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CIA HISTORICAL STAFF

The Directorate of Intelligence
Historical Series

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE HISTORY

PART III: 1957-1967

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FBIS - 3

May 1972

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Chapter 1 INFLUENCES DICTATING FURTHER EXPANSION

FBIS continued to expand after 1957. New monitoring posts were established, new requirements levied, and new developments continually demanded higher expenditures. There was a broadening both of the collection areas and the consumers served. In most ways 1957-1967 was essentially an extension of the previous decade, with similar problems and solutions. Sources of information continued to expand, while need for the information daily became more apparent. This seemingly irresistible demand for greater activity, more equipment, and more personnel was countered by restrictive forces which dictated the development of new tools and methods to make possible fulfillment of the FBIS mission without steady expansion. Emphasis had to be shifted from growth to quality. Instead of continued expansion to meet the new challenges, FBIS management was forced to seek better ways of doing the job with roughly the same resources.

Scarcely any phase of FBIS activity escaped a microscopic and questioning examination during the ten years; the scrutiny was not directed at broadcast monitoring per se but at methods used in conducting the operation. The collection of raw intelligence material from foreign

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broadcasting, with related dissemination activities, was accepted universally as an essential operation. What FBIS had to demonstrate was that it had adopted and perfected the best methods for tapping this intelligence source. There was no further doubt that FBIS operations were a logical and legitimate activity of CIA, but FBIS continually had to demonstrate that its results merited the expenditure of resources allotted to it by CIA management. Of course, the FBIS charter, NSCID 6, made the organization a service unit of common concern to all governmental offices, giving it a separate identity.

Yet, despite the conflicts and doubts, the continual FBIS struggle to prove its importance to CIA, and the constant effort to get sufficient personnel and funds for a thorough job of monitoring foreign broadcasts, it could be said that after 1957 FBIS had come of age as an established CIA unit. There was no further talk of making it a part of USIA or the State Department and there was more frequent and open acknowledgement from other offices that FBIS was capable of performing its mission with a minimum of guidance. FBIS had gained the respect, if not the enthusiastic praise, of practically all units of CIA. A glance at FBIS management during the period supplies a test of the extent of stability

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FBIS had achieved. During the first six years of FBIS operations, four different men occupied the head office; in the decade 1947 - 1957 four different men headed FBIS; at the beginning of this period, 1957, Roger G. Seely was FBIS Chief, and at the end of the period, 1967, he still occupied the office.

Continued Growth of Foreign Broadcasting

The explosive increase in foreign radio transmitters leveled off somewhat in the 1950's, but growth continued. In 1953 the number was said to be 4,500, a 100 percent increase in a little more than five years.* In August 1960 the number was 7,500, an increase of 67 percent in seven years. 1** The BBC and FBIS were listening to a third of the transmitters in 65 languages, which was a marked increase in the number monitored but not a substantially increased percentage of those broadcasting.*** Moreover, by 1960 the only foreign transmitters covered thoroughly were those in China and the USSR. FBIS and the BBC listened to 85 percent of them. The rest were monitored more selectively. The 12 FBIS stations were filing a little

* See page 224, Part II of History.

** For serially numbered source references, see Appendix B.

*** See page 221, Part II of History: FBIS and the BBC at that time were said to be hearing 23.7 percent of the broadcast wordage.

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more than 200,000 words a day, including 90,000 from the USSR and communist East Europe and 51,000 from the Far East. 2/ ters were being constructed or planned in 22 countries 3/ and in April alone FBIS cruising monitors discovered 16 new transmitters not previously reported. 4/ Moscow continued to expand its International Service, while Peking added broadcasts to Africa in several languages, including Hausa, and by June 1963 was broadcasting 60 hours a week to Africa. By June 1963 the Castro regime was broadcasting propaganda continuously 19 hours a day in Spanish, Portuguese, and English. From 1955 to 1962 the hours of international broadcasting by communist transmitters more than doubled. FBIS and the BBC were monitoring broadcasts from 90 countries in 1961. By the spring of 1963 this number had increased to 115. 5/ Moscow announced in June 1963 that it would start programs in Malagasy, the ninth language used in broadcasts to Africa. In July 1963 Peking stepped up its broadcasts to India, adding a new language, Tamil. 6/ In November 1963 the Soviet International Service alone was making 1,113 hours of broadcasts weekly, an increase of 177 hours in a year. 7/ FBIS and the BBC were monitoring 830 hours of this.

In 1956 FBIS and the BBC were monitoring voice broadcasts 1,404 hours a week, or 201 hours daily. By 1964 this

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had increased to 2,203 hours a week, or 315 hours daily. Press transmissions monitored in 1956 totaled 214 hours a day. In 1964 this had grown to 354.

USSR broadcasts were covered 485 hours weekly in 1956 and 566 hours in 1964, but those from Communist China jumped from 189 hours to 451 hours. East European radios were covered 87 hours a week in 1956, but only 78 hours in 1964. West European coverage dropped from 100 hours a week in 1956 to 45 hours in 1964. Only three hours of broadcasts from Africa were monitored weekly in 1956, and by 1964 this had jumped to 123. Broadcasts from the Americas also registered a sharp increase, from 74 hours weekly in 1956 to 317 hours in 1964. The cut in voice monitoring from West Europe was partially replaced by press monitoring, for it was found that satisfactory West European information could be obtained from press transmissions with less manpower. 8/

By June 1964 FBIS and the BBC were listening to six million words daily in 67 languages from 117 countries, compared to under two million being monitored in 1947. Approximately 250,000 words daily were being filed to Headquarters, about double that of 1947. 9/ Selection at Headquarters also was obviously much more strict in 1964, as only about half of the filed wordage was appearing in the

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Daily Report, although much not appearing there was used on the Wire, in Economic Abstracts, and by the RPB. The Daily Report was publishing 115,000 words daily in 1955, and in 1964 the average had grown only to 126,000. 10/ Peking announced in December 1964 that it would start broadcasting 21 hours a week in Mongolian, and also add programs in Indonesian, Thai, and Swahili. FBIS was able to cover at once only the Indonesian. 11/ A review at the end of 1964 showed that during the year Moscow increased its broadcasts 221 hours a week. Only a small portion of the new programs were covered. 12/ The Collection Guidance Staff, reviewing intelligence activities against Communist China in 1964, reported that broadcasts from China had grown 50 percent in six years, and though FBIS had attempted to keep up with the increase, it was doubtful that this policy could profitably be continued. 13/ Okinawa, the prime monitoring center for Communist China, was faced with an unmanageable backlog of 79,000 words, enough to take the full time of a monitor for a month. 14/

In 1966 Moscow was broadcasting 213 hours a day to foreign audiences in 68 languages. Ten years earlier the total had been half that, in 40 languages. Moscow was carrying 177,000 commentaries a year, compared to 77,000 ten years earlier. Peking had increased its hours of broadcast to 166 a day in

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32 languages, including 97,000 commentaries a year, up from 25,000 in 1956. 15/ The number of stations broadcasting in 1966 was placed at 17,000. FBIS and the BBC still were listening to six million words daily, nearly four times as much as in 1948, but a much smaller proportion of the total. Wordage filed to Headquarters remained at about 240,000 daily, 125,000 of which were published in the Daily Report. 16/ Obviously FBIS could not keep up with the steady expansion. At the end of 1966, two services were fully covered: Soviet domestic, and Peking's domestic and NCNA. Peking's international broadcasts were only 40 percent monitored, and only 60 of the 150 regional and provincial stations were covered. Moscow's international service in 65 languages was about 70 percent monitored. 17/ Transmissions from other areas were, of course, covered to a much lesser extent.

