, business leaders, and political party influentials. Although they make up the bulk of the articulate anti-television segment of the population, their busy schedules allow little time for television anyway. It is not realistic to expect even half of this group to see a documentary program aimed specifically at a topic of interest to them. Distrust of the orientation of the show, competing personal plans or problems, reading, or work-related activity all tend to decimate the viewing ranks of this group. Those who do view a program, however, are more likely to stimulate public discussion. This group is most likely to catch subtle or implied arguments in a TV presentation, to rationally question a program's interpretation of news events, and to be disturbed by arguments directed at the mass audience.

To review graphically the relative magnitudes of the various groups, we have:

1. Mass Majority	2. Peripheral Mass	3. Non-elite Educated	4. Educated Elite
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In Table 1, we have outlined some rough quantitative estimates of the likely media habits of these four groups. The differences in magazine usage are perhaps the most dramatic feature of the table. Differences, although far less significant, appear in the usage of newspapers, radio, and television—especially for news.³

TABLE I: APPROXIMATE MEDIA USAGE FOR EACH OF THE FOUR AUDIENCE GROUPS

<i>Per cent of U.S. Population Which:</i>	<i>Mass Majority (50-60%)</i>	<i>Peripheral Mass (20-40%)</i>	<i>College Grads (10-25%)</i>	<i>Elites (¼%)= (100%)</i>
Read any non-fiction books in the last year	5	15	30	50
Read one issue a month of <i>Harpers, National Review</i> etc.	½	2	10	25
Read an issue a month of <i>Time, Newsweek</i> or <i>US News</i>	5	10	45	70
Read one issue a month of <i>Look, Life</i> or <i>Post</i>	25	50	65	30
Read a daily newspaper	70	80	90	95
Read <i>New York Times</i>	1/5	½	5	50
Read national or international news first in paper	10	20	30	50
Want more foreign news in paper	10	20	30	50
Listens to radio daily	60	70	85	?
Hears radio news daily	50	60	65	?
Uses television daily	80	75	65	?
TV news	45	45	45	?
TV favorite news medium	60	35	20	?
News favorite TV show	5	15	30	50

This characterization of population differences is, of course, quite arbitrary and over-simplified and must remain so in light of the scarcity of relevant research material. The reader should not interpret our crude illustrative typology as a statement that only ten per cent of the population knows what's going on in the world or that most Americans are incapable of forming rational international opinions. Rather it has been our purpose to suggest how unrealistic it is to treat all segments of a mass audience as equal entities. The fact that advertising and marketing personnel have begun to look at audiences in this differentiated fashion may have drastic repercussions on media content in the years ahead, especially for television. The criterion of success for an ad will no longer be the number of sets on during the commercial or even the number of people who *see* the ad, but rather those who see it and are *motivated* by it to go out and actually *buy* the product. In line with this, television producers should devote some effort to defining what parallel effects on citizen *behavior* (letter-writing, voting, arranging speakers for meetings, etc.) are expected from television programs on world affairs.

We should also note that by emphasizing educational background, the above typology disregards important audience differences deriving from such factors as age, sex, race, and geographic location. Younger adults, probably because of greater concern with career and family, are less informed and interested in world affairs than older adults—even though the younger tend to be better educated. Similarly, women, Negroes, and Southerners are also far less interested in, and less informed about, world affairs.

WHO GETS WHAT MESSAGE

By its nature, narrative accompanying the television pictorial display can convey far less analytic information per unit of time than printed media. The script for a half-hour documentary can be read by a knowledgeable person in the subject area in less than ten minutes. Moreover, the viewer does not have the opportunity to check a point which he has missed. For these reasons, when aiming at all but the fourth (or elite) group in the audience typology described above, it would be well to concentrate on making no more than two or three major points in a TV program, to make them as explicit as possible, to repeat them with slightly different phrasing, and to make them behaviorally relevant (for example, showing the viewer with whom he can communicate to effect desired change).

Such suggestions need some modification if a series of programs is planned—a strategy to be recommended in view of some discouraging evidence on the effects of single programs. Data from a large sample of high school students showed that the “CBS National Citizenship Test” (a one-shot program) did effect changes in attitudes and information, but only directly on the issues covered in the program; attitudes and knowledge about related issues were not affected. Moreover, the direct effects of the program had all but disappeared six months later. In other words, these high-school viewers appeared to retreat to their pre-exposure positions over time in those areas where they had changed originally.

A repeated finding of attempts to convey information through educational or political campaigns is that those who already are best informed (that is, groups three and four in our audience typology) are most likely to pick up the information given in the campaign. Moreover, such campaigns appear to be even less successful in changing entrenched attitudes than in conveying information.⁴

This finding was one of the major results of the well-known Cincinnati experiment.⁵ This field experiment, conducted over 20 years ago, was a large scale effort to change world affairs information and attitudes in the public. The experimenters used almost every media device then known—discussion groups, special school lectures, pamphlets, radio spot ads—to illustrate the advantages of the U.N. After six months of intensive educational effort, the percentage of the population knowing nothing about the U.N. remained at the same 30 per cent level as before the campaign began. One woman who heard the radio pitches for the “U.N. plus U (you)” said that she had heard it over and over, but she “never did find out what it means.”⁶

More recently, six months after the launching of Sputnik, there was *no* increase in public perception of the actual scientific purpose of satellites over that found previous to Sputnik—despite a barrage of information in all the media during those six months. What did increase—and this is interesting in light of our remarks about the prevalence of Americans’ traditional anti-Communist mentality—was the perception of satellites as the basis of a contest between ourselves and the Russians.⁷ But the main point here is the very concrete ways in which international events are viewed by the public and how these events may be short-sightedly interpreted to fit into these concrete ways of thinking.

In order to more clearly define the aims of world affairs broad-

casting, it may be helpful to examine the current state of public attitudes toward underdeveloped countries. Again only limited knowledge is available concerning the ways in which the public perceives the international arena. We know that, unlike major academic and social commentators (i.e., our "educated elite" category) who see the gap between the poor and rich nations as the world's most important problem, the public (including the well-educated third group) sees the world as mainly divided on the issue of Communism vs. Capitalism—a division seen as more a moral than a political distinction. The underdeveloped nations are perceived mainly in terms of their relative neutrality on this dimension. In terms of the public's largely personalistic conception of the world, we might see the western nations wearing the white hats and the Communist countries the black hats, with the underdeveloped countries in the role of the Pauline we are trying to rescue from the peril.

Tables two and three outline the results of a recent survey of Detroit adults, whose views on foreign affairs probably do not differ drastically from those of a cross-section of all American adults. With respect to the amount of foreign aid about as many of them felt that the U.S. should give more foreign aid as felt we should give less; half deferred by saying that we've given about the right amount. In terms of which of our major foreign policy goals and problems were most important, Detroiters rated aid to the underdeveloped world as of quite low priority compared to problems with the Communist world and getting the United Nations to work effectively. It was, of course, of even lower priority than problems here in the United States, such as unemployment, race relations and taxes.⁸

If we do give aid, Detroiters felt that the things these countries need should be at the personal level—food, schools, good leaders and the desire to help themselves—rather than system needs such as factories, transportation, communication lines, and scientific personnel. A common public objection to foreign aid runs something like this: "If we're going to give money away, there's plenty of people in our own country who can use it more." That large amounts of foreign aid are lost to corruption and "never reach the people" is another prevalent public viewpoint. When asked which of seven criteria should determine the amount of aid, the one most often mentioned was "how carefully the aid will be used."

**TABLE II: RANKINGS GIVEN BY A CROSS-SECTION OF
DETROIT ADULTS**

Problems Facing the U.S. Government

	Per cent of First Choices	Average Rank
Controlling or cutting down the supply of military weapons in the world	5	4.8
Handling problems with the Russians and other Communist countries	20	3.5
Finding jobs for Americans who are out of work	28	3.0
Handling racial problems in the United States	24	3.0
Helping the underdeveloped countries of South America, Asia and Africa	4	5.3
Reducing taxes for our citizens	6	4.4
Getting the United Nations to work effectively	11	4.0

Goals of the U.S. Government

	Per cent of First Choices	Average Rank
Improve our economy and standard of living	8	4.8
Win friends and allies among other countries	10	4.5
Prevent war	30	3.3
Be prepared to defend our country against possible aggression	13	3.7
Show other countries the value of democracy by practicing it here at home	20	3.4
Prevent the spread of Communism in free countries	13	3.8
Help other countries grow and develop	6	4.5

TABLE III: RESPONSES OF THE DETROIT PUBLIC TO QUESTIONS ABOUT FOREIGN AID

Should the United States do more than it has, or less than it has to help these (underdeveloped) countries develop? Figures given in per cent.

More	26
Less	25
Same	43
Don't know	6

Of course there are many things that the underdeveloped countries do not have. Which of the following are things they don't have now, and really need? First, what is their biggest need?

	Per cent of First Choices	Average Rank
a) Highways, airports, communication lines etc.	3	7.1
b) Good political leaders, administrators and public opinion	20	4.1
c) Well-fed and healthy people	32	3.9
d) Religious faith	8	5.7
e) Modern farming methods	5	6.0
f) Schools and teachers	10	4.1
g) Engineers, scientists, technicians, etc.	3	6.0
h) A fair share of the country's land and wealth for everybody	3	6.9
i) Factories and equipment	1	6.6
j) The desire to improve themselves	15	4.6
	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 5.5

TABLE III (Continued):

Here are some things which the United States government might consider when deciding whether or not to send aid to a foreign country. Which one do you feel is the most important—the one that should be given greatest weight in reaching the decision?

	Per cent of First Choices	Average Rank
a) How friendly the government is to the United States	12	4.3
b) How strong the Communist threat to the foreign government is	19	3.8
c) How democratic the government of the foreign country is	5	4.7
d) How carefully the aid funds will be used by the foreign country	26	3.0
e) How poor the people in the foreign country are	11	4.3
f) How hard working and willing to do their part the people are	15	3.7
g) Whether the aid will help or hinder the American economy	12	4.2
	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 2.8

It seems to us that very few of these viewpoints would have been picked up from direct contact with television, and we are therefore doubtful of television's potential ability to alter the current state of public attitudes. This is not to say that television has had no impact on the public's international attitudes, but rather that the effects are on the more concrete and visible levels of the public's perceptual world. This can be judged by the examples that Robert Kintner, then president of NBC, used in a 1965 article to point up the effects of television on the public's view of news events:

. . . Today many people of relatively little formal education, who read slowly and without pleasure, have met with and probably understand more of the world around them than any but a handful of sophisticated and curious minds understood fifty years ago. They have watched the British bury the greatest of their modern heroes; seen a Russian Premier bang his shoe on the table at the UN; looked on while South American students threw tomatoes at a Vice President of the United States; visited classic and modern Greece; observed the savagery of guerilla warfare in Vietnam, Yemen, the Congo, Algeria. New Englanders have seen for themselves how Mexican *braceros* live in California's Imperial Valley; people on the banks of Puget Sound have been plunged into the caldron of a Harlem riot.⁹

PERSONAL INFLUENCE

That personal sources are far more effective than media sources in influencing public attitudes has been found with monotonous regularity in social science research. However, the widely-held belief that ideas automatically "trickle down" from the media to the "knowledgeables" who in turn relay the information to the less-informed may be a myth. Especially with reference to complicated and abstract matters such as world affairs, it appears that media ideas flow to the knowledgeable who in turn discuss these ideas with other knowledgeable. Information on world affairs does appear to trickle down to the less informed in the long run; however, this requires several lengthy stages, and the international situation must itself remain stable over this period for the new views to be seen as valid.

We would suggest, however, that involvement of personal sources is almost imperative for subtle shifts in the international arena to be absorbed by the public. Evidence indicates that this was necessary for the shift toward public perception of China as a greater enemy to America than Russia. Throughout the four groups we have distinguished, information presented in the media must contend with the deep-rooted and potentially mistaken (yet more influential)

impressions of the viewer's friends and family. In order for a new idea expressed in the media to be diffused throughout the public, it should be unique or important enough to find its way into casual interpersonal conversation and then be agreed upon by most of these who talk about it.

LIKELY FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Although it is true that the public is becoming better-educated, many social commentators appear overly optimistic about what this portends for the future make-up of media audiences. However, when looking at the most critical set of media users—those who have gone to college, whether graduating or not—it is important to note that the projected rise in this segment's proportion of the total U.S. population is only from 16 per cent in 1960 to 21 per cent in 1980.¹⁰ This hardly constitutes enough of a change by itself to effect a dramatic rise either in general television programming or in that segment of the population adequately informed about world affairs.