In only one operation did FBIS attempt to keep up with world broadcasting -- in cruising. The Broadcast Information Service (BIS) of FOS recorded and made available program changes and continued to publish at intervals Broadcasting Stations of the World. These publications grew so large that by 1960 they presented a serious problem. They were considered to have limited intelligence value, but from time to time proved valuable to some CIA units. 18/ Careful cruising also was

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necessary to prevent the loss of valuable broadcasts. For example, ECB cruisers in August 1966 discovered a new Moscow program in Creole for Haiti, and informed Panama, which started coverage immediately. 19/

Continued Demand for FBIS Product

All indications after 1957 were that users of FBIS products -- especially the Daily Report -- continued to find them valuable, and even essential, to intelligence operations. Specific guidance remained of doubtful value, as it became more and more obvious in CIA official quarters that FBIS operations did not lend themselves to specific guidance. Target lists, very important in the early days under CIA, still were sent to the field, but most FBIS employees were skeptical of their value. A State Department official, writing of FBIS in 1957, declared that "its leading role in the intelligence community" was the result primarily of the "cooperative, resourceful, and rapid way" in which its tasks were carried out rather than its mere fulfillment of "assigned operations." 20/ The FBIS Liaison and Requirements Officer worked diligently with consumers in an effort to incorporate their views into the target lists and, though he and most FBIS editors remained doubtful, the testimony of some users indicated they felt their needs were properly considered. 21/ The head of VOA wrote early

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in 1967 that his organization felt "flattered" at the effort made by FBIS to learn its needs and supply them, as he realized the VOA was only one of many FBIS clients. 22/

One of the most reliable gauges for collection guidance remained the periodic consumer survey, relied upon both to determine consumer wants and to weed out subscribers with no real need for FBIS services. A survey near the end of 1957 brought no critical comment but showed some lack of enthusiasm. Subscribers to USSR Trends and Highlights were cut from 276 to 259. Circulation of the White Book, however, was cut by only three. Most users expressed a hope that coverage of such areas as China and Latin America would be expanded. Chalmers Roberts of the *Washington Post* called the White Book "absolutely essential" to his work and expressed a wish to get it a day earlier. The chief complaint from subscribers to Official Use Only Daily Reports was that they did not carry enough economic information, making it evident that the economic cards should be distributed more widely. By the end of 1958 the USSR and East Europe Daily Report was issued to 664 users, compared to 624 at the time of the 1957 survey, while the Far East Daily Report had increased from 548 copies to 561.

The FBIS Chief complained in 1959 that the consumer survey "elicited little guidance," as most users feared they

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would lose important material if they advocated changes, but the fact remained that it was the most reliable guide FBIS had been able to find. 23/ Direct contact with consumers supplemented the surveys to make consumer guidance more real. The Editorial Branch Chief met with representatives from user offices, including OCI and ORR, to discuss the need for full texts of leader speeches, those by Nasir being the question at issue. It was agreed that many speeches were largely useless, but consumers insisted that questions remained if they did not get full texts. FBIS continued to publish full texts. 24/ Many offices with which FBIS personnel had direct contacts were eliminated from the consumer survey for 1959, reducing considerably the total of questionnaires issued. The number distributed was 1,051, with 600 of them for CIA offices. The 24-page questionnaires sought to elicit much more information concerning needs than was previously obtained. The result was continued praise of FBIS publications and many suggestions that were impracticable. For example, a State Department official suggested that FBIS should use more voice broadcasts from the Philippines without decreasing its press material. Actually, press was depended upon because most voice broadcasts from the Philippines were "singularly unproductive" and difficult to monitor. 25/

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In the 1964 consumer survey the need to reduce the number of copies of FBIS publications distributed was given considerable emphasis. This was effective, for some offices found they could get by with a smaller number. For example, the Defense Department decreased the number of Official Use Only books by 69, but counteracted this partially by asking for about half that many White Books. Suggestions for improvement were received, but most of these were countermanded by requests of an opposite nature. 26/ In 1965 a special DDI memorandum which requested user evaluation of FBIS publications elicited only "praise of the highest order" from all important intelligence offices. 27/

Daily Report supplements gave some added indication of the usefulness of FBIS material. The proceedings of the 21st CPSU Congress in 1959 were carried in 15 supplements totaling half a million words. Special orders for more copies ran the number published to several times that of the regular book. Copies distributed outside the Government by the State Department brought letters of appreciation from more than a dozen universities, including Chicago, Harvard, Stanford, and Columbia. 28/ A supplement on the world communist meeting in Moscow in December 1960 brought requests for 3,200 extra copies.

Consumer response proved most reliable in citing areas insufficiently covered. Most users hesitated to say they were

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getting too much, or unimportant, information but were much less reticent in declaring they were not getting enough. Complaints of an insufficient amount of Austrian information were passed on to the Austrian Bureau in 1957. Judging Austrian broadcasts to be largely useless, the bureau chief felt that one man transferred from Vienna to the State Department in Washington was the only one complaining. The FBIS Liaison Officer, having had seven officials tell him they wanted more Austrian information, was able to correct the bureau chief. 29/ When it became apparent in 1958 that the Hokkaido post would have to be moved or discontinued, because of the withdrawal of Army supporting units, and again when the same problem arose in 1963, user estimates of the station's product convinced CIA officials that Hokkaido monitoring should be continued. 30/ Reception surveys had been made in Africa in 1956 in anticipation of increased demand for African information.* The anticipated demand was not readily apparent, so plans for monitoring in Africa were delayed. The Bower Report, which surveyed the work of OO components in 1959, mentioned a probability that FBIS would need to expand into Africa. FBIS instituted a second survey in 1959, and discovered a sharp increase in demand for African monitoring. 31/ When intelligence community interest in internal China grew, particularly in the 1959-1962 period, FBIS gradually expanded regional

* See pages 268-269, Part II of History.

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coverage at Okinawa and encouraged the BBC to start monitoring in Hong Kong. 32/

Praise from intelligence officials, while offering no specific guidance, served as a constant confirmation to FBIS that its services were in demand. Tokyo reported in October 1957 that CINCPAC in Hawaii had instructed the Fifth Air Force to give every assistance to FBIS, as CINCPAC found its copy quite valuable. Leaving a State Department office after five years, an official wrote in 1958 that he found FBIS services important when he came, and they had grown "more important in the interim." 33/ Vice President Nixon sent a personal commendation to FBIS for the "rapid and effective" service of its Radio Propaganda Branch in 1959. 34/ Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote the DCI in 1961 praising FBIS, and Roger Hilsman of State INR cited the excellence of FBIS coverage in one particular instance. 35/ Presidential Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy had "high praise" for a special memorandum prepared by RPB at his request in 1964. 36/ Henry Loomis, VOA head, told the Key West Post in 1964 that FBIS was the "most important source of information available to VOA." 37/ State Department officials in 1965 called FBIS "an essential intelligence source," and declared that reports from the commercial wire services, with their "highlighting of sensational passages," had proved to be no

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substitute for FBIS textual material. 38/ The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, visiting Key West on 19 April 1965, said he wanted "to pay my respects to this vastly underrated organization." 39/ Following attendance at a class in the State Department, an FBIS editor in 1963 wrote that he was impressed with the attention given to FBIS publications during the course and the "lavish praise" by officials, who called FBIS publications "indispensable." 40/

Efforts were made several times to levy requirements for technical information on FBIS, with only partial success. FBIS bureaus in 1957 were asked to report signals from Soviet sputniks to the Smithsonian Astrophysical Laboratories in Cambridge, Massachusetts. FBIS engineers responded, reporting to the Wire Service, which forwarded the information. Meetings of the Inter-Office Telecommunications Advisory Committee (IOTAC) were held in late 1957 and in 1958 relative to levying requirements for exploitation of Soviet amateur broadcasting. Both the FCC and FBIS were suggested for the job. FBIS estimated that to properly handle the work it would need eight new engineering slots. 41/ FBIS continued to work with IOTAC and provided information when possible but with no additional personnel. Early in 1959 another problem was placed on the agenda of IOTAC -- the location of certain clandestine broadcasting stations. Under the direction of the FBIS representative, Norman

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F. Kriebel, several studies were made in 1959. FBIS was willing to accept responsibility for the work provided it obtained sufficient personnel and adequate direction-finding equipment. Such equipment was never obtained.

Growing Requirements for Propaganda Analysis

The fact that the Trends and Highlights covered a span of a week, and the Surveys two weeks, robbed RPB material of much of its timeliness. The natural solution was use of the Wire Service to get urgently needed analysis to recipients. This procedure was formally adopted early in 1957, with classified implications or conclusions eliminated and summaries of publications articles carried in advance on the wire. 42/ RPB also regularly sent analyses by wire to the London Disarmament Conference early in 1957, a practice regularly followed for later conferences. In May 1958 RPB filed 15 items on the wire, most of them in connection with the Taiwan Strait crisis. 43/ Field bureaus were instructed to keep this RPB procedure in mind. 44/ U.S. delegates at the Geneva Conference on the test ban treaty received 14 RPB analyses before the end of 1958, with at least four of them also carried on the regular FBIS wire for other users. 45/ Conference officials sent a note of appreciation for this "extremely useful" service. 46/ As of the end of September 1961, RPB had filed 120 analyses to the

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Geneva Conference on Laos. 47/ In 1964, when a State Department official wanted analysis to be resumed at Saigon, FBIS was able to counter by declaring that the work could be handled better in Headquarters, and wire items could be supplied Saigon as required. 48/

Probably the best indication after 1957 of the growing demand for FBIS analysis was the steady increase in special requests. Some of these were fulfilled by regular Radio Propaganda Reports (RPR), while others were so specialized as to demand memoranda sent only to the requesting offices. During 1957 103 RPR's were published. 49/ Before and during the Khrushchev visit to the United States in 1959, RPB prepared 11 different studies at the request of various offices. 50/ Many were on a crash basis, requiring the postponing of regular work. In April 1961, in addition to four RPR's and 16 wire items for the Test Ban Conference, RPB completed five special studies upon request, including one for the DCI and one for the DDP. 51/ In June 1961 six such requests were met. An unusual request in 1962 came from the Ambassador to Greece, who wanted a report on broadcasts to Greece for use in briefing the Greek Foreign Minister. RPB forwarded the report through the DCI. Another report, prepared for several offices, covered Soviet comment on

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outer space law. 52/ A DDP Task Force on Cuba wrote the ADO in 1962 praising the special study on Castro's promises and admissions prepared by RPB upon its request. Some requests had to be rejected. For instance, a call to the ADO in 1963 from the Liaison Staff of the NSC asking for a special report on the Middle East was answered by an explanation that RPB handled only Communist bloc and Cuban propaganda. 53/ Advance copies of the Trends and Highlights were delivered to the White House upon request in February 1965. 54/ With Xeroxing, such advance deliveries to various offices became a common practice.

Insistence that RPB expand its operations was heard as early as 1958. The need for more propaganda analysis was discussed at an IAC meeting, resulting in a request from ONE that RPB outline the areas in which it considered information inadequate for propaganda analysis. 55/ In the consumer survey of 1958, about 40 percent of the users replying expressed a desire for Middle East analysis, although RPB was not then or later authorized to analyze information from non-communist countries. 56/ The demand for regular RPB publications also began to increase noticeably about this time. In 1958, RPB's distributed totaled 382; in 1959 this number had grown to just over 500, where it remained for several years.

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A requirement causing concern to RPB and FBIS for three years had its inception on 8 May 1959, when Air Force Intelligence wrote the DCI outlining a need for continuous up-to-date propaganda analysis to detect indications of future hostilities and suggesting that RPB undertake such analysis. FBIS and the ADO accepted the idea in principle, noting that subtle indications that communist bloc leaders were preparing their own people for hostilities could be detected in studies of propaganda much ahead of the obvious indicators such as call-ups and defense alerts. However, such a study would demand a sizeable increase in FBIS personnel. 57/ Following talks with DDP representatives, who professed considerable skepticism but decided that it was not a matter of direct concern to the DDP, RPB Chief Paul McPherson met with Lt. Col. William A. Stewart of the Air Force to study the feasibility of the suggestion and to work out details. In a long report they agreed that propaganda watch indications were feasible, outlined necessary analysis techniques, and made estimates of the additional personnel and equipment that would be needed. 58/

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Many objections arose. Some officials felt that only the Air Force was interested in such a watch program, but FBIS officials showed that OCI, NIC, and the State Department also

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were vitally interested. Another suggestion was that this large staff would be useful only during times of crisis. This also was countered. 59/ The DDI was skeptical, but with endorsement of the NIC Chief and the Indications Control Officer of OCI, a pilot project with [redacted] was recommended. 60/ The DDCI called for further study by RPB and NIC. Then on 21 March 1961 the USIB approved a recommendation of its Warning Systems Survey Committee charging FBIS with implementation of a propaganda analysis indications program, to be preceded by an initial planning stage study to identify bloc propaganda patterns of possible significance. 61/

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This action created some confusion. McPherson had been replaced by [redacted] as Chief of RPB, and neither the ADO nor the DDI had been present at the USIB meeting. Following another USIB meeting, on 23 March 1961 the DDI and ADO instructed FBIS to accept the responsibility, but to proceed only with a preliminary planning paper pending approval of [redacted] positions. 62/ As an illustration of FBIS capabilities for indications analysis, a file was prepared showing indications noted during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis and the shortcomings apparent in this study that could have been detected with a deeper study. This was forwarded to the DDI with the statement that this fulfilled the USIB directive for a preliminary study, while any further action would