This puts a considerable damper on the potential impact of a new and hopeful innovation in television. CBS has recently announced a new audio-visual system called EVR (Electronic Video Recording) which plays through a conventional TV set. When this becomes available here, perhaps within two years, the home viewer will be able to select and view a program on foreign affairs much as he now selects and reads a library book. Also when a satellite direct-to-home system becomes available, it may bring, as a recent *Fortune* article stated, "a radical realignment of all previous patterns of radio and TV broadcasting," with a far greater variety of program choices available to the viewer at any given time. Presumably, this would eventually decrease the share of total available audience viewing each program, but the number of viewers of a particular kind of content (such as foreign affairs) might be *increased* because more programs would be available on specialized topics within this general area—much as radio has recently increased its total audience by offering more specialized programs directed to particular audience segments.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE USES OF TELEVISION

As of the moment, television has many advantages over the other news media. It is seen as more credible.¹¹ It reaches large segments of the public who have trouble understanding foreign news in the newspaper and who receive no news magazines. Its typical documentaries (although not high rating programs) draw larger audiences

than typical news magazines, and it appears to be the most popular public news medium.

On the other hand, television fails to provide the interpretive or editorial framework necessary for the public to adequately understand most international events. The relatively infrequent documentaries on international topics usually draw less than half of the audience drawn by a typical light entertainment show in the same time slot. In the documentaries, only a few of the points made can be absorbed by the vast majority of viewers and these points have to be repeated and kept simple if they are to have any impact. The typical documentary will probably be missed or ignored by the majority of those who are most informed (group four of our typology) about the international issue in question. This elite in fact looks down its nose on TV generally.

There is some question as to the effects of television documentaries on the three non-elite groups. A related and important question concerns the objectives of the networks in broadcasting foreign affairs programs, and the order of priority of these objectives. Some possible objectives might be to increase public understanding of international affairs, to enhance the network's prestige, to attract a "quality" audience for other programs, to please the FCC, or to influence national policy. Obviously, the ordering of such objectives will determine to a great extent the kind of topics chosen for emphasis, the manner in which they are treated, the amount of background detail provided, and the kind of audience toward which the programs are directed.

If a broadly stated objective is "to increase public understanding of international events," it may be necessary to segment the total "public" into sub-publics (such as our four groups) and to direct different levels of programming to each. Regarding topics, formats, and treatments likely to attract and retain a mass audience (i.e., large numbers of viewers from groups one and two) and assuming that one of the objectives is to increase the size of audiences for foreign affairs programs, it is obvious that this cannot be done without supplementing the present audience of well-informed people with other persons who have previously rejected the opportunity to view such programs. This latter group also has tended to reject other kinds of public information programming, but several programs have managed to attract large numbers of these people. The CBS audience-participation programs on driving and health will serve as examples. Three characteristics of these programs stand out: they

involve viewers actively rather than passively, they were seen as offering information which was personally relevant, and this information was seen as of practical use.

Less-affluent persons, who will have to be drawn into the public affairs audience if this audience is to grow appreciably, have been shown repeatedly to have relatively limited perspectives with regard to time (inability to plan ahead and to delay gratification), space (family-neighborhood-city are clear, state-nation-world are fuzzy), and large social aggregates (simply incomprehensible). These people are often found to be not only narrow but xenophobic; they not only have little understanding of distant events but are distrustful and sometimes hostile toward them—especially when these events are seen as threatening in some respect. These multiple barriers suggest that to enlarge the foreign affairs audience, future programs should:

- Emphasize the import of policies and events for the intended audience rather than for "the nation;"

- Give specific examples of the consequences of policies and events for people with whom individuals in the intended audience can identify;

- Give "success stories" whenever possible and appropriate to counteract such things as the negative public image of foreign aid; Present information which is novel or surprising; and

- Utilize some means of creating audience involvement, perhaps by presenting more active confrontations between spokesmen for differing views.

Of course, such formats or treatments must be well publicized in advance of the programs if audiences are to see them by choice rather than by chance.

Perhaps a more cynical strategy (at least in the eyes of those who hold to a romantic view of our democratic society) would be to aim foreign affairs programs mainly at groups three and four in our topology and to essentially expect only minimal response from groups one and two. These former groups are already most cosmopolitan in orientation, most interested in international affairs, and most likely to act in response to a program (e.g., writing to a congressman). Such an approach implicitly assumes that it would be naive for television to attempt to bring the vast majority of members of groups one and two near the levels of orientation of the better-educated. With the growing crisis in race relations in the United States, it may be difficult enough to keep the international orientation of groups three and four as high as it was prior to the beginnings of this crisis.

We suspect that this audience focus is already in operation at the present time. Indications are that foreign-policy decision makers are tuned in disproportionate numbers to programs such as the *Today* and *Tonight* programs, network documentaries and "intellectual ghetto" discussions on topics of interest, and the efforts of educational television (especially something like *PBL*). While it is not realistic to expect half or even a quarter of these influentials to view a particular foreign affairs program, they will soon hear about it through word-of-mouth, if the program has something unique or interesting to contribute. It might further help this process in the future if newspapers and magazines were to more actively supplement TV foreign affairs programs with constructive criticism and reviews after broadcasts.

There are several shortcomings and even dangers in forsaking the mass audience, however. Not the least of these is that there already seems to be a substantial, if not increasing, feeling of resentment toward "eggheads" and "professors" by the less-educated. A monopoly of programs beamed at the better-educated audiences could serve to create even greater apathy or distrust of government foreign policy among those who can't follow what's happening. It is obvious that somehow these "unreachables" must be reached.

An important step toward making world affairs programs more effective in attracting and holding the mass audience could be taken if producers were to supplement their intuition with research when making decisions about program topics and treatments. Research can be designed to answer far more interesting questions than merely how many sets are tuned to a certain channel.

At present, many producers prefer to judge their programs as art rather than as communication vehicles; they regard a program's "quality" as more important than its ability to arouse interest or convey information. The producers's creative or artistic integrity has to be respected, but when this is the *only* consideration the outcome too often wears the unfortunate label of "an artistic success but a commercial failure." Programs in this category support the elitist view that what's good cannot be popular, and vice versa. However, there is reason to believe that the number of programs which satisfy both the producer and the audience can be increased by making greater use of information on audience beliefs, values, experiences, and other characteristics. To enlarge the audience for world affairs programs by doing so would serve the long-term interests of the industry as well as the nation.

NOTES

1. However, because of its elite audience, it may well have had more impact on recent federal meat legislation than that generated by the other media (including commercial television, which also gave the legislation considerable coverage).
2. We would expect this group to become most informed through exposure to the program.
3. These figures are for the most part derived from data in Robinson, J. *Public Information About World Affairs*, Ann Arbor, Michigan: Survey Research Center, 1967.
4. Available research does indicate that the media can have more effect on lightly-held attitudes on "unimportant" issues, however.
5. This study is described in Hyman, H. and Sheatsley, P. "Some Reasons why Information Campaigns Fail," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1947, 11, 412-423.
6. This example again points to the greater probable utility of explicit (vs. implicit) appeals.
7. This evidence is reviewed in McLeod, J. and Swinehart, J., *Satellites, Science and the Public*, Ann Arbor, Michigan: Survey Research Center, 1960.
8. It is very unlikely that holders of these three attitude positions had anywhere near an accurate idea of how much actual aid we've given. Neither for that matter would the authors of this paper if they hadn't been embarrassed into looking it up.
9. A further quote from Kintner's article contains other interesting observations, "Almost nobody (except network news officials) has seen all of this; some people have seen little of it. Even so, Huntley-Brinkley and Cronkite between them, over the course of a month, reach more than half of all American households; and the average television documentary is seen by 11.5 million people."
10. The 20-30 age bracket will be about 33 per cent college-exposed; however, this is about the same percentage of this age group that will not finish high school.
11. Perhaps in large part this is due to its almost total lack of editorial stands now on the increase, especially at the local level.

TV COVERAGE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

MALCOLM WARNER

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COVERAGE ON NETWORK TELEVISION

This analysis is based primarily on the observations of one viewer who watched programs broadcast over ABC, CBS, or NBC between the hours of 5 P.M. and 11:30 P.M. every day during June, 1967, and during much of July. His observations were supplemented by earlier studies made by himself and by others, by a variety of documentary materials, and by an analysis of 25 documentary programs aired during the period 1964-67.

June 1967 was not a typical month, since the Arab-Israeli war dominated this period. Nevertheless, arrangements for systematic viewing had to be made in advance, and neither the Arabs nor the Israelis notified us that hostilities were to occur. We had no choice but to proceed as planned. In our defense we would advance the proposition that no month is "typical" insofar as news is concerned.

The procedure adopted was to watch all late afternoon and evening programs on Network A on June 1, all those on Network B on June 2, all those on Network C on June 3, and so back to Network A again on June 4. This rotational pattern was followed

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throughout the month. It was a rigorous schedule. When should one eat dinner? Prior to 5 P.M. was too early; after 11:30 too late. The solution adopted by the researcher was to have his wife prepare bite-size components that did not necessarily have to be eaten hot. Then, armed with a sweep secondhand watch, pencil, and pad of notepaper, he was free either to take notes or to eat at any moment.

In New York news occupies five and one half-hours, on weekdays, out of the 19½ hours available during the 5–11:30 period on all three networks. This includes local reports and perhaps gives a misleading impression of the attention given to news, especially because New York is not necessarily typical of the nation and because only the early evening news shows enjoy the largest audiences.

During prime time there are seven and one-half hours of newscasts per week on the three networks, Monday through Friday.¹ The weekend news situation is not constant, and varies with sports coverage, etc. Altogether, we have a total of about nine hours prime time network news shows per week, of which, after deducting commercials, just under four-fifths is actually news. Thus, there is a weekly "news hole" of slightly over seven hours into which foreign news must be fitted.

In our "rotating" sample during the month there was a total of 690 minutes of prime time network news, or eleven and one half hours. The total amount of foreign affairs coverage was 451 minutes, about 65 per cent. This was a higher proportion than would have been obtained for most months. An estimate for an earlier period during 1965–66 was 55 per cent,² and a random sample taken over the 1966–67 period confirmed this approximation.

The amount of news relating in some way to developing nations was about 209 minutes, or approximately three and one-half hours. This was 29 per cent of the total time, and 46 per cent of all foreign affairs coverage.

Vietnam and the Middle East nations dominated the coverage of the developing world. Other developing nations that appeared in the sample were Cuba, South Korea, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Aden, India, Nigeria, Algeria, and Taiwan. They were given 26 minutes of coverage, or about five per cent of the total "news hole."

¹For the purposes of this analysis we are defining prime time somewhat more broadly than is customary, and include the period from 5 P.M. to 11 P.M. Taking 7 P.M. to 11 P.M. would give us the network shows for NBC and CBS, but would exclude ABC.

²Friedman, P., *Television Network News*, unpublished Senior Thesis, Princeton University, 1966.

If this figure of three and one half hours of news relating to developing nations were projected for the year for all three networks, it would give a total of 126 hours per year. Given that the month in question was heavily weighted with news from the Middle East, a more realistic figure would be slightly over 100 hours per year.

During June there was the following to add to the news total of three-and a-half hours on the developing nations:

- U.N. debates (two evenings)
- Three hours of Middle East specials (ABC, CBS, NBC—one hour each)
- One half hour ABC travelogue ("Brazil")
- Two two-hour entertainment films using developing nations as background.
- Eight hours of *Tarzan* and *Daktari* (African background)
- One and one-half hours of a Kosygin press conference.

The following listing includes programs with particularly large audiences that contributed items to the sample:

<i>Show</i>	<i>Homes Reached*</i>	<i>Ranking*</i>
<i>Daktari</i>	13,757,000	21
<i>CBS News Special</i> (Sunday)	13,318,000	22
<i>Tarzan</i>	10,698,000	53
<i>NBC Evening News</i> (Huntley-Brinkley)	10,015,000	58
<i>CBS Evening News</i> (Walter Cronkite)	9,238,000	66
<i>ABC News Special</i> — "Ivanovich"	7,938,000	81

*Source: ARB Network Target Television Audience Report, July 1967.

If an effort is made to correct for the atypicality of the sample month, coverage of the developing countries over a year's period during prime time might look somewhat as follows: News 100 hours, Documentaries six hours, and Entertainment (background) 120 hours. The obvious conclusion is that the bulk of the coverage (very broadly defined) is either in segments of news bulletins or appears as background in entertainment programs.

If one takes 226 hours as the total time devoted to the developing nations during heavy viewing hours in a typical year, just over three per cent of the time available during these hours is accounted for. If one defines coverage narrowly (to exclude entertainment programs), then the developing nations receive between one and two per cent of the available time.

A THREE-MONTH NEWS SAMPLE FROM ONE NETWORK

In order to provide a picture of foreign affairs coverage over a longer period, the records of one network's prime time news pro-

grams were reviewed for the three months beginning June 1 and ending August 31, 1967. During these three months a total of 431 items were presented, *excluding* Vietnam coverage. These items were classified as "major" or "minor," the former being a correspondent's report with film; the latter being read by the newscaster and not necessarily accompanied by film. Of the total, 152 were "major" items and the balance "minor" ones. An example of a major item would be a one minute, 50 second film showing U.S. Jews arriving to assist Israel in the Middle East crisis; an example of a minor item would be 15 seconds devoted to a statement by King Hussein of Jordan.