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depend on sufficient personnel. 63/ In summing up FBIS developments in May 1962, the FBIS Chief noted that RPB was continuing to make a major contribution to the Watch Committee, but was handicapped by a personnel shortage and thus unable to develop indications analysis. 64/ FBIS still was being called upon for further studies to demonstrate indications capabilities as late as July 1962. 65/ In August the ADO sought to bring the matter to a close and recommended to the DDI that FBIS conduct no further short-term study and that USIB be informed that FBIS had carried out the USIB directive. 66/

As RPB records accumulated in connection with quantitative analysis, the value of RPB research data was recognized in intelligence offices and requests for such information increased. McPherson announced early in 1958 that RPB would in the future prepare research aids, such as compilations of Soviet radio commentators and references by Soviet leaders to nuclear weapons. 67/ RPB reported in 1962 a heavy demand for information from the "war themes" cards, which by then contained 6,000 communist statements on the issues of peace and war. 68/ Employees from other units frequently visited RPB files to make their own studies, some spending several days. During one typical month in 1965, personnel from State and other CIA offices called upon the Research Branch of RPD for help in answering questions concerning Vietnam,

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the Dominican Republic, the Warsaw Pact and V-Day anniversaries, Soviet military capabilities, and a few others. 69/ Occasionally RPB data served to correct wrong impressions. For example, the belief that the CPR had become more threatening in its attitude toward Taiwan following explosion of its second nuclear bomb was discredited by an examination of RPB records. 70/

As with other FBIS products, voluntary statements by users of RPB services gave an indication of the extent to which the materials were used and appreciated. Boris Klosson of State wrote in 1957 that the experience gained by RPB analysts had steadily enhanced the value of their product, which had "played an important role in shaping our evaluations of the Soviet scene." 71/ A CIA official in 1958 mentioned RPB analysis as "one of the most vital aspects of intelligence work." 72/ A USIA official in 1960, praising desk-to-desk cooperation between his office and RPB, said that his staff made heavy use of RPB publications, and "readily admitted" that USIA got much more than it gave in return. 73/ Writing from Moscow in 1961, Ambassador Thompson was high in his praise of an RPB, saying he had read it "with great interest." 74/ Ray S. Cline was quoted in 1963 as saying the type of analysis done by RPB was "unique" and its analysts should have "every assistance from related units." 75/ An official in USIA called an RPB report on Soviet leadership "probably the best piece that

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is likely to be done on this material for some time." 76/ The U.S. Ambassador in Indonesia in 1965 criticized strongly the apparent belief that Peking established the line for the Indonesian Communist Party, as reflected in an RPR, but added that he certainly did not want to disparage the "excellent and essential FBIS coverage." 77/

But while the work of RPB was being more widely recognized in other intelligence offices, its popularity was not always high among other units of FBIS. RPB personnel were not normally included in rotation to field bureaus, and other FBIS employees sometimes failed to understand their work. RPB created a considerable amount of work for field bureaus, and this was not always appreciated. The tendency among bureau editors was to judge the accuracy of their selection by the proportion of a bureau file that was published in the Daily Report or in the Wire Service. Material that was used only by RPB could not be identified in publications. The commentary list became a burden in some bureaus and a cause for considerable grumbling. Vienna reported in 1958 that one-fourth of the bureau's translation time was spent on support for RPB. 78/ The bureau staff spoke of RPB's "insatiable desire for statistics," and one senior editor reported in 1958 that his orientation in RPB was "largely wasted," primarily because RPB was not organized to conduct extensive orientation tours. 79/

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Another editor stated that RPB had "an unsavory and undeserved reputation" and suggested steps to better popularize its work. 80/ Bureau staff members complained of lack of direction from RPB, a weakness that was partially corrected by institution in May 1962 of field trips for RPB analysts. 81/

Need for Speed in Delivery

By 1957 the British belief that most monitored material could just as well be sent by airmail was long outdated. Speed was recognized as a desirable ingredient of all FBIS handling. Any time an FBIS item reached responsible officials ahead of commercial news agency reports, the employees concerned were considered entitled to a commendation. In January 1957 creation of a special committee was suggested so that when a reaction report was desired it could be produced within a 72-hour deadline. 82/ Late in 1957 Okinawa editors were criticized because an item related to a Thai coup was sent routine and was slow in reaching the BBC. 83/ On the other hand, in July 1958 some important items from Cyprus reached Headquarters in five minutes. 84/ The user survey in 1958 showed appreciation for speed in delivery and elicited some suggestions that even greater speed would be desirable. Considerable attention was given to the fact that news of the Baghdad coup of 4 November 1958 reached Washington officials more than an hour and a half before being reported by

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commercial news agencies. 85/ An Okinawa news flash on the attempted assassination of Sukarno in 1962 reached Headquarters in four minutes, 47 minutes ahead of the AP. A full translation of the Jakarta broadcast, available to wire recipients just 51 minutes later, quickly countered an erroneous UPI dispatch saying that Sukarno had been killed. 86/

The BBC shared in this improved FBIS reputation for fast service. The Nikolayev orbital flight announcement on 11 August 1962 was monitored by the BBC and distributed in Washington in just seven minutes, beating the AP by 50 minutes and eliciting much praise for both FBIS and the BBC. 87/ FBIS records in later years are replete with similar examples of fast coverage and appreciation of recipients. A Syrian coup on 8 March 1963 was reported in Washington six minutes after being filed from Cyprus, beating the Reuters report by more than an hour. When Khrushchev was incorrectly reported to have died in April 1964, FBIS was well ahead of the news agencies both in the original report and in the clarifying corrections. 88/ Peking's announcement in Mandarin, 27 October 1966, that it had successfully tested a guided missile for use with nuclear warheads was on the FBIS wire in eight minutes. An FBIS report of the Togo coup in January 1967 was distributed in Headquarters 34 minutes ahead of the AP.

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The new emphasis on speed in reporting naturally enhanced the FBIS wire, known originally as the "B Wire." On 13 March 1958 it was officially designated as the FBIS Wire Service and certain changes were ordered. 89/ These included the introduction of short topical headings, and a bulletin format for unusually significant items. In September 1958, CIA, State, and the Defense Department each asked for another wire outlet. These were supplied as soon as arrangements could be made. 90/ In December the Air Force asked for its own outlet, expressing an anxiety to have the installation completed by 15 January; it was installed on 5 January. At the end of 1958 the wire was going to 27 offices, 91/ Arrangements were made in February 1958 to change the switchboard arrangement so that four more consumers could be added. On 21 May 1959 arrangements were completed through OCI and OC to install a wire outlet at Camp David for the special use of the President. 92/ By August 1961 the Strategic Air Command at Omaha was added. An extra outlet at the White House was added on 14 December 1961, in the Situation Room. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio applied for Wire Service in September 1962. McDill Air Force Base in Florida asked for the service in March 1964. This brought the number of outlets to 35. 93/ By 1967 it had reached 37. Most outlets served many individuals.