Foreign affairs items can be broken down by the area with which they primarily deal. During the period in question the breakdown was as follows:

	<i>Major</i>	<i>Minor</i>	<i>Total</i>
Middle East	105	194	299
China and Hong Kong	7	33	40
Europe (Incl. USSR)	12	31	43
Africa	4	21	25
Latin America and Caribbean	8	9	17
Asia (Excluding Vietnam and China/Hong Kong)	2	5	7

If we exclude the Middle East and Communist China, a total of 49 items dealt with developing countries. Of these, 14 concerned the Congo (two major and twelve minor), five Nigeria (all minor), three Luthuli (one major, two minor), eight Cuba (four major, four minor), three Anguilla (one major, two minor), and six Korea (two major and four minor). Two mentions were given Nkrumah; two to the OAS; one each to an African air disaster, the Caracas earthquake, guerrilla activities in Bolivia, and miscellaneous events in Mexico, Panama, and Burma.

In order to compare TV news coverage with that of a major newspaper, stories appearing in the *New York Times* on the developing nations during June were checked against stories in the "rotating" TV news sample. It is impressive that no item listed as a "major event" in the "News Summary and Index" on the split page of the *Times* was missing from the sample. On the other hand, 42 other items (only one of which was carried on the first page) were *not* reflected in the television coverage. Somewhat under half of these could be classified as "hard" news; the remainder were trend, roundup, or color stories.

Several footnotes to this comparison may help to put it in per-

spective. First, a few items in the TV sample were not included in the *Times*. Second, it is possible that the sampling method used in watching evening programs meant that certain items were missed, although a random check of scripts did not turn up any instances. Third, the number of words devoted to each item by TV tended to be considerably less than the number used in the *Times*. Finally, TV coverage usually ignored economic developments. The sample included only one item of this nature, which concerned Taiwan. Economic news generally, except for Wall Street prices, is a minor category on television, while it bulked large in the inside pages of the *Times*.

THE IMAGE OF DEVELOPING NATIONS IN A TV DOCUMENTARY SAMPLE

It was difficult to select a satisfactory sample. First, the number of programs specifically dealing with developing nations was limited; indeed, it was necessary to go back as far as February 1964 in order to accumulate 25 documentaries, and even so a number that related only tangentially to the developing nations had to be included. Second, some networks produced more documentaries than others. Third, scripts were not available in some cases and in others screenings could not be arranged.

The following documentaries were included in the sample (all programs were one hour unless otherwise stated):

- NBC "The Bay of Pigs" (February 4, 1964)
- NBC "Cuba: The Missile Crisis" (Feb. 9, 1964)
- NBC "The Nile" (May 24, 1964)
- NBC "Sikkim: Yankee Queen" (June 17, 1964)
- NBC "Jawan: The Defense of India" (May 26, 1964)
- NBC "Ganges: Sacred River" (September 15, 1964)
- NBC "Projection '65" (December 29, 1964)
- NBC "Santo Domingo: War Among Friends" (May 28, 1965)
- CBS "Santo Domingo: Why Are We There?" (May 31, 1965)
- NBC "Projection '66" (December 26, 1965—two hours)
- NBC "Laos: The Forgotten War" (January 5, 1966)
- NBC "Congo: Victim of Independence" (April 3, 1966)
- CBS "Mexico: A Lesson in Latin" (April 26, 1966)
- CBS "The U.S. and China" (May 27, 1966)
- CBS "The Anti-Americans" (June 7, 1966)
- ABC "Know the V.C." (August 20, 1966)
- NBC "Thailand: The New Front" (December 16, 1966)
- ABC "Vietnam: Rebuttal" (November 12, 1966—one-half-hour)
- ABC "Year End Review" (December 28, 1966)
- NBC "Projection '67" (December 29, 1966—one-half hour)
- CBS "Correspondents Report" (January 29, 1967)
- CBS "The Convulsion in China" (January 19, 1967—one-half-hour)

NBC "Indonesia" (February 19, 1967)
NBC "Israel: Victory or Else" (July 23, 1967)
ABC *Africa* (September 1967—four hours)

All of these documentaries provided *some* insight into the problems of developing nations, but fewer than ten were *principally* preoccupied with them. Those perhaps most squarely on the topic were the following:

"Ganges: Sacred River:" Covers industry and agriculture in travelogue style, but also emphasizes efforts at modernization. Shots of hand-painting cloth, oxen drawing water, women sifting grain, men working at looms, etc. Excerpt from script: "These ways of agriculture were ancient when Alexander the Great invaded India, more than three centuries before Christ. The leaders of modern India, sitting in New Delhi, know it, and they know it must be changed."

"Congo: Victim of Independence:" Emphasis on "mutiny, massacre, fragmentation, foreign meddling, economic decline," and "garish mixture of the Stone Age and the 20th Century." Would probably support a variety of Anti-Africa stereotypes.

"Mexico: A Lesson in Latin:" More penetrating treatment than most. Excerpt: "The first great social upheaval of this century ended peonage, brought down the great landowners, established a democracy on the borders of the United States. It was the Mexican Revolution. The United States opposed it from the first (but)... the United States now applauds this society. Today Mexico is a bridge from the affluence of the United States to that part of the Western Hemisphere where the world's population is exploding most rapidly and is most explosive." Dr. Edmundo Flores participates in the program.

"The U.S. and China:" Focuses on political upheaval, but includes material on economic problems as well. Guests on the program included American experts on China. Excerpt: "Until recent months Mao Tse-tung decided what was right for China. Now his closest lieutenants are using Mao's ideas to battle one another for power—almost as though Mao himself were no longer in effective control. At issue among them are such vital differences as: Economics: Should China devote more of her limited capital to agriculture, thus reducing investments in armaments? Relations with Russia: Should they improve? Relations with the U.S. over Vietnam: Must there be war? And finally: Must it be nuclear?"

"The Anti-Americans:" Visitors and experts from Mexico and Thailand give views, mainly about the United States and U.S. foreign policy, from the two developing nations. Some information about conditions in Mexico and Thailand is included; e.g.: "Things are coming to a point at which very often when people in Latin America defend certain nationalistic positions, or certain progressive ideas about the way social, economic or political progress should take place, this is taken as a form of Anti-Americanism...."

"The Convulsion in China:" This focuses on domestic upheavals in China, but was tangentially relevant to other developing nations in Asia. Contributions by journalists recently in China, and

by American journalists specializing in China, led to a fairly balanced picture.

"Indonesia: The Troubled Victory:" A really exciting and powerful program, but it treated the subject almost entirely from a Cold War viewpoint, as the introduction indicates: "As our war in Asia gets bigger, a largely unnoticed victory over the communists has been decisively won in Southeast Asia. In fact, it is the single biggest defeat ever handed the communists anywhere in the world, and it was won without a single American soldier, American dollar, or bomb."

Africa: This four hour documentary was easily the most ambitious and the most many-sided of any program viewed. While it may have supported some commonly-held stereotypes about Africa, it went beyond them in many cases, and included an unusual amount of economic information. It also succeeded in attracting almost one-third of the available audience.

Another nine documentaries dealt with the developing nations, but treated them in a "cold war" context or else reported an actual war or crisis. This tended to diminish the degree to which they were able to promote understanding of the nations involved. The programs on Cuba and Santo Domingo fell into this category, as did those on Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. "Israel: Victory or Else" covered some Israeli political issues, but gave little attention to the basic problems of development. It must be classified largely as a "war documentary."

Two programs appear to have been dominated by the photography itself. This was certainly true of "The Nile," which was a very pleasant sequence of pictures, but didn't come to grips with economic or political development in the Middle East. It probably was also true of "Sikkim: Yankee Queen," although this judgment has to be based on a brief description, since no script was available and a screening could not be arranged.

The NBC *Projections* and the CBS and ABC review programs of the year 1966 included some excellent material on the developing countries, but related to many other areas as well. As was the case with nearly all other programs in the sample, their emphasis was political—economic matters were mentioned only in passing.

It was the impression of the analyst that the prevailing images and stereotypes of the developing nations were not likely to be changed very much by the documentaries that were examined. They hardly conveyed a sense of urgency about the problems of rich and poor nations and the implications of these problems for the United States, as they dwelled more on the political crisis of the moment or the picturesque details of foreign landscapes. Most programs were highly "American-centered," the documentary on "The Anti-Amer-

icans" providing the most extreme example. Perhaps such an approach is necessary in order to attract audience interest, but it is difficult to imagine a BBC program entitled "The Anti-Britons." The average documentary is supportive of American foreign policy, and casts the United States as the principal, if somewhat reluctant, champion of the free world. The Communist nations are seen as constituting the main threat to peace.

Topicality seemed to govern the choice of subjects treated in most cases. There is no regular commercial program dealing with foreign affairs that is comparable to the British prime time news-magazine *Panorama*. (The National Educational Television's *N.E.T. Journal* comes closest.) As far as the fare available to the mass television audience is concerned, the relatively sophisticated and exhaustive treatment given to American domestic politics contrasts sharply with the limited and much more superficial attention to international affairs in general and the developing nations in particular.

DECISION-MAKING IN TV NEWS

Television news, because its compression of form imposes special editing and newsgathering requirements, is subject to much greater central control than is the case with the average newspaper. This makes for a small number of decision makers, and piles the responsibility on their shoulders. They are a *national* institution in a way that the various American newspapers are not, and this makes them a factor of major political importance.

This study of the central "gatekeepers" in television network news did not deal with a *sample* of the decision makers; it covered *all* the important participants. Since under 50 people effectively shape the nation's TV news, and they are concentrated principally in the New York newsrooms of the three major TV networks, this was a reasonably accessible collection of individuals. Each of the three networks has a Vice-President or President in Charge of News, an Executive Producer, an Associate Producer, and so on. (Titles vary slightly from network to network.) Although not at the top of the administrative hierarchy, the Executive Producers have the specific responsibility, and in fact the power, to decide the form and content of the widely-viewed news shows of NBC, CBS, and ABC. Thus, *three* men constitute the "power elite" of the television news policy.

Our interviews with these television "gatekeepers" have been treated so as to preserve anonymity, as that was one of the conditions

given to the individuals involved. This enabled them to speak frankly and bypass formal public relations channels. Quotations and descriptions presented below have been edited to remove material that would make identification possible; in some cases they are amalgams of comments made by two or more individuals. This procedure does violence to the personalities involved, but since the selection of quotations is designed to focus attention on elements that are common to all three networks, personalities would not come through strongly in any case.

This observer was allowed to observe any part of the news operation in the three networks, and was excluded only from the most confidential conversations, which were very rare in their occurrence. In each network the following roles were studied: the Vice-President in charge of news, the Executive Producer, the Washington Bureau Chief, the Associate Producer (also known as Producer or Senior News Editor), the News Editor, the Newscaster/Commentator, the writers, the copy editors, and the reporters.

Since small numbers of people are involved in making decisions on news coverage at each network, they naturally develop a relatively homogenous point of view. With the exception of the reporters, they are in frequent, informal contact. On questions affecting the news show each one knows fairly well what the others are likely to think. As one copy editor phrased it: "After working with the show for so long, you can tell what will and will not interest the writers, editors, and producers. It's a basic journalistic sense. . . ." An Executive Producer observed: "The other guys here know what I'm after." A news editor added: "All of us think alike."

Common approaches among all three networks are encouraged by the fact that each monitors the output of the others very carefully—and all keep a watchful eye on the *New York Times*. It is interesting to note that each network feels that the other two pay more attention to it than it pays to the others. In addition, many of the principal news personnel at the various organizations have known each other in various capacities for years; a large proportion of them came up through similar journalistic channels. This does not mean that each network does not have a unique style, but it does mean that the similarities in news judgment among the networks are more impressive than the differences.

The Vice-President in Charge of News: His main task is the overall direction of the news department and the delegation of specific production and editorial functions. Although he observes a general

policy on non-interference, he is responsible for interpreting the organization's policy on news, and is concerned with such matters as levels of taste, how much controversy to get into, and so on. "We let the people in the news show have their own views within bounds. These must be acceptable to the management of the news division and the company. They must be *overseen* by the company."

The broad paternal influence of the Vice-President in setting the style for a news show may be inferred from the following comment made by one of them on a specific, to some possibly trivial, point.

A locution is gaining currency among news broadcasters (not only ours), which I find tasteless and repugnant. It is referring to the President of the United States merely as "Lyndon Johnson." He is, it must be clear, either "President Johnson" or "Mr. Johnson." Occasionally, if there is good reason, he is "President Lyndon Johnson," especially when distinguishing him from "President Andrew Johnson."

While we're on names, saying "French President de Gaulle" prevents confusion with "Bulgarian President de Gaulle;" and I believe the proper non-sectarian usage is "Cardinal Spellman," not "Francis Cardinal Spellman."

All Vice-Presidents are heavily concerned with relationships with the Federal Government. Here is a composite view: "I believe we are part of the Establishment, even if unconsciously. Journalists try to ingratiate themselves with their sources. I have to live with these people. The Washington staff also have to. Nothing occupies us more than the war—that's the government. Space, that's the government. Elections, that's the government. How much does the government use us? Well, we are at the mercy of government officials and congressmen. There's the question of license renewal that never worries newspaper editors. . . . The government could put us out of business if we lost the big local stations. The other reason is that the people who run the networks are part of the Establishment. . . ."