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As the number of Wire recipients increased, selection of wire items became broader. In April 1961 the average daily distribution was from 20,000 to 25,000 words, but the Algerian crisis, which began on 22 April 1961, brought a new record, with 55,000 words carried in one day. 94/ During August 1961 the daily average was 32,000. In May 1965 another record was set during the Dominican crisis, with the Wire Service distributing 35,000 words daily, for more than a million during the month. 95/

A number of rather notable services could be attributed to the Wire Service and FBIS speedy reporting. A Khrushchev message on Cuba to President Kennedy on 22 April 1961 reached Washington well ahead of any other version and was run on the FBIS wire. Copies were torn from the outlet in the Executive Offices and hurried page by page to the President during an NSC meeting. 96/ NSC later commended FBIS formally, writing that FBIS "appears to be the best available source for accurate, fast reporting of official foreign announcements, usually as fast as the commercial services but much more complete and accurate." 97/ Reaction to the UNGA speech made by President Kennedy, 25 September 1961, was written up in a Reaction Report on 28 September, with a copy forwarded immediately through the NSC to the President's vacation spot. 98/ The full text of a long Castro speech

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delivered in December 1961 was on the wire within 24 hours through coordination of ECB and the Wire Service. 99/

President Kennedy himself was able to exploit one of the more notable scoops FBIS made of the Soviet press service. Shortly after a midafternoon press conference on 30 August 1961 at which the President had said the American representative at the Geneva talks on a nuclear test ban would continue for another week to try to make some progress with the Soviet delegation, he was handed an FBIS intercept from a TASS Central Asia circuit for the regional press. It revealed that the USSR had decided to resume testing nuclear weapons, a fact not due for public announcement by the Soviets for five hours. President Kennedy announced this publicly and thus scooped TASS on its own item. The Mediterranean Bureau, which monitored the item, was praised for its work, and the responsible editor was personally congratulated by Mr. Dulles. 25X1

Rapid service supplied by FBIS brought letters of praise later in 1961 from Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other State officials. 100/ USIA in July 1964 described as "an extraordinary accomplishment" completion of a 3 1/2 hour Castro weekend speech by work time Monday, as Cuban court reporters in exile "worked all day Sunday just transcribing the speech in Spanish." 101/

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A White House request for Egyptian reaction to a U.S. announcement in June 1965 was answered in 30 minutes, to the "amazement" of the White House spokesman. 102/

Increased Demand for Lateral Services

The early Headquarters effort to limit lateral services through fear that the bureaus would neglect their chief mission -- to serve Washington -- was largely forgotten by 1957, though Headquarters still sought to exercise some control. In most cases bureaus were free to grant lateral requests if they reported the action to Headquarters. Some censorship remained. For example, a request of the Vietnamese Embassy in Tokyo for file material from Okinawa was rejected on the grounds that the Embassy should get its material from the Vietnam Foreign Office, which had lateral material as well as some Daily Reports. 103/ Sometimes the bureaus wanted requests turned down. London was opposed to sending a roundup of non-communist comment to the Disarmament Conference, as it would place too heavy a burden on the editorial staff. 104/ The Saigon Bureau referred to Washington a DDP requirement for press scrutiny, which the bureau chief felt would transform his heavily burdened staff into a translation section for other offices of CIA to the detriment of its primary mission. In response to the Saigon complaint, Headquarters replied that although there were precedents for press scrutiny by some of the bureaus, no

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translations were to be undertaken until and unless the Washington offices of the requesting units submitted requirements. On 24 June Saigon reported that it was engaged in a limited translation effort but more than this would require a staff expansion. 105/

Lateral services of some bureaus already were heavy in 1957. For example, Saigon was distributing 40 copies of its file -- to the German, Japanese, and British embassies in addition to U.S. and South Vietnamese offices. In Saigon mimeograph copies also were being made of Okinawa copy and the Pink Sheet from Headquarters. 106/ WCB and the four Far East bureaus were addressing either their entire files or selected categories to 78 addressees outside FBIS. 107/ Late in 1957 the DDI issued a letter of commendation to staff members of the London Bureau for their lateral support to the Disarmament Conference. 108/ Near the end of 1958 it was reported that FBIS field bureaus were sending material laterally to 150 different offices throughout the world. 109/ Two months later the number was put at 169. 110/ Numerous international conferences were served directly by textual and analytical selections from Headquarters in addition to special services from field bureaus. Following the London Disarmament Conference, the London Bureau supported the Geneva Test Ban Conference, then the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference in 1959. Early in 1961 the State Department sent an analyst to FBIS for two weeks to help plan FBIS services to the 14-nation conference on Laos, which started on 11 May. 111/

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By May 1960 field bureaus reported that files were being sent laterally to 244 offices. Okinawa led the list with 52; Panama was lowest with eight. 112/ Late in 1961 17 U.S. embassies, legations, and consulates in the Middle East were getting FBIS services 113/, and representatives from USIA and State met with FBIS officials to urge additional lateral services. Stated FBIS policy was to serve on an ad hoc basis any overseas office that had communications available, but FBIS would not issue a general statement obligating itself to provide specified material. 114/ Reports at the end of 1961 showed FBIS materials going directly from the bureaus to 321 offices. 115/ By March 1963 the number had reached 389. 116/ Despite efforts since 1963 to avoid duplications and cut marginal services, 250 overseas offices were getting lateral services in 1966 and new requests were still being made. 117/ Requests for new lateral services continued in 1965 and 1966. Saigon, for instance, reported in May 1965 that the Joint Public Affairs Office in Saigon, representing 75 U.S. officials, had asked for more FBIS local reporting. 118/ ECB reported that offices desiring its epidemiological bulletin had increased to 40. 119/

In addition to regularly filed lateral services, some events demanded special treatment. When Vice President Lyndon Johnson

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visited the Middle East in 1962, the various bureaus filed selected items to him at embassies he visited. A similar service was provided for Secretary of State Dean Rusk during his 1963 visit to Pakistan. During one month in 1964 the London Bureau provided three special lateral files, including one reporting Somali verbal attacks on Ethiopia to several African embassies. 120/ In March 1964 FBIS provided the Canal Zone Government with special reports on Panama broadcasts for use at the OAS meeting. 121/ Special reports on a Lagos treason trial were supplied by the African Bureau to the Nigerian Northern Region Government in June 1964. 122/

Not all requests for lateral service were accepted automatically. The U.S. Ambassador in Kabul in 1959 asked for analyses of Soviet broadcasts to Afghanistan in the belief that many of them were specially tailored for Afghan listeners. FBIS replied that it had no capability in Pushtu, but that Persian broadcasts beamed to Afghanistan did not bear out the Ambassador's suspicion. 123/ In 1962 the new Ambassador in Argentina requested a direct file from Panama. It was supplied, but with a warning that this did not establish a precedent. 124/ The FBIS Chief decided, following a 1959 field trip, that because of heavy bureau commitments there should be some standardization of lateral services. CINCPAC

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requirements were discussed in Honolulu, then refined and streamlined. 125/ [] Deputy FBIS Chief, on two subsequent field trips found that the reduced file was considered more valuable. 126/ The value of the FBIS lateral file in its reduced form was corroborated in 1962 by a CINCPAC request. Following the Cuban crisis the Army had cut back the FBIS file from the Far East to such an extent that CINCPAC felt it was losing important information. It therefore asked that priority remedial action be taken and that the file be expanded. 127/

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The Ambassador in London informed the London Bureau in 1960 that its greatly appreciated report on the Moscow intercept of his speech was in his hands ahead of most press reports. 128/ The USIA head reported in 1960 that FBIS field services were of "inestimable value" in development of the USIA program. 129/ The Southern Command wrote in 1962 that FBIS cooperation during President Kennedy's Latin America tour was "vitally important" to the accomplishment of the command's mission. 130/ Later in 1962 the Caribbean Air Command sent a note of special appreciation to the Panama post for its services during the Argentine crisis. Early in 1965 the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries in Alaska sent to FBIS a note of appreciation which stated that the bureau "never had been so well informed." FBIS reports had enabled it to use its

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surface and aircraft patrols to much better advantage. 131/
In August 1966 the senior U.S. representative at Panmunjom
visited the Okinawa Bureau to express his appreciation for the
services he had been receiving in Korea. 132/

Coverage Needs Induced by Political Developments

Effects of the Cold War on radio monitoring were readily
apparent by 1957. Most of the FBIS and BBC effort was devoted
to better coverage of the communist world, particularly the
USSR, though the communist takeover of China had induced consider-
able expansion of Chinese monitoring. No development in the
1957-67 decade exercised a more pervasive influence. There were,
however, other political developments that created a noticeable
increase in demand for FBIS materials.

The assassination of the Guatemalan president in 1957 not
only spurred a demand for more information but also disclosed
that several clandestine radios were promoting the Castro revolu-
tion and encouraging uprisings in other areas. 133/ By early
1958 at least seven such clandestine stations had been heard. 134/
Some steps already had been taken to establish cruising posts
in Latin America.* With revolutionary action in Guatemala and

* See pages 265-267, Part II of History.

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Cuba and the growth in clandestine broadcasting, pressure began to increase for better coverage of the area. WCB and ECB made a valiant effort to monitor the clandestine stations, but the most important ones could be heard from neither location. In December 1958 Castro and Urrutia, who later became President, made what were believed to be important speeches from Santiago, Cuba, which FBIS facilities were unable to monitor. 135/

After Castro's successful takeover in January 1959, the need for better radio coverage became urgent. ECB dropped other programs to give more attention to Cuba, and Panama--already in operation as a cruising post--was authorized to train local employees as monitors and to take over certain coverage. ECB reception of the Havana radio was satisfactory only part of the year, and Panama was little better. The need for a new monitoring location had become apparent by early 1960, 136/ and technical equipment was shipped to Key West in mid-April. 137/ The FBIS Deputy Chief had already talked to Naval officials in Key West and obtained permission to monitor from there and to use Naval communications for transmission of 2,000 words daily to Headquarters. 138/ [redacted] veteran ECB monitor, arrived at the Naval Base 30 April 1960, with engineer [redacted] accompanying him to set up monitoring equipment. 139/ Devoting

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his attention entirely to the Cuban radio, [] started
 filing material immediately. The value of the coverage was
 quickly established, so the next question was: Should the post
 operate full time or only during the period of bad reception
 at ECB? 140/ The decision was to keep the post operating inde-
 finitely, with [] from WCB sent to replace []
 on 1 November 1960. ECB and Key West operations were carefully
 coordinated by telephone, with the superior Key West reception
 contributing to both the quality and quantity of Cuban coverage.

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Castro's speech espousing Marxism, delivered on 2 December
 1961, focused still more attention on Cuba. To provide the
 Secretary of State with an English text of the 5-hour speech
 within 24 hours, Spanish-speaking editors at Headquarters, FDD
 linguists, and State Department employees contributed their
 services. 141/ Increased demand for Cuban coverage led the DDI
 to consider expansion of the Key West Post and the addition of
 television monitoring. 142/ One problem FBIS had to contend
 with was the desire of some officials to jam the Cuban radio.
 This was successfully opposed 143/, thereby increasing pressure
 on FBIS to give better coverage. In May 1962 a formal request
 for [] employees in RPB to provide analysis of
 Cuban broadcasts was filed, and in June FBIS detailed an editor

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to prepare for the new Cuban Task Force a special study on Castro's promises and failures. 144/ The study generated considerable enthusiasm and a demand for scores of extra copies. The addition of [redacted] [redacted] to RPB was approved. The stationing of [redacted] at Key West also was approved, but before that move was made the Cuban crisis outdated the plan. 145/ On 11 February 1963 a formal request for a total staff [redacted] at Key West was filed and approved. 146/ Key West was unique among FBIS stations in that it covered broadcasts from only one country. It also had no editors, using instead [redacted] experienced monitors who did their own editing and filing. Key West started regular television monitoring in 1963. 147/ By the time the post was in full operation, the Panama Bureau also had been expanded and plans were being made for a station in Puerto Rico. This heavy concentration on Latin America certainly should be attributed largely to the impact of political changes which followed Castro's coming to power. Developments in the Dominican Republic in 1965 merely made more apparent the need for better Latin American coverage.

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By early 1960 it was evident that political developments in Africa had created a need for monitoring and a site selected in Nigeria was awaiting approval by the British and Nigerian

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Governments. 148/ In July 1960 FBIS was receiving urgent calls for better African coverage. 149/ Other offices in CIA were worried in September 1960 about the increase in Chinese broadcasts to Africa and filed special requests for information with FBIS. 150/ The Kaduna Bureau was in operation and supplying at least part of the demand for better African coverage early in 1961. 151/

Political turmoil in Vietnam and Laos placed an extra burden on FBIS services, but the developments in the Far East that created the most severe strain were the Sino-Soviet schism and Chinese domestic upheavals. Pressure for better coverage of Chinese regionals began to build in 1957 as this segment had been largely neglected because of low productivity and reception problems. 152/ By 1961 intelligence offices were urging fuller coverage of Chinese regionals as a substitute for the loss of Chinese publications, which had become practically unobtainable. 153/ The BBC also reported a need for Chinese regionals within the British Government, and tentative plans for monitoring at Hong Kong were discussed. 154/ By the end of 1961 Okinawa had expanded its coverage of Chinese regionals and was filing about 3,000 words a day, but nearly half of the known broadcasting stations in China were practically unmonitorable

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from Okinawa. 155/ As pressure continued to grow, both at home and in London, FBIS took the stand that monitoring from Hong Kong should be a BBC responsibility. This viewpoint was accepted in London and Hong Kong, but BBC funds for expansion were unavailable at the time. 156/

The Okinawa Bureau was not happy at the new emphasis on Chinese regionals, for the Chinese staff there was faced with a perpetual backlog, and monitoring of regionals only made the situation worse. In addition to the need for more regionals, the Sino-Soviet split led to more broadcasts by Moscow in Mandarin and by Peking in Russian, placing another extra load on the FBIS staff. Early in 1963 FBIS reported that it was exercising a virtual saturation coverage of Peking national and international broadcasts and was monitoring Chinese regionals 75 hours a week. The BBC had acknowledged its responsibility for monitoring in Hong Kong but still was unable to start operations. 157/ Early in 1966 Okinawa was informed that pressure for more Chinese material was still growing, and that OCI was depending on FBIS for a large part of its Chinese information. Additional Chinese monitoring capability at Okinawa was considered essential 158/, although Okinawa in July 1966 was translating from Chinese dialects and filing to Headquarters

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more than 13,000 words a day. Its backlog was 165,000 words and growing. 159/ Tests were made at Hokkaido late in 1966 with the idea of monitoring some Chinese regionals there. 160/ In January 1967 the Wire Service was giving 40 percent of its space to Chinese information and FBIS was pressing for more Chinese monitors. 161/ By this time the BBC was monitoring in Hong Kong, taking a little of the pressure off Okinawa.