The Executive Producer: If the Vice-President in Charge of News lays down the ground-rules for the news operation, the Executive Producer is charged with interpreting them. He is in control of the news selection process. He puts the show together and has the final word on the "line-up." This is the order in which the items of news are to be presented, how much time will go to each, how much film, and so on. While some decisions may be delegated to others, the final responsibility is his.

The Executive Producer is constantly dealing with news materials and the men who produce and handle them. People come into his office with messages, news tapes, scripts, and so forth all day long.

The phone constantly interrupts his routine, especially to and from Washington. Many of the conversations are conducted in a jocular vein. Personal relations seem to be warm.

The Associate Executive Producer: Next in importance to the Executive Producer in day-to-day decision-making is his chief associate. The exact title of this official varies; he can be called Producer, Associate Producer, or Senior News Editor. He works very closely with the Executive Producer, often putting together the show in his absence. Indeed, in at least two of the three network shows the task of supervising day-to-day operations is largely delegated to this level of decision-making. According to one network executive, the role of the associate is also "to worry about tomorrow's show," to see that film is coming in, that correspondents are sent off to certain areas, and so on.

The Washington Bureau Chief: While the ultimate decisions are made in New York, the Washington Bureau Chiefs have a great deal to say about what goes into the show, especially when Congress is in session and important news is breaking in the Capital. One described his activities as follows: "I handle all the film and administrative responsibility. We have three writers who also act as reporters and editors. The commentator is very busy. We take all day, then in the afternoon talk. I know what is available. All the time we keep New York informed. Control is in New York, but it's no problem for us...they respect the opinion of people closer to the story.

"It's difficult to work in Washington, because so much news is what is *said*, ideas. You have to know *who* said it. Many social problems come out this way, via Congressional hearings, such as the problems of the American city... The first day of the hearings on Vietnam—the beginning of the Congressional doubts—with Rusk, we had *nine* minutes of the show.

"All news is managed, isn't it? The Pentagon hasn't come out and said we have blundered. All released news is managed. Nobody tells me what I have to put on, *but* nobody says anything he doesn't want to... If you don't know something, that's managed news. But in Vietnam, the guys (reporters) are all over the country and can go anywhere they want."

The News Editor: He keeps up with the progress of various stories constantly checking and re-checking, and is responsible for the details of the news, within the broad policy laid down by the executive producer. He may handle news reports, edit film, or both. In at least

one network he works most closely with the Associate rather than with the Executive Producer.

News editors cut out much of the blood and gore from Vietnam coverage, but have to work with so much filmed violence that they tend to become jaded and cynical. Whatever private feelings they have become smothered by the sheer quantity of war footage; to protect themselves they maintain a certain "hard-boiled" atmosphere.

The Writer: The role of the writer is to translate the guidelines provided by the Executive Producer into narrative, working with raw inputs from the wire services and other sources. Writers are college graduates, usually majors in English Literature or Journalism, who formerly worked on leading newspapers. They may also report from the field, but are generally based in the newsroom. They provide the parts of the show that are read by the newscaster, although the latter may re-shape these items or write some of his own copy.

Writers are not primary decision-makers, but they can often, by a phrase, affect the flavor of a report. They adapt to the style and stance of the show as a whole, although they are held on a "long" rather than a "short" leash.

The Copy Editor: An important step in the selective process takes place at the point where the tape is taken off the wire service machines and distributed to those in the newsroom who use it to build the show. The copy editor, who is in charge of this function, is primarily responsible to the news editor, but has to maintain an overview of the total news flow in order to make an intelligent selection. He reads the *New York Times* carefully in the morning, and monitors radio and other TV networks as well as the wire services.

The Reporter: Since he works outside the newsroom, the reporter is not an integral part of the dynamics by which a show is produced. Nevertheless, in a sense he also is a decision-maker, since he controls the images that actually appear on film (in conjunction with the cameraman and possibly a field producer), and creates some of the copy. He is thus really an intermediary between the producers, who decide that he should be covering a particular area or problem, and the final editing process.

The Newscaster/Commentator: He is not the master of the news show, as it might appear to the viewer watching the home screen. A leading executive remarked: "One of the myths of broadcast news is that the stars have the responsibility." But neither is he a mere

news reader. The role of the "star" varies somewhat from network to network, but all of them participate in the formation of day-to-day policy. In addition, they write or re-write some of their own copy, they may choose to follow a particular story, or they may comment on the news by means of "editorial eyebrows"—using their facial muscles to register a variety of reactions. A Washington Bureau Chief noted: "The Executive Producer is boss, but if the commentator wants to do something, he can do it too." While the commentator may garner more than his fair share of the glory, he also takes a disproportionate amount of the blame. When a mistake is made, fifteen people in the organization may be involved, but the public blames the star. To quote another executive: "The man in camera is hung with it."

CRITERIA FOR NEWS SELECTION

Criteria used in news selection are largely subjective; personnel in TV newsrooms have difficulty articulating them. The executive producers very frequently use the phrase "it grabs me" or "it doesn't grab me." This is a shorthand way of saying that it excites their news sense. It often happens, on Mondays, that nothing in fact "grabs" them. As one put it: "It seems like a light day... a quiet newsworld, nothing special." This suggests an absolute criterion, but the fact that a show must be put on leads to relative criteria—some items are less unsuitable than others. "Some days we command the news, other days the news commands us. Judgment is based on instincts of 25 years in the business. The wire services and other gatekeepers decide something, but this has to be probed."

When asked to define their criteria more precisely, TV news personnel mention a large number of factors, including importance to the domestic public, the number of people affected, audience interest, political balance, dramatic quality, and of course, "freshness" and "timeliness." Again, there is frequent recourse to generalities.

Importance to the domestic public: One Vice-President felt that his organization looked for news that was "of interest and importance to the American people—but considered more narrowly as of timeliness and immediacy; this means Vietnam, air pollution, medical developments, aviation safety, educational practices, American commitment to Southeast Asia, and failing support for U.S. leadership in Europe." There is an admitted bias toward domestic political news. An executive producer remarked: "I'd count in the poverty program, and Vietnam as an American political story... and every other year, you know, is a political year... elections." (It is interest-

ing to note that Vietnam was nearly always seen more as a domestic story than as foreign news.) A copy editor, likewise, said that he emphasized political news: "I stress it very strongly. . . . People are concerned with what their government is doing. If there's a big story, it has national impact. . . . I treat the war as a special kind of news story. . . . People are dying there. Everybody is concerned whether they have a father or a son there."

Number of people affected: This is a closely related criterion. In the words of an executive producer: "Significance is the only criterion. My personal inclination is for a story that affects a lot of people." A copy editor added: "We figure the number of people it affects—the national and international interest, basic everyday interests." Washington Bureau Chiefs were likely to stress the role of power and change: "In Washington especially, you have to judge whether the man who says something will have some effect on it; do they have power in their position. In the case of Senators, for instance, you have to see what committees they sit on, what they can change. News boils down to significant change."

Audience interest: Attitudes toward the audience are ambivalent. On the one hand, the tastes of the audience are seen as important, as a factor that must be taken into consideration. On the other, there seems to be considerable doubt as to what the audience really wants and a feeling that it is improper to play up to the audience too much. An executive producer states, "We try to (create) . . . a program for a national American audience based on the assumption they may not have read or heard any other news. We also assume that they are as literate and informed as we on the staff. We don't offend them, even if we simplify our approach. We are watched by millions of people, but that's an abstraction; I sometimes have the feeling nobody is watching. No conception of the audience, except on the smallest possible sampling, namely me, affects my news judgment." Another executive suggested that there was some controversy about how much simplification should be attempted, when he observed: "There's a long-standing argument about the mental age of the average TV viewer." An associate producer specifically denied pandering to the audience: "We don't know the audience and it doesn't matter; we don't tailor the show to the audience." Some producers feel that perhaps audience tastes should be given more systematic consideration: "We don't do enough research, that's our problem. The research department made a study three years ago—why people like the show—but that's all I know."

Political balance: Judging from their observations on a wide range

of subjects, the sympathies of decision-makers in TV news are overwhelmingly Democratic or Liberal Republican, but they try to keep their personal views in the background. "In the area of politics we're extremely anxious to maintain a fair balance, although under the law we are not required to. But the public gets easily irritated about political questions." Or again: "We try to be fair. As long as we're accused of being too Republican *and* too Democrat, then we know we're fair."

Dramatic quality: This criterion also arouses some ambivalence. As a Washington Bureau Chief remarked: "Imposed on the news gathering is the 'show-biz' angle. The newsmen are stars in Hollywood terms; this affects the roles in the program, the make-up of the program and what they want. . . . You get into an area outside news." But the same man remarked later: "We try to cover what is significant—no pictures for pictures' sake, for example, parades." A film editor who cut much of the gore from Vietnam coverage said that he left some in because "violence was news." Another observed that demonstrations were "rather cliché these days—not of much interest unless they were violent." An executive producer spoke of the need to give the illusion of speed. "Last night we were very peppy—each item under two-and-one-half minutes."

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COVERAGE

Foreign affairs news is seen as secondary to domestic news unless, as in the case of Vietnam, it can be treated as a domestic story. "Generally speaking," said one executive producer, "foreign news is not as popular as domestic news, but sometimes you can show foreign countries in relation to domestic topics. We have no great educating mission." "The biggest thing this week is China," said another, "but how to fit it in? Generally we have more material than we can use."

Covering developing nations was seen as especially difficult, because cost considerations were added to questions of news judgment: "The developing nations are an economic problem. We have *one* man in the whole of Africa to deal with it. . . . There's very little coverage of Latin America too. And we're only just involved in Southeast Asia. The reporters are often not to blame—the problem is with the editors back here. A legitimate question is to ask if coverage of such foreign news is the role of the evening show. We're interested in the day's news rather than trends—although we do some."

Another executive producer agreed: "After covering the main stories of the day and the Vietnam war and the Great Society, there's little space for anything else. . . . Trend stories like Latin America are difficult to communicate. . . . African coverage is largely of exotic and superficial crises. But we're good on domestic race questions."

Most TV news decision-makers thought that the evening news shows would eventually go to one hour—actually 50 minutes, but it was not clear whether this development would be likely to lead to greater foreign affairs coverage. It is possible that the same considerations that result in curtailment of foreign news on half-hour shows would apply to the longer format. Also, doubt was expressed that an hour-long show could hold attention. "I think we will go to a one-hour news program," observed a Vice-President. "It will be a service. The set will be on, but people not necessarily watching." The same doubts led an executive producer to oppose a one-hour show: "I don't think the show will go to an hour. We can't keep people's attention for any more than a half-hour." Some wondered whether there would really be enough good stories to fill a longer show. "That is fine in a lush news period, but it'll be difficult in the summer. We'll have to have seven or eight minute mini-documentaries. I think it could be made interesting for prime time."

A Washington Bureau Chief assumed that the show would eventually be extended: "When we go to an hour, we'll do more (on foreign affairs), probably fill it with interviews. We won't use experts—you can talk to them over the phone to get the facts. Here you get back to 'show-biz,' because experts are generally dull."

The principal problem in connection with presentation of more international news on prime time television news shows thus seems to be seen as how to make the items conform to the demanding standards that are now applied. Already, with the half-an-hour shows, there is often a situation of poverty in the midst of plenty. That is, there is much more material than can be used, but there may not be enough that satisfies the news requirements of the executive producer and his associates. Some speak of "anxiety where we feel or suspect that we couldn't fill it," even though such an extreme situation seems never to have arisen. For foreign affairs to play a larger part on evening television news, either new and more gripping methods of presentation will have to be found or the decision-makers in the networks will have to be persuaded to broaden their present criteria for selection.

EMERGING NATIONS— WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW

MAX F. MILLIKAN

In preparation for the conference reported on in this issue, several of the experts on the underdeveloped world invited to the conference were asked to prepare brief papers on themes which they felt needed more emphasis than they were currently receiving. There was a good deal of agreement among the authors of the four papers prepared in response to this request.¹ What follows is an attempt by one of them to summarize the essential points made.

The first point was a very simple one: there should be a great deal more coverage of developments in the underdeveloped world. In saying this all the authors were aware that the same could be said of almost every subject and that the amount of coverage which can be given to anything is limited by television time and the degree of viewer interest. With respect to available time it was their conviction that the priority given to the underdeveloped world and to U.S. relations with it is totally out of line with the importance of conveying some elementary aspects of this subject to the average citizen. Certainly this must be done if issues of U.S. foreign policy are to be intelligently handled. With respect to viewer interest this is unaffected by what television does. While journalism, electronic or otherwise, cannot make an inherently dull and insignificant subject interesting and important, it is surely one of the major functions of responsible journalism to generate interest in the public mind in

¹Papers were prepared by Messrs. Millikan, Edward S. Mason, Robert Asher, and Frank Coffin. Their original papers are available on request from the World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston.

issues which the journalist regards as important even though the public initially does not.