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Chapter 2 FORCES RESTRICTING FURTHER EXPANSION

As in the previous decade, inhibiting forces counteracted the powerful FBIS urge to expand to meet consumer demands. To meet these demands, the natural response was to promote steady growth. More personnel, more equipment, more funds, and more monitoring posts were sought. By 1957 foreign broadcast monitoring, with 16 years of experience, was considered an efficient and sophisticated operation. To do more monitoring -- and there seemed to be no way to avoid the necessity of more monitoring -- expansion was essential. The reasoning seemed sound and goals were set, but inhibiting forces made necessary revised thinking and revised goals.

Restrictions on personnel and budget were the most potent forces limiting FBIS expansion. CIA management at this point had to consider more and more seriously the validity of FBIS claims for funds and personnel. Sometimes needs that loomed large in FBIS thinking were deemed of less importance than other Agency needs by officials having to consider all areas of the Agency.

The result was that FBIS could not begin to keep up with the growth in foreign broadcasting and the demand for its services. It was forced to weigh the demands, one against the

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other, reduce its plans, and make a constant effort to revise and improve methods and techniques. These limitations prevented FBIS from reaching its full potential in collecting information from the foreign mass media but also forced it to become more efficient and more selective in carrying out its responsibilities.

Continued Personnel and Budget Limitations

A shortage of qualified personnel continued to be the primary FBIS problem. As manpower finally became available to fully staff the organization, personnel ceilings were imposed by CIA management. These restrictions began before 1957. The authorized T/O and personnel ceiling reached its peak in 1953, when the T/O was [REDACTED]

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At that time both figures still were well above the actual number on duty [REDACTED] 162/ In 1957 the T/O stood at [REDACTED] fewer than were actually at work four years earlier. The FBIS Chief informed field bureaus early in 1957 that the service was operating under a "rigid personnel ceiling" which would prevent any overall expansion. If a particular bureau were to receive even one additional editor, Headquarters or some other bureau would have to be cut one. 163/

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The FBIS Liaison Officer estimated in 1957 that Saigon was losing 30 percent of North Vietnamese and 60 percent of South

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Vietnamese press material because of a staff shortage. 164/ At Vienna the translation staff had never been able fully to cover the press scrutiny assigned to it. 165/ Late in 1957 authorization of a flexible T/O gave FBIS management the capability of transferring established slots and grades without prior approval. 166/ There also was a slight relaxation in restrictions on the number of foreign nationals, with the ceiling set [redacted]. This made the limit on all FBIS employees, staff and non-staff, about the same as it had been in 1953.

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At Headquarters, FBIS faced a small crisis in 1957-58 because of the installation of allocated communications channels, making mandatory an increase in teletypists. A temporary authorization of [redacted] was approved, with the understanding that the total would be reduced to the ceiling by 30 June 1958. 167/ After this deadline FBIS continued to carry [redacted] classified employees, though with no formal increase in the ceiling. In December 1958 the classified ceiling was cut [redacted] though FBIS still was allowed to maintain its staff [redacted]. By the end of 1959 the number of employees had dropped below the ceiling. In March 1960 the foreign national ceiling was again raised, [redacted], and three months later it was boosted [redacted] 168/ A review of all positions in 1961 resulted in cutting the non-staff ceiling

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[redacted] The classified ceiling remained 25X1
[redacted] 169/ 25X1

By June 1961, with expansion into Africa and Latin America needed, FBIS management became concerned about the freeze on personnel. Noting that the staff ceiling had declined from [redacted] while demands on the staff both at Headquarters and in the field had increased, the FBIS Chief asked for an increase of [redacted] personnel by 1966. 170/ In June 1962 the classified ceiling was raised slightly, [redacted] to provide for Cuban analysis. The non-staff ceiling remained [redacted]. This represented an increase of less than [redacted] in five years, while foreign broadcasts and requirements for FBIS services continued to double and quadruple. A report on the Mediterranean Bureau late in 1962 reflected the overall situation. In ten years the bureau had increased its weekly monitoring from 374 hours to 763. During the same period the monitoring staff had increased [redacted], while classified employees had dropped [redacted]. Monitoring had increased 104 percent, personnel [redacted]. The wordage file from the bureau had nearly doubled. 171/

In December 1962 the foreign national ceiling was allowed to increase [redacted] 25X1
The FBIS Chief again made a plea for relaxation of restrictions,

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declaring that it would be impossible to cover adequately the Cuban radio with no personnel increase. The number actually at work at the time was [redacted]

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over the ceiling -- and [redacted] non-staff personnel. 172/ Another plea followed in May 1963. 173/ But instead of an increase,

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the classified personnel ceiling for the 1964 fiscal year was

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[redacted] FBIS, however, was allowed to carry [redacted]

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above that figure and was promised that in another year the ceiling would be raised [redacted]. 174/ The FBIS Chief warned field bureaus late in 1963 that there was practically no hope for improvement during the coming year, making necessary "the best possible utilization of available manpower" and continued careful scrutiny of methods and techniques. 175/ Requests

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from crisis-ridden bureaus for more editors had to be rejected in spite of the additional requirements levied on them. 176/

Late in 1964 the classified ceiling was further reduced [redacted]

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The ceiling for foreign nationals was [redacted], making it higher than the staff ceiling for the first time. 177/ In February

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1965 the numbers of staff employees and foreign nationals at work were exactly the same -- [redacted]. 178/

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FBIS continued intermittently to argue for a relaxation of employment restrictions, usually with ADO support. In June 1965, urging a staff increase, the ADO noted that 45 percent of

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FBIS slots were watch positions, with [redacted] required to fill a single position 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

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He also pointed out that 60 percent of the FBIS staff rotated to field bureaus, with travel time and home leave cutting actual working time to 75 percent. 179/ FBIS later pointed out

that [redacted] editorial positions were in field bureaus,

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and because of travel and leave [redacted] were necessary to

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keep [redacted] slots filled. 180/ Since sufficient personnel to

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staff field bureaus remained unavailable, a primary problem of FBIS management was to decide which bureau could best suffer a

shortage with the least damage to the overall FBIS mission. 181/

Some relaxation was allowed on the foreign national ceiling.

At the end of 1966 FBIS had [redacted]

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[redacted] 182/ By that time there were 14 field

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bureaus, as compared to 10 in 1953. From 1953 to 1966 staff personnel on duty decreased more than 10 percent; this was offset by a non-staff increase of 50 percent.

As had been the case in the previous decade, money was more readily available than personnel. Higher operating costs were met, and funds were provided for several new bureaus.

There were some budgetary restrictions which hurt, however.