As to the real issue of how important developments in the underdeveloped world are to the United States, it should be sufficient to point out that all the major international crises threatening U.S. involvement in war or in outbreaks of violence which have occurred since the end of World War II with the sole exception of Berlin have had their origins in the underdeveloped countries. The list is long,—Korea, Algiers, Cyprus, the Congo, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Kashmir, West Iran, Suez, the Israel-Arab short war, and finally and most dramatically, Vietnam. The frequency and regularity of these occurrences suggest that whatever happens in Vietnam there may be many similar situations over the next couple of decades, and that the U.S. will probably involve itself in at least some of them. Whatever one may believe about the ultimate causes of these instabilities—how far they are generated, supported, and made dangerous by great power involvement and how far they are of essentially local origin—their nature and what we can and should do about them are profoundly influenced by the process of modernization through which all the underdeveloped countries are currently passing.

When one of these situations erupts into major violence as in Vietnam or the Arab-Israeli War, television gives it magnificent current coverage. But a search of television listings for the past year in an attempt to find items about the underdeveloped world that we could analyze at the conference turned up, with the notable exception of the ABC *Africa* special, surprisingly little on the commercial networks and somewhat less than we had expected on educational television. The conference confirmed that the quantitative coverage of the underdeveloped world has been very limited (apart from Vietnam) and devoted some attention to how this sheer lack of attention could be corrected.

One author emphasized that an understanding of what is happening in any underdeveloped country cannot be conveyed even in an elementary way without introducing much more of a time dimension and a sense of historical process into current programs than is now done. These societies are superficially so different from ours that any cross section reporting of the current scene is almost bound to underline to an American viewer the strange and exotic features of these foreign cultures. The impulse is very powerful to exploit after the fashion of the *National Geographic* the colorful customs

and queer habits of foreign peoples. The important thing for Americans to understand is not how different these people are, but how rapidly their societies are changing and the kinds of strains to which this unprecedented pace of change subjects the people who live in them. The important missing dimension is not how different these countries are from us but from what they were as little as ten or twenty years ago.

We do need to understand how big the gap is between the rich nations and the poor ones. This is easy to portray. But we need also to understand that the poverty of the poor nations is not inevitable, and that steps can be and are being taken by both developed and underdeveloped countries to do something about it. What is required is the twin goal of showing desperate need *and* of indicating confidence that the job is one that can be done.

Most of the underdeveloped countries outside Latin America have emerged from traditional hierarchical societies in which power was held by a very few to more broadly-based ones with considerable mass participation only since World War II, and even in Latin America this transition is also a very recent development. In most of the underdeveloped world the changes of the last two decades have been more extreme and dramatic than those of the preceding two centuries. An understanding of these radical changes is absolutely necessary to an understanding of how these people feel, or of their aspirations and frustrations, and of why they behave so often in what seems to the American such queer and unreasonable ways. The television professionals must suggest ways in which this crucial time dimension could be more widely introduced in programs about the underdeveloped world. For example, starting from an interest in a country's current crisis, a television program could pursue the crisis' roots in this certain nation's recent history.

A theme which all the authors agreed needs developing and which has not been treated on any television program is that the economic development efforts of many of the underdeveloped countries which we have been supporting with our aid programs over the past 15 or 20 years have been quite successful. Here the introduction of the time dimension stressed above is critically important. These countries are so very much poorer than the United States or even than Western Europe—their per capita incomes are on the average from 1/20th to 1/50th as large as ours—that any snapshot picture of current conditions will fill the American viewer with the conviction that they are failures, and if so why do we go on helping them?

But what matters is not so much how they compare with us. Even if they are fantastically successful, they cannot possibly achieve our current level in less than a century. And it may take longer. What matters is where they started from 20 years ago. The thing to watch is the rate at which they have been growing. This can be expressed, of course, statistically, but it can also be shown visually in a wide variety of ways.

Measured by growth rates the average for the underdeveloped world (excluding Communist China) has been for the past decade between four and one half and five per cent per year, a higher figure than the U.S. achieved during its decades of most rapid growth in the 19th century. A considerable part of this growth—about two and one half per cent—has been absorbed in supporting the additional people produced by the population explosion of the last two decades. Thus growth in income per person has not been as fast for these countries as it was in our own period of development. But even in per capita terms the average growth has been between one and one-half to two per cent, a quite respectable figure. This average has been achieved by balancing some failures with zero or negative per capita growth rates like Indonesia against some quite fantastic successes with per capita growth rates of three or four per cent or better like Taiwan, South Korea, Mexico, Greece, Israel, and Sudan. Even those in the middle with growth rates close to the average like India, Pakistan, and Brazil have growth records which in historical terms are very impressive. Two per cent per year per capita does not sound like much, but as we discovered in the United States, it doubles in a third of a century and multiplies eightfold in a 100 years.

Those portions of the American public with any awareness at all of the underdeveloped countries have a prevailing impression that these countries' problems are so insurmountable that there is not much we can really do to help them get on with the job of development. The record of the past decade properly told flatly contradicts this impression. There should be some programs on the success stories mentioned above, giving of course the debit as well as the credit side of the ledger but underlining that substantial progress is possible and has in fact in some places been achieved. With a proper time dimension built into the record of even the average performers like India, the quite unjustified sense of hopelessness that pervades much American thinking could be dispelled.

There are two reasons relating to developments in the race be-

tween food and population for believing that, with adequate help from the developed world the record of the past decade can be markedly improved upon in the next two or three. The first is the dramatic revolution in agriculture based on new varieties and new technology which has gathered momentum in parts of the developing world in the last two or three years. This offers the promise of a sharp increase in the growth of productivity in agriculture which provides more than half of the income of many countries. The second is the increasing effectiveness of population control programs, which will take much longer to work but which have for the first time in many countries real possibilities. Both have been treated in isolated television documentaries, but continuous coverage of these two inherently fascinating historical processes is totally missing.

The role of foreign aid in the development performance of the last decade has been critically important. While U.S. economic aid has constituted less than one-half of one per cent of the U.S. gross national product each year—something like \$.25 out of every \$100 of U.S. income—and has thus not been much of a burden to us, it has been tremendously important for a number of the underdeveloped countries. Because they are so poor, they have to use almost all of their limited resources for the subsistence needs of their populations and have very little left over to invest in the things that make growth possible like schools, roads, communications, electric power, industrial plants and equipment. For some of the underdeveloped countries and notably for the success stories, foreign aid has constituted from one quarter to one half of the total resources these countries have been able to devote to all kinds of development purposes. As these countries develop their own productive capabilities, they will ultimately be able to produce and export enough to pay for the imports they need both to keep their economies going and to expand their stock of productive facilities of all kinds. Aid need not go on for ever, and some countries like Taiwan which were formerly heavy aid recipients have now become self sufficient in foreign exchange. What to us have been relatively small amounts of economic aid have made the difference for a number of these countries over the past decade between growing per capita incomes and stagnation at subsistence levels. Rates of growth could have been very much higher had aid levels been only marginally higher than they in fact were. We should think imaginatively about ways of demonstrating this dependence of economic growth on foreign economic assistance.

While the U.S. contribution has been critical, less than half of the total foreign aid received by underdeveloped countries has been supplied by the United States. Americans tend to believe that we are staggering under a grossly unfair share of the aid burden. In the first place this simply is not so, and in the second place even if it were so it would not necessarily be an argument for reducing our share. Making the U.S. decision on the level of aid heavily dependent on the willingness of other countries to finance their fair share, as we calculate it, may simply hand them a veto on action that would be in the American interest even if our own share were "unfair."

American economic aid as a proportion of national product has been shrinking rapidly for some time. Total official disbursements by the U.S. in 1966 represented a lower proportion of national product than the disbursements of five or six other developed countries including some big ones like France. We are even further behind in our share of public and private capital combined. And if one thinks that, in keeping with the principle of the progressive income tax, richer countries can afford a higher proportional contribution than poorer ones, we, the richest country in the world, should be at the head of the list.

There are many misconceptions about the costs of foreign aid to the United States which good television treatment could help to clear up. Many people not only feel that the resource burden of aid is much larger than it in fact is—one years economic aid now costs us less than three weeks of the war in Vietnam—but that it has a critical effect on our balance of payments. While this is a complex subject even for economists, those who have studied it agree that since the bulk of aid (nearly 90 per cent) now consists of goods and services supplied directly from the United States, the effect of aid on the U.S. balance of payments is relatively minor.

In all underdeveloped countries which have records of good development performance over the past decade, local self-help efforts have been very substantial. While aid has been a critical ingredient, the willingness of the recipient governments to take strong measures and to make significant sacrifices in order to promote development goals have been absolutely essential. The record here has been mixed. Some countries have been plagued with inflations which they have not found possible to control. Government red tape and bureaucratic inefficiency have inhibited growth almost everywhere, and instances of major corruption and of gross misuses of funds are not hard to find. Nonetheless in some cases fiscal management has

been unusually good. Many countries have imposed tax rates on themselves which would be regarded as high in much richer countries like ours. Looking back on the graft and corruption, especially in city politics, which characterized the most rapid period of American growth, we should not be too purist in our judgments of countries in which nepotism and the greasing of palms to get things done are deeply embedded in the local tradition. In short, while the record of self help and dedication to development is not an unmixed one and while it is important for us to continue to press for improvements in performance by the recipients of aid, the record of the more successful underdeveloped countries in this regard is one of very substantial accomplishment. There are a variety of persuasive and interesting ways in which this record could be documented either for individual countries or by broad surveys by continents or for the whole underdeveloped world.

One of the main reasons Americans are or should be interested in the progress of the economic development efforts of the underdeveloped countries is that we believe the success of these efforts is somehow related to the political process in these countries and to the prospects for instability, violence, extremism, and xenophobia. These are very difficult matters to elucidate in any simple and convincing way even to a sophisticate, let alone to an unsophisticated audience. Nonetheless to fail to deal with the underdeveloped world's economic and political performance would be to leave out the dimension of the problem of modernization that is or should be of most interest to the American electorate. The notion that economic improvement will guarantee political stability or increasingly effective democracies is clearly wrong and can only lead to false expectations. It is important to convey to American audiences that the modernization process through which the underdeveloped countries are now going is inevitably destabilizing. We cannot tear a traditional society apart, disrupt all its traditional practices, introduce wholly new aspirations for education, jobs, political influence, national dignity and pride without some evidences of revolution and violence.

A very interesting parallel can be drawn here between what is happening to the newly awakened people of the underdeveloped world and what is happening to our own underprivileged minority groups in the United States. There was no violence in the slums, no emergence of a Black Power movement, and very little extremist agitation among American minority groups until their economic,

social, and political position began to improve. People do not revolt against conditions they regard as hopeless and unchangeable. It is when conditions begin to get better and aspirations previously regarded as hopelessly unrealistic begin to seem possible that frustration mounts and spills over into extremism and violence. Yet no one would argue that at this stage in history economic and social stagnation either for our own minorities or for the peoples of the underdeveloped world is an effective prescription for stability. The aspirations are already changed. The possibility of success with them depends on a rapid expansion of economic potential and opportunity in the future.

Without economic development there can be no progress in education, in more productive agriculture, in the expansion of roads and communications, in the extension of electric power, in the development of industry. By introducing the time dimension, one can document the radical way in which aspirations in the underdeveloped world have changed in the last twenty years. Without development, the means to satisfy these aspirations even partially will not be present, and the result will inevitably be frustration, a mounting level of pointless violence, and a high probability of increasing U.S. military involvement as in Vietnam. With development, there is no guarantee that the process will be smooth and peaceful. But there is at least a much greater chance that over two or three decades it can move markedly in this direction.

Americans must somehow be brought to understand first that the ferment in the underdeveloped world is a very new phenomenon; second that it has both positive and negative aspects; third that the positive aspects have a much greater chance of success in a climate of economic expansion and prosperity; and finally that America is in an extraordinary position to influence this climate in a wide variety of ways. We should explore ways in which practitioners and specialists in electronic communication and academicians expert in the evolutionary processes at work in the less developed countries can co-operate better to project themes like these to a variety of types of American audiences.

EMERGING NATIONS: WHAT THE PUBLIC WATCHES

GERALD M. JAFFE

This report presents audience response to television programs about Emerging Nations and compares it with audience reaction to other types of programming. Some of the data for this comparison is less than complete because many of the programs were not commercially sponsored and therefore not reported by the A. C. Nielsen Company. The A. C. Nielsen Company is the only rating service reporting almost continuously all year long (48 weeks, 24 hours a day), but will not report non-sponsored programs. NBC does purchase the ratings on most of these specials telecast on NBC at an additional cost. Folders on CBS' and ABC's specials are unavailable.

Audience composition data (number of viewers of particular age and sex groups per 100 sets tuned) is gathered for only 24 weeks of the year (20 prior to the 1966-67 season), with the greatest concentration at the beginning of the season. It is at this part of the season that the network, because it is trying to establish its new programs, schedules the fewest specials. In addition, almost no documentaries reach the minimum standards on the separate diary service to be reported on a detailed basis. Other demographic data (household) are also reported for 24 weeks a year and only for commercially sponsored programs.

For purposes of keeping to a fairly tight definition of "Emerging Nations," all programs dealing with Vietnam, and the Middle East this past summer, have been excluded. Despite all these handicaps, however, sufficient data do exist with which to establish general guidelines to the type and size of the audience of the average program covering Emerging Nations.

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The ability of any program, documentary or entertainment, to attract an audience depends on many factors. The major factors are the strength of the program itself, the time of the evening, the competition, and the lead-in program. All these factors determine the average audience and competitive share of each program. In addition to this the total audience is determined by the program length.

The additional factor of different programming ideologies among the networks must also be considered. NBC has generally preferred to spot its documentaries throughout the schedule to give the effect of "special" status to the programs, while CBS has traditionally set aside the same hour each week for its *CBS Reports* documentaries. Many of ABC's documentaries have been from independent sources and have generally not dealt with foreign affairs.

The data available over the past five years indicate that the average audience to programs on Emerging Nations is probably about 9,000,000 persons per minute, located in 5,000,000 different homes. The total audience to these particular programs is about 50 per cent greater than the average audience—14,000,000 different persons in 7,500,000 different homes. To put this into perspective, the average entertainment program in prime time (7:30 P.M.—11:00 P.M.) attracts an audience approximately twice as large, and the average Huntley-Brinkley or Walter Cronkite newscast attracts an audience about 60 per cent larger. It can also be seen that documentaries on Emerging Nations, as most documentaries, are not very competitive—averaging an 18 share of audience and generally having less audience than any of the competing programs.

TABLE I: AUDIENCE COMPARISONS (000)

	<i>Emerging Nations</i>	<i>Entertainment Program</i>	<i>Huntley-Brinkley Newscast</i>
Total Audience:			
Homes	7,500	11,000	9,300
Persons	14,000*	24,500	18,500
Average Audience:			
Homes	5,000	9,500	8,100
Persons	9,000*	20,800	15,800
Share	18	31	33

*Audience composition to the average documentary is projected on to the home data for Emerging Nation programs.

Source: NTI: Emerging Nations 1963-1967
Others: Latest Year

Not all documentaries on Emerging Nations or foreign affairs are uncompetitive. A few do compete successfully against entertainment programming. The most stunning example of this was ABC's recent four-hour special *Africa*. This program attracted the largest audience ever to a program of this type. During the course of the four hours over 19,000,000 different homes tuned to at least six minutes of the program and almost 8,500,000 homes were tuned to the average minute. It is estimated that upward of 40,000,000 persons viewed some portion of the program with about 17,000,000 million viewing the average minute of the program.

There have been several other programs dealing, all or in part, with Emerging Nations that have reached large audiences—though not necessarily by entertainment standards.

TABLE II: TOP FIVE PROGRAMS ON EMERGING NATIONS IN TERMS OF HOMES (000) REACHED

	<i>Network</i>	<i>Total Audience</i>	<i>Average Audience</i>
<i>Africa</i>	ABC	19,260	8,340
"White Paper-Foreign Policy"	NBC	13,670	5,920
"Battle for Asia-Laos"	NBC	10,820	7,470
"Voice of the Dragon"	NBC	9,040	5,650
"Morley Safer's Red China Diary"	CBS	8,840	6,590

Source: NTI

We managed to isolate seven documentaries with demographic data by the type of household viewing the program. These data make no inference as to the number, or age, of individual viewers in these homes. It simply designates the home by its type; e.g., the home is located in A sized counties, has middle sized income, etc. Averaging the seven specials gives us a composite view of the type of home that views the average documentary on Emerging Nations (Table III below).

In general the most distinguishing feature of the audience is its lack of a pronounced slant to any particular audience type. There is a tendency for the programs to be viewed more in upper income homes and homes where the head of house has some college education. The programs are viewed least in rural areas and in homes where the head of house is under 35 years of age and is a high school drop-out. Strangely, in homes where the head of house never attended any high school these programs have a higher rating. A comparison of the type of audience viewing the documentaries with the audience

viewing other forms of programming is more favorable. This is particularly true in the areas of income and education where the entertainment programs and the nightly newscasts tend to show a poorer slant than the documentaries.

TABLE III: A COMPOSITE VIEW OF THE TELEVISION AUDIENCE TO PROGRAMS ON EMERGING NATIONS ON AN INDEX BASIS

	<i>Emerging Nations*</i>	<i>Average Evening Program</i>	<i>Average H-B & W.C.</i>
Average Program: Rating	8.7	17.2	14.7
Index	100	100	100
County Size:			
A (largest 25 Cities)	98	102	83
B (other cities)	101	100	105
C (small towns)	108	99	129
D (rural areas)	93	95	103
Household Income:			
Low (-\$5,000)	97	92	113
Middle (\$5,000-9,999)	99	104	92
Upper (\$10,000+)	109	101	101
Age of Head of House:			
-35 years of age	92	100	73
35-49 years of age	104	108	91
50-64 years of age	104	94	106
65 + years of age	102	93	154
Education of Head of House:			
Grade School	101	96	118
1-3 Years High School	87	99	99
4 Years High School	101	104	86
1 + Years College	108	95	97

* Data are available for only seven programs.

Source: NTI

While there are no studies measuring the effectiveness or impact of these programs on the audience they reach, we do have a measure of what people say they feel about a program. Eleven documentaries have been extracted from Tv-Q (a syndicated public opinion survey of television programs) with the following results:

30 per cent of the people who have seen these documentaries say that these programs rank as one of their favorites. This is four percentage points above the average evening program but well below people's opinions of their favorite newscasts.

Men appear to enjoy these programs more than women.

Adults 35-49 years of age prefer them more than any other group.

Again, a comparison by type of viewer favors the documentary to other forms of programs. The average entertainment program is liked best by children up to the age of 17, and the *Huntley-Brinkley* and *Walter Cronkite Newscast* are liked best by persons over 50 years of age.

TABLE IV: POPULARITY BY SEX AND AGE ON AN INDEX BASIS

	<i>E. N.</i> <i>Documentaries</i>	<i>Average</i> <i>Program</i>	<i>H-B</i> <i>W.C.</i>
All Persons: Tv-Q	30	26	44
Index	100	100	100
Men 18 + Years	107	85	107
Women 18 + Years	93	85	114
Persons: 6-11 Years	93	158	36
12-17 Years	83	112	55
18-34 Years	93	81	86
35-49 Years	107	77	102
50 + Years	97	92	134

Source: Tv-Q

In summary it can be said that the size of the audience to documentaries on Emerging Nations is generally small compared to entertainment programs or regular newscasts. On the other hand the quality of the audience to these programs generally surpasses other forms of programming.

**SUPPORTING TABLES:
DOCUMENTARIES ON EMERGING NATIONS 1963-1967**

NBC

		<i>Day</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>TA¹</i>	<i>AA²</i>	<i>SH³</i>
1967	"THE CHINA CRISIS"	Mon.	8:30-9 p.m.	11.8	10.4	15
	"BATTLE FOR ASIA: INDONESIA"	Sun.	6:30-7:30 p.m.	15.6	10.3	19
	"BATTLE FOR ASIA: LAOS"	Thurs.	7:30-8:30 p.m.	19.7	13.6	22
	"MANANA IS NOW"	Sat.	8-8:30 p.m.	7.9	6.5	12
1966	"VOICE OF THE DRAGON"	Sun.	6:30-7:30 p.m.	16.8	10.5	19
	"BATTLE FOR ASIA 'THAILAND'"	Fri.	10-11 p.m.	15.7	11.9	24
	"CONGO: VICTIM OF INDEPENDENCE"	Sun.	6:30-7:30 p.m.	14.1	9.0	18
1965	"WHITE PAPER: FOREIGN POLICY"	Thurs.	7:30-11 p.m.	25.4	11.0	21
1964	"THE RIVER GANGES"	Tues.	10-11 p.m.	9.0	7.0	14
	"CHANGING MATILDA: NEW AUSTRALIA"	Tues.	10-11 p.m.	10.6	8.2	16
	"RIVER NILE"	Sun.	10-11 p.m.	16.0	10.3	23
	"SIKKIM & ITS YANKEE QUEEN"	Wed.	9-10 p.m.	8.7	5.7	11
	"WHITE PAPER: BAY OF PIGS"	Tues.	10-11 p.m.	14.5	11.1	20
	"DEFENSE OF INDIA"	Tues.	10-11 p.m.	7.8	5.5	12

¹Total Audience

²Average Audience

³Share

CBS

		<i>Day</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>TA</i>	<i>AA</i>	<i>Sh</i>
1967	"MORLEY SAFER'S RED CHINA DIARY"	Tues.	10-11 p.m.	16.1	12.0	23
	"LETTERS OF HO CHI MINH"	Tues.	10-10:30 p.m.	7.2	5.8	10
1966	"MEXICO: A LESSON IN LATIN"	Tues.	10-11 p.m.	13.7	9.2	18
	"U.S. & CHINA"	Tues.	10-11 p.m.	5.5	3.4	7
1965	"WHAT WENT WRONG IN SANTO DOMINGO"	Mon.	10-11 p.m.	12.1	8.3	18
	"KASHMIRE: THE REASON WHY"	Tues.	10-10:30 p.m.	9.3	7.8	15
1963	"PRESIDENT KENNEDY: COSTA RICO"	Fri.	10:30-11 p.m.	9.1	7.9	16
	ISRAEL: ITS NO FABLE"	Wed.	7:30-8:30 p.m.	10.8	5.6	15

ABC

1967	<i>AFRICA</i>	Sun.	7-11 p.m.	34.4	14.9	25
1965	"MISSION TO MALAYA"	Sat.	9:30-10:30 p.m.	14.4	10.4	18

Source: NTI

**AUDIENCE DEMOGRAPHICS TO DOCUMENTARIES ON EMERGING
NATIONS ON AN INDEX BASIS**

	TOTAL U.S.		COUNTY SIZE				HOUSEHOLD INCOME		
	<i>Rtg.</i>	<i>Index</i>	A	B	C	D	\$5,000	\$5-9,999	\$10,000+
"BATTLE FOR ASIA"	11.9	100	115	100	91	64	100	99	99
"RIVER NILE"	6.3	100	111	73	111	110	98	98	108
"CHINA CRISIS"	10.4	100	85	103	126	100	88	101	113
"MANANA IS NOW"	6.5	100	92	108	120	86	95	97	114
"LETTERS OF HO"	5.8	100	59	133	136	116	131	86	90
"SANTO DOMINGO"	8.3	100	99	83	114	114	98	106	88
"M. SAFER'S RED CHINA DIARY"	12.0	100	107	108	85	86	87	90	136

	TOTAL U.S.		AGE OF HEAD OF HOUSE				EDUCATION OF HEAD OF HOUSE			
	<i>Rtg.</i>	<i>Index</i>	-35	35-49	50-64	65+	GS	1-3 Yrs. HS	4 Yrs. HS	Coll.
"BATTLE FOR ASIA"	11.9	100	82	118	92	102	88	102	109	97
"RIVER NILE"	6.3	100	86	124	90	98	122	106	78	98
"CHINA CRISIS"	10.4	100	97	115	94	77	67	93	118	114
"MANANA IS NOW"	6.5	100	89	117	98	86	112	100	85	108
"LETTERS OF HO"	5.8	100	60	97	124	141	162	93	72	74
"SANTO DOMINGO"	8.3	100	93	88	110	124	108	66	110	111
"M. SAFER'S RED CHINA DIARY"	12.0	100	110	78	118	99	89	62	108	130

Source: NTI

TV-Q SCORES TO DOCUMENTARIES ON EMERGING NATIONS
ON AN INDEX BASIS

	ALL PERSONS		ADULTS 18+		AGES				
	Tv-Q	Index	Men	Women	6-11	12-17	18-34	35-49	50+
AFRICA	37	100	95	105	97	95	108	111	81
"MANANA IS NOW"	20	100	105	120	160	35	70	235	80
"LETTERS OF HO"	27	100	115	89	-0-	130	115	44	122
"BATTLE FOR ASIA: LAOS"	34	100	121	94	74	65	82	124	112
"CHINA CRISIS"	32	100	116	100	22	47	116	94	113
"CONVULSIONS IN CHINA"	27	100	111	67	185	100	74	96	93
"BATTLE FOR ASIA: THAILAND"	30	100	113	87	107	93	117	80	107
"CONGO; VICTIM OF INDEP."	32	100	100	97	41	97	119	100	88
"RIVER NILE"	36	100	81	117	175	72	108	97	94
"MEXICO"	25	100	116	104	68	64	80	136	104
"CONGO"	28	100	118	79	136	136	111	107	89

TELEVISION AND THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY

FRED FREED

I speak not as a representative of NBC News or the television industry, but as a working producer of television news documentaries. My purpose is simply to describe briefly how this area of television news documentaries works so that we may talk realistically about how television practitioners and members of the academic community can work together. Too often we seem to speak different languages. We do not even trust each other very much. The TV professional finds the academic divorced from our "real" world, and he finds us without sensitivity to his "reality." It seems to me that these feelings are no longer relevant—and are becoming increasingly self-indulgent. We need to work together, because the time we live in requires it.

What is relevant now is this: The chief instrument of communication with most of the people of this nation, whether we approve of that fact or not, is television. Most people in America turn to television to find out what is going on in the world. The relevant question for us in television news is: How can we best tell them? But I think it is relevant for you too—as concerned citizens, as members of the intellectual elite, as teachers. That is why it is important for us to talk about your relationship with television.

FRED FREED came to CBS radio in 1948, and has been in radio and television ever since. At NBC since 1961, he produced the *Today* program, and between 1962 and 1965 he was with Irving Gitlin's Creative Projects unit. He produced NBC *White Papers*, among them, "Death of Stalin," "The Cuban Missile Crisis," and "The Decision to Drop the Bomb." In 1965 he was the producer of NBC's three and a half-hour "American White Paper: Organized Crime in America," which won a Peabody Award.

I am not referring only to educational television or Public Television. It would be a cop-out, I think, for the academic community to use its participation in Public Television as an excuse not to dirty its hands in commercial television. It would be just as much of a cop-out for us to ignore, because of Public Television, what you have to give us. If we did that, the blunt result would be that you would speak on television mostly to each other and to your like-minded friends. It might be more comfortable that way, but to me it would be more useful if you talked to a broader spectrum of viewers.

I think, if we believe in saving this society of ours, it is worth the effort—yours and ours—to reach as many people as possible with the kind of information and insight you can give us. We're concerned here specifically with the less-developed world. Our coverage of that world, both in spot news and documentaries, has often been less than distinguished. I don't think we—or you—have done enough to make Americans truly aware of and sensitive to the dimension of the revolution of the non-White world. It is also clear that this revolution has a great deal to tell us about the incipient revolution developing in the Black ghettos of America—in our own non-White less-developed areas.

We tell a good deal about events. We report them, individually, reasonably well. But we find it more difficult to show relationships, roots, underlying meanings, causes and effects. We often fail to project the directions of what is happening, where it may lead, and how it can affect us. You can help us to do that. But if that is going to happen, we must both be clear about what it is we are dealing with. We ought to begin by being candid.

Admittedly, there is much to criticize in our programs from the standpoint of your expertise. But of what is wrong can be charged to the limitations of television as an instrument of communication. The most serious of these limitations are those which affect the attention of the viewer:

- the size of the screen
- the conditions under which people look at it: in a lighted room, with people moving in and out and interrupting
- the condition of the viewer: often tired or distracted, interested in escaping his own troubles, not much interested in listening to the world's
- the fact that the viewer can't turn the page back and re-read what he read a few minutes ago

Television is essentially a medium of emotion, not thought. But the point, it seems to me, is that despite these handicaps, we must still

examine subjects that are complex and demand thought, simply because for many people there is no other source of information on these subjects.

Television has one great overriding advantage as a means of communication—the size of its audience. Many millions of people—many more millions than are reached by newspapers or magazines or in seminars or lectures—watch TV. But there are limits to what we, and you, can do effectively on television, and it would, I think, be well to examine those conditions before we consider what we *can* do. I don't think it is necessary for us to accept artificially-imposed limitations, but we should know what is it we are dealing with.

Consider documentary news programs—the area of television news with which I am most familiar. You have probably seen *CBS Reports*, *ABC Scope* or *NBC White Paper*. Like almost everything else, one of these programs begins with an idea one of us has. The ideas we have are limited by what we know, and quite often we don't know all that we ought to know. We are often unaware of currents and forces moving under the surface that have not yet become visible to the eye of one who is not a specialist. Here we could use your help.

But it's important to understand that having an idea for a program is not the same thing as having a program. An idea is not a program until management approves it, allocates a budget for it, assigns people to prepare it, and schedules air time for it. Getting this approval is a complicated process, involving factors of timing, need, and balance with other programs scheduled by management. At best, we put between 35 and 50 documentary news specials on the air each year. Which will they be? The river Nile? Khrushchev's memoirs? The state of our space effort? The jockeying for the Presidential nomination? The roots of racial disorders? Management will ask questions like these: How many other programs have we done on this general subject? How much interest is there in it? Is it as important as other subjects being proposed? What kind of a program will it make?

It is a simple fact that there are certain subjects for which it is difficult to get approval. Networks live under far greater pressure than newspapers or magazines or college faculties. Networks use the public air. They have a public responsibility. Networks are also in business, and businesses are concerned with making money. The chief way networks make money is to put on the air programs that a great many people watch—programs that sponsors will spend a lot of money to support. A program about an economic crisis in India

or the population explosion in Latin America does not have the audience appeal of some other subjects. This is not to say we do not try to get them on the air. It is to say they do not strike an immediate responsive chord at upper management levels. Just as naturally, many people in management do not believe in getting the network into controversy for what they consider gratuitous reasons. You may blame them for this, but you should be able to understand them. Similar pressures are not unknown in the academic world. The politics of playing it safe is universal, and people who are willing to take chances are rare anywhere.

One of the problems of commercial television is that no one is quite certain what its primary mission really is. To make money is clearly one mission. But beyond that what? To entertain? To teach? To inform? To sell? To soothe? Is television an opiate? An educational institution? A stage? A newspaper on film? Television is surely some of each of these. The network news departments are also some of each. At best they represent the network's sense of public responsibility—the network's conscience. At worst, they exist because the Federal Communications Commission insists that they exist, and they are used to paying lip service to public service. But at the root of all thinking about television's mission is this hard fact: the first step with any program is to persuade people to watch it. Those people on the other side of the television screen have absolutely free choice. They may not tune in at all. If they do tune in, at any moment they may tune out with a small motion of the wrist. News, as well as any other programming department, has to keep this in mind.

Documentary news specials are usually one-hour programs, although I have done two programs that lasted three-and-a-half hours, and Jim Fleming of ABC now holds the record with his four-hour program last fall on Africa. These documentary programs are an invention of television. They are not like a book, or a magazine article, or a big screen movie, or the *March of Time*, or the documentaries of Flaherty, or like anything else ever seen before.

Those of us who put these documentary programs together live within certain arbitrary perimeters. The chief of these is time: four kinds of time. First, the air time available for the program. The network has 13 hours of broadcast time a day—92 hours a week. While most of these go for regularly scheduled entertainment and news programs, some 35 to 50 hours a season are set aside for planned documentary programs. Decisions must be made, by news manage-

ment first, and then by company management, on how to fill these hours.

Several factors are involved in these decisions. One is money. With color, the cost of one of these programs now averages around \$125,000. The network ordinarily gives up at least another \$100,000 from the sponsor at the regular hour this program will replace. That brings the network's investment up to nearly \$250,000, and it would be pleased if someone would defray at least part of this. But someone is not likely to be interested if the program is very controversial on one hand, or visually not very exciting on the other. In other words, you might find it hard to get a sponsor for a program on Negro anti-Semitism or on the GNP.

This situation creates real pressure. We must fill the time available with programs that can be sold and that will attract many viewers. This does *not* mean the network won't do programs that can't be sold on subjects that are not popular. It means the network won't do *many* such programs. And, of course, controversy means trouble. The network sometimes doesn't mind trouble if it feels that trouble is worth getting into. The problem, of course, is what trouble is worth getting into? For example, we may do a program on an important, controversial subject. No one sponsors the program. The network loses money. The audience is small. The critics are unenthusiastic. Perhaps no one reviews it. Those who said we should do it don't watch. Those who didn't want us to do the program watch and write letters, send telegrams, and make phone calls—all denouncing us. Other pressures are exerted. There are letters from congressional committees, FCC complaints, complaints from potential sponsors. To put it bluntly, the rewards are often not commensurate with the risks the network is asked to take.

But let us assume that the network decides to budget and schedule a certain program. A second kind of time now threatens us—time to prepare. A newspaper can afford to turn one reporter loose for months to investigate a story. Sometimes it even does. But for television to do the same thing requires many people, much equipment and much money. How long do we have? Probably three months, and if we're lucky perhaps five. Ordinarily, none of us begins as an expert. We are reporters. What entitles a reporter to become an instant expert, and within weeks after he begins to learn about the subject, explain it to millions of people? This, I realize, is the historic function of a reporter. I am not now arguing against the employment of reporters who are educated and trained in history, eco-

nomics, and political science, and who know the fields in which they work with some expertise. Such reporters work in our news departments in increasing numbers. What I am suggesting is that they are not likely to be experts in the sense that you are experts in many specific situations they are required to report. They have to become instant experts.

That is where we need your help—both to prepare us for what we may have to deal with in general and to help us deal with it specifically. In translating what you know to the television screen the television news reporter and producer has certain craft skills you do not possess. They know, or should know, how to use the tools of their trade. They know, or should know, how to put what they know on the air. The question is what *do* they know? They know what they can find in books, papers, reports. They know what the people involved will tell them. They need to know what the specialists in the field can tell them. You are those specialists. What we have to learn is how to better use what you can tell us in the context of what will translate most effectively onto the television screen.

That brings us to still another kind of limiting time—time on the air, which averages 51 minutes with breaks, openings, commercials, and so on. You can fairly ask, “can anyone say anything in depth on television in 51 minutes interrupted six times by commercials?” The answer is that it’s very hard—but the answer also is that we’d better find a way to do it, because television—more and more—is going to be the place where most people get their image of the world they live in.

There’s a fourth kind of time which limits our effectiveness. That comes when you’re given a time for your program. Who is on the other channels at the same time? I recently did a program on the causes of the disorders in Detroit last summer. It was a program that had important things to say. We used the expertise of Wayne State University, and had Daniel P. Moynihan as our chief-on-the-air reporter. It was a controversial and, we felt, useful program. NBC gave us the money and the time to do it. We had everything in our favor except this: that week CBS began its television movie season with *The Great Escape* in two parts. While we were on the air, so was the second half of that movie. That movie got the highest rating of this television season, which means a great many people missed our program. In fact I would think only some of those who already knew something about the subject saw our program. For the most part, the very people we hoped would see it—middle class White

America—saw *The Great Escape*. NBC spent close to \$200,000 to examine the causes of the disorders. Is there a more important subject? How many of *you* saw it?

This brings me to the key question—to whom are we speaking? Most academics tell me we ought to have “good” television for “them”—those people out there. It should be good for “them.” They seldom suggest they would like to watch television themselves. To whom are we speaking? To you experts? To intelligent laymen already interested in the subject? To educated people not yet interested? To a mass audience, not much interested and not very well-educated? Is our mission to get people interested? To examine the subject in depth? To summarize what is known? To say something new? To whom are we talking? To young people? To adults? To college graduates in the suburbs? To Negroes in the ghettos? They’re all out there. They all have television sets. Shall we be pragmatic and address ourselves to Jack Gould and *The New York Times*? Should we try to win *your* approval? Or should we speak to the widest possible audience and necessarily speak with less sophistication, more slowly, more simply? Or should we just try to please ourselves? Sometimes we can do all or most of these things at the same time.

Often we have to choose. Often we have to ask ourselves: will most of the viewers be able to follow this? Do they have the necessary background? Don’t we have to tell them things that anyone who has followed this story already knows? To tell them those things takes time. If you put something in, you have to take something else out. Each time you add or cut, the nature of the program changes. We have 51 precious minutes of air time. We have a potential audience in the many millions. Presumably we have something important to say. To whom should we say it? If we say it to you, will you watch? If we say it to the people in the ghetto, will they bother to tune out the movie and tune in our program?

There are some other limitations. Money is one. I mentioned \$125,000 for production. That is a great deal of money. But the fact is most of it goes for technical things. To buy and process film. For fares, hotel, car and phone bills. To pay the salaries of camera and editing crews. For office space, transcripts, and screening time. Not for research. Money is limited, I regret to tell you, even in television.

What about censorship? Most censorship on television is self-censorship. I have never been turned down for a program I wanted to

do for censorship reasons. On the other hand, I'm not sure I have ever asked to do one I knew management would not approve for those reasons. I suppose we are most timid about Congress and those government agencies which hold some power over us. Sponsor pressure, which you hear so much about, has never affected any program I've done. Sponsors do not have the right to see news programs at NBC before they go on the air. NBC puts those programs on the air whether they are sponsored or not. NBC put on a three-and-a-half hour program on organized crime at a cost of half-a-million dollars without a sponsor. No one has ever suggested I say something or not say something to please a sponsor.

But this brings us to another, not incidental question. Should we in television news express our own opinions? Should we take editorial positions? Or should we try to be objective and carefully balance all points of view? A lot of people tell us we should take strong editorial positions. But we usually find that what they mean is, we should strongly support their point of view. They usually favor strong opinions that agree with theirs. Liberals are likely to tell us we ought to attack conservative concepts. When we do not agree with their liberal views they are not so enthusiastic. Recently I attended a conference to discuss television reporting of last summer's racial disorders. A number of Negro leaders and a white sociologist suggested that one problem in our coverage was that we did not put on the air enough *positive* news, enough about the "good things" happening in the Black Ghettos. But back in the 50's when the *Southern* stations were telling us the same thing about our coverage of the disorders down there, some of these people felt differently.

Last spring I did a program about gun laws in this country. I took a position that it is too easy for people to get guns. NBC is still answering complains from people who found that program unfair. If you take an editorial position, there is one basic legal—and moral—problem you have to deal with. The other side has a right, and, I think, ought to have a right, to answer you—and ought to have equal time and equal facilities to answer you. Television does not belong to those of us who have the use of it. We have no special right to say "this is how it is because we say so." The other side, no matter how deeply we disagree, has a right to be heard. But that can be very expensive. It could mean the expense of another quarter-of-a-million dollars to the network to provide that hearing. How often can even television afford that? But even if we didn't think we ought to have to give the other side time to be heard, Congress and

the FCC often do. So beyond the morality of this question lies the matter of simple necessity—a necessity which does not, as you know, similarly affect newspapermen, congressmen, or professors.

There is another limitation, and that is one which we create. On television, pictures of things happening are ordinarily more interesting than pictures of people talking. If you are in the business of making television documentaries, you are also in the business of making films. So you try to choose subjects you can make films about. It is easy to film fighting in Viet Nam. It is hard to film a treatment of the national budget. The budget is clearly more important than a skirmish at Dak To, but it is hard to *see* on television. We have not yet learned how to show it. When we try, people turn to another channel. Yet people have to watch our programs. If they don't, we fail, no matter how brilliantly we examine the budget, the Alliance for Progress, or Nasser's economic difficulties.

These are the broad outlines within which we work. Within them, what can we do together? How can you help us? Let me be specific about some programs I have put together with academic assistance. First let me discuss a successful example of co-operation between the practitioner and academic interests in a sensitive area. In the spring of 1964 NBC approved a one-hour program examining the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. No air date was set, and I was given virtually unlimited time for research. After I had read the basic books on the subject, I went to the man I thought had written the most informative and objective book, Herbert Feis. Mr. Feis was then at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton and he agreed to serve as Program Consultant. At the same time I began to talk with a young scholar whose views diametrically opposed those of Mr. Feis—Gar Alperovitz. I, and the people working with me, saw them both regularly. We argued out each point of controversy, among ourselves and in our meetings with them. After several months we were, in fact, experts on the subject. All this happened before we even began to consider what we would put on the air. We decided the key to the story was *how* the decision was made. Although we disagreed with Mr. Feis on some points we found we were generally closer to his views than to those of Mr. Alperovitz.

At this point we outlined the program and began to talk with the people who had participated in the decision. Many of them were academics: Robert Oppenheimer, George Kistiakowsky, Vannevar Bush, James Conant, Rudolf Peierls, Glenn Seaborg, Harold Urey, and others. They told us, both as participants and as scholars, what

we could have learned nowhere else. Then we did what hardly any scholar could do. With time and money, we were able to see and film interviews with every living participant in the decision to use the atomic bomb except former President Truman. We had concluded Mr. Truman had little to do with the real decision—which may explain why, when he heard what we wanted to ask him, he did not want to talk to us.

One of our academic advisers was Robert Butow, who is at the Far Eastern and Russian Institute at the University of Washington, and who wrote, as you probably know, the definitive work on the Japanese decision to surrender. It is a book, incidentally, never widely recognized but widely used by other writers, and I think one thing we were able to do was to give Bob Butow some of the public recognition he deserved. He put us in touch with Japanese who had participated in the decision in Tokyo in the last days of the war. We saw them all. When we came back to the United States, we had on film detailed interviews with these men, which we presented to the Far Eastern and Russian Institute.

This, I think, was a real collaboration between the television and academic worlds. We helped each other. We were useful to each other. Each furnished something the other could not, and in the end we had a television program that said much that had never been said anywhere else before.

My point is this: Without people like Mr. Feis and Mr. Butow we could never have gotten so deeply into our subject so quickly. We would have gone off on dead end trails. We would not have had entree to many of our key witnesses. Most important, Mr. Feis and Mr. Butow understood our problems. They knew we would not put everything on the television screen. They realized that the limits and possibilities led us where they, as academics, might not have gone. In return, we were able to bring to Mr. Feis and Mr. Butow first-hand testimony that they had not been able to get at before. We were able to give them material that was useful in new editions of their books. This was a very happy experience.

We had an equally happy one on a program that examined the Bay of Pigs debacle. Our consultant then was Theodore Draper. With his help we saw almost everyone who had part in that catastrophe. Draper had conducted, for many months, a long-range correspondence with Dr. Justo Carillo in Guatemala City, an anti-Castro liberal who had been shunted aside by the CIA. It was Carillo who was told by President Kennedy while the fighting was

still going on that the CIA had misled him, and Mr. Kennedy told Dr. Carillo who in the CIA had done it. We decided to film him talking about this, so we made a phone call, got plane and hotel reservations, and flew him to New York, where Ted Draper met him for the first time. When the program was finished, Draper, who is a tough critic, said that it was the most definitive work on the subject up to that time. Perhaps despite this, we had an audience estimated at 12,000,000.

Now let me describe a program on which I had considerable academic assistance, but of which I am not so proud. It is one of the few programs of mine that Mr. Gould of the *Times* and I agree on. We both thought it was a failure. It was a program on nuclear proliferation, and we approached it with the same care we had exercised on the atomic-decision program. We had six months to prepare it, and we saw all the experts at the Hudson Institute, Rand, IDIA, the Pentagon, Harvard, and MIT. We saw people like Jerome Weisner, Carl Kaysen, Herman Kahn, and Bernard Feld. They directed us to all the right people involved in the proliferation issue. We went to Geneva, to Egypt, and Israel, West Germany and France. We filmed the Indian nuclear reactor. Despite this we failed on two counts: the program was not very interesting, either to experts or laymen, and we didn't add anything really useful to the proliferation arguments.

What happened? For one thing, the issue turned out to be too complex for the time we had to tell about it. We tried to simplify it and simplified it so much that we failed to say anything significant. I think one factor worth thinking about is that television is a medium of the specific—of the event. This was a program of ideas, and those ideas were extremely sophisticated. We found there was a greater gap between what the experts were saying and what ordinary people knew than we had thought. I think it is useful to mention these problems. But I think it would be a mistake to give them too much weight, because in retrospect, the real reason the program was not good was that I didn't do my job well enough.

In fact, I think if we are honest we have to admit most of the failures of our television programs are human failures—failures of talent and imagination in using this marvelous instrument of communication, information, and education. I think the fault is partly yours too, because our relationship has not been as fruitful as it could be, and you have not used us as well or as artfully as you

might have to get onto that small screen in those millions of homes that special insight and knowledge that you have.

What I have been describing here are some of the limitations of television, and I think they are useful as guidelines to what we can and cannot do well on television, and to the kind of help you can give us. I think we need that help, but I'm afraid the evidence suggests we are as reluctant to receive it as you are to give it.

Let me offer, as an example, one way in which we might begin to talk to each other, and begin to have some sort of working relationship. Suppose that at the beginning of each year, ten academics—the leading experts in their fields—were to join in a series of informal conversation with a few key television newsmen. The purpose of these conversations would be to allow the academics to review and put into perspective the problems and issues in their areas of expertise which will arise in the next twelve months. These would not be the surface problems which are already visible, but those under the surface that we ought to know about if we are to deal intelligently with future events which might otherwise seem arbitrary and unrelated.

You might, for example, long ago have told us some of the things we are only now discovering about Indo-China. You might tell us a good deal about Africa and Latin America that will help us to understand the ferment there. Why did Che Guevara fail? Why didn't he have the support of the Bolivian people? Why was the Bolivian army able to operate efficiently against him? If we had had the proper background information perhaps we could have answered these questions for our viewers. Perhaps we could tell them now why revolutions of the left have so far failed in Latin America. Can we expect Viet Nams there? What's really happening? Perhaps you could tell us some important things we ought to know.

It would be important that these conversations between us—perhaps three or four of them in the space of a month—be kept small and informal. If they are going to be useful, it is absolutely essential that they not become institutionalized. We have to meet in an atmosphere where we can talk freely, and where there is real give and take. If that doesn't happen we will both lose interest very quickly. And it is crucial that we do not lose interest. You have a great deal to tell us. And we have an instrument for getting what you have to tell to many millions of people who need, now more than ever before, to know as much as possible about the world they live in.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Paul Sann. *FADS, FOLLIES, AND DELUSIONS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE*. New York: Crown Publisher's, Inc., 1967.

John Turing. *MY NEPHEW HAMLET*. New York: A.S. Barnes & Co., Inc., 1967.

A book about 20th century America and one about a 17th century Shakespeare play both may seem at first vastly distant in theme and content. But closer examination proves the opposite. Both Paul Sann and John Turing examine the social and political phenomena of each book's era with the same purpose: why certain groups and individuals became prominent and influenced the lives of their contemporaries?

Paul Sann attempts, however, not to argue his personal viewpoints but to present certain events of American life to the reader for close consideration. He describes the influence of the Batman, the Diet, and the Ouija board craze within the day to day life of America. For example, during March, 1966 two American Astronauts (Neil A. Armstrong and Major David R. Scott) were in serious trouble in an un-controllable space craft, so ABC interrupted its scheduled program when the good news came announcing the safe landing of this capsule. Because it happened at 7:44 P.M., *Batman* (that night with Julie Newmar) was taken off the air. "In New York, the emergency operators pressed into service by ABC couldn't handle more than 300 angry calls at that time." 700 calls followed. CBS and NBC experienced the same problem. Surprisingly most of these calls were from adults not children. And it seems to imply that the other fads, follies, and delusions of America were not only invented but also followed by adults. Record sales of Ouija boards and Diet theories, therefore, also captured the American adult's money and belief. Paul Sann asks why this happened? The reader must find his own answer.

The author also investigates the more serious political, social, and spiritual fads and delusions and their effects upon certain groups. The Technocracy of Howard Scott, the Old Age Revolving Pension of Dr. Townsend, the End Poverty In California, and the Chain Letter craze in America are given unbiased coverage. The foundations, techniques, and followers of such spiritual leaders as Billy Sunday and Father Divine are examined; and sometimes exposed. From these fads and delusions of the 30's and 40's, the author considers the Hippies as a significant fad of the 60's. But the basic question of Paul Sann is still: "Why?"

Even changing fashion fads (especially the mini-skirt) challenge the thoughts and eyes of the reader. Television's quiz-show scandals demonstrate how easily many people are duped. Yet Americans are eager participants of super market quizzes and games even after that Quiz Show experience of how winners are selected. Of course some of these games are honest, but not all of them. Then why do Americans still become duped by new fads, follies, and delusions? The author doesn't give an answer. He asks: "Why?"

This book is enjoyable reading and viewing, for there are many pictures to accompany these puzzling chapters. Perhaps by reading it, one can understand 20th century America more than by reading an academic history book. For maybe one may see himself involved in these various fads, follies, and delusions and, therefore, answer the author's main question: "Why?"

In the same way *My Nephew Hamlet* investigates a point of view hardly considered by the public and academia alike. Most interpretations of *Hamlet* portray Claudius as the murderer of Hamlet's father in an act of treason against the state of Denmark. Likewise, many people could be charged with treason in *Fads, Follies, and Delusions of the American People*. Likewise, John Turing puzzled by these portrayals of Claudius uniquely claims many people followed Claudius willingly. Then why believe *Hamlet*? He asks the same question that Paul Sann does: "Why?"

John Turing claims to have discovered an original diary of Claudius written in a code of Danish, French, and Latin. He found it difficult to translate this journal because of an apparent attempt at secrecy. But the narrative of Turing's translation is easy to read.

At all times the question of validity is present. Turing claims that for his translation he can ". . . cite testimonials to the authenticity of this journal from the bibliophiles of Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, Yale, or Princeton." Then he proceeds throughout the entire journal of Claudius to show the white side of the villain Claudius in Shakespeare's *Hamlet*. At times this reader questions the validity of Claudius' ignorance of Hamlet Senior's murder, of Claudius' proof of a conspiracy between Hamlet Junior and Fortinbras for the Kingdom of Denmark, and of his analysis of Gertrude as an unloving and domineering woman. According to Claudius she urged him to marry her after Hamlet Senior's death although she did not want the physical marriage customs. She told Claudius on their marriage night that she often ate apples while Hamlet Senior enjoyed her assets. One way of forcing Claudius to marry her was the promise of swaying enough votes to elect him King. Hamlet Junior does not fare well at all in this book.

As for these facts and their validity, Turing asks the reader to ". . . judge for himself as he measures the net in which Claudius himself became entangled, whether or not this narrative carries more conviction than any that has yet, like the elder Hamlet's ghost, beckoned him to go away with." He is challenging the reader. The author wants the reader to understand both sides (the diary and the play) and answer why the events in Denmark resulted in the many deaths at the end of *Hamlet*, which Turing uses as the final chapter of Claudius' diary.

Or is this another "put on?" Is this another delusion of the people. Certainly, after reading this book, one must answer for himself as one must do for Paul Sann's book the question: "Why?"

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