For example, the FBIS Chief protested in 1958 that elimination of overtime for professional workers would work a decided

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hardship on FBIS, as overtime was a necessity during crises, and professional workers as well as clerical employees had to put in overtime. Prohibitions to correct abuses, he declared, should be applied where abuses existed "and not against a component whose record is as conservative as that of FBIS." 183/ As late as 1964 FBIS management still was defending its overtime policy, [redacted]

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[redacted]

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184/ FBIS also protested in 1964 a prohibition on use of the overseas telephone and succeeded in getting an exception to existing regulations. 185/

Total FBIS allotment for the 1957-58 Fiscal Year was

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[redacted]

exclusive of extra funds for bureau construction and purchase of land and equipment. 189/ Comparable annual increases

continued until 1964-65, when FBIS requested [redacted]

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[redacted]

to meet problems of technical obsolescence,

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new communications costs, and the need for a major bureau in Puerto Rico, along with an increase in the personnel ceiling.

Chances for getting this amount were viewed as poor because of

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national pressures to cut spending. FBIS agreed to delay several projects, including the transfer of ECB to Puerto Rico 190/ and rejected the urging of some intelligence offices to establish a monitoring post in South Africa.

Plans for spending [redacted] on improved monitoring and communications equipment also had to be delayed.

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192/ The allotment for 1965-66 was [redacted]

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[redacted] This represented more than a 100 percent increase in ten years.

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From 1957 to 1967 FBIS was more successful in obtaining funds than additions in manpower. Although FBIS did not always get every dollar needed, it was evident that improvement rather than simple expansion was favored by CIA management. By 1966 new problems were arising. The national need to cut overseas expenditures resulted in elimination or delay of considerable FBIS travel. 193/ Over the protests of the FBIS Chief,

instructions were issued to hold FBIS overtime costs [redacted]

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[redacted] The FBIS Chief protested. 194/

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Limited Reproduction Capabilities

The FBIS agreement with the Printing Services Division (PSD) in November 1957 eliminated much controversy between the two units, but did not end all publications problems.*

* See page 117, Part II of History.

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The FBIS Chief warned the bureaus a year later that they must "tailor the monitored product to reproduction capabilities," as the gap between wordage filed and that published in the Daily Report was steadily widening. 195/ PSD complained that the burden of printing FBIS publications continued to grow, as the 1957 agreement limited the number of pages but not the number of copies. The first move made to placate PSD was to limit press scrutiny in the Daily Report, passing on to FDD all but the most timely items. This did not affect bureau operations, as a full scrutiny still was needed by RPB. 196/ PSD complained late in 1961 that the number of books printed was 30 percent higher than in 1957, and that it was becoming daily more difficult to get the printing done on time. 197/ A PSD request that the number of copies be limited to the 1957 figure was refused by FBIS. 198/ Instead, FBIS forecast that the number of pages printed daily would have to increase up to 27 percent through the coming five years. It agreed to hold the circulation increase to about ten percent. 199/

Recipients of the White Book complained in 1963 that much important communist material appeared in the Official Use Only Daily Reports but not in the White Book. FBIS explained that this resulted from the necessity of limiting arbitrarily the number of pages in the White Book in order to get it printed. 200/

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The State Department also complained that much material needed by scholars was being withheld because they had no access to Official Use Only Daily Reports and could not get enough copies of the White Book. At a meeting of State and CIA officials, FBIS tried to explain its problems. One possible solution offered was publication and sale of the White Book by the GPO. 201/ Changes in the method of distribution also were agreed upon to lighten the burden on PSD. 202/

Conditions grew worse, with PSD several times unable to get the books published and delivered on time. Coordination meetings were scheduled in October 1963, and FBIS several times arbitrarily cut Daily Report pages below the agreed 350 to get the book published on time. Important deliveries were late, including one to the President. 203/ PSD suggested that FBIS convert to flexowriter offset mats with the same number of words but fewer pages. FBIS had no money for flexowriters but agreed to experiment with different mats to save page space. 204/ FBIS also pledged new efforts to hold down the number of books printed. 205/ Experimentation with a smaller type face, already under consideration, was quickly activated, and parts of the Daily Reports were reproduced with the smaller type. Some users complained, but others appreciated the effort to make more information available. 206/ Gradually all Daily Reports were

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converted to the smaller type, and in October 1964 a new agreement with PSD was signed, to go into effect on 1 January 1965. It provided for 340 pages daily, with copies held to 3,550. FBIS reserved the right to increase pages to 360 during critical international developments but pledged to reduce the number of pages by four with each 10 percent increase in circulation. As the former 350 pages, with the new type face, had been cut to 320, it was felt that this agreement would be satisfactory for the three years of its life. 207/ During April 1965 the Daily Reports averaged 242 pages and 128,260 words daily, then considered the maximum PSD could handle. 208/

Inherent Limitations on FBIS Capabilities

FBIS pioneers had assumed that eventually, teamed with the BBC and similar groups in other friendly countries, the organization would blanket the world, making available to all units of government every item of foreign broadcast information needed. By 1957 it was apparent that this was an impossible dream. Radio broadcasting and other newly developing forms of mass distribution were expanding so rapidly that it would have been difficult even with unlimited resources. Numerous handicaps having little relationship to the shortage of resources became apparent. One handicap was the steady increase in the number of languages used in broadcasts. Assembling a staff of linguists capable of

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monitoring in 75 languages -- no small accomplishment -- was not enough. New languages and dialects continued to appear on the air and frequently were used by communist transmitters in their propaganda.

Early in 1957 there was intense interest in Moscow's Pushtu broadcasts to Afghanistan. FBIS discovered that locating a Pushtu monitor was a difficult assignment that might take years. 209/ Even with more common languages it was difficult to maintain a permanent capability in small bureaus where only one monitor might understand a particular language. When he was absent the capability was lacking. This was forcefully demonstrated at Vienna in 1957 when a very important item in *TRYBUNA LUDU* was delayed several days because the sole Polish monitor was on vacation. 210/ In Saigon it proved impossible to find capable Vietnamese monitors who also understood English. They had to translate into French, making a second translation necessary at a considerable expenditure of manpower and time. 211/ Early in 1958 several offices wanted texts of Trujillo regime broadcasts in Creole to Haiti, but FBIS had no Creole capability and no prospects for locating a Creole monitor. 212/ About the same time ECB could hear Moscow broadcasts in Tamil but could do nothing with them until a USIA linguist came to the rescue. 213/

The most frustrating example of linguistic difficulties was the search by the Mediterranean Bureau for Kurdish monitors.

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In 1958, with Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran expanding broadcasts in Kurdish and agitation developing for an independent Kurdistan, FBIS considered a Kurdish capability essential. The search for Kurdish monitors started in June 1958; by the end of the year a dozen leads had failed to produce one suitable candidate. 214/ The first FBIS Kurdish monitor finally reported for duty 31 May 1960, two years after the search began. 215/ Two months later he had to be dismissed, again leaving the bureau with no Kurdish capability. 216/ Eventually capable monitors were found, but the experience led FBIS to call upon more than 20 U.S. missions in foreign countries to help recruit linguists for unusual languages. 217/ By that time Saigon was having difficulty finding Cambodian monitors. Moscow started broadcasts to Asia and Africa in Sinhalese and Bambara in 1960, but FBIS found them impossible to cover. 218/

With the inauguration of monitoring in Africa, FBIS found so many local dialects that it was impossible even to consider covering most of them. A half dozen were selected, but even this was too many. 219/ In 1965 the State Department wanted texts of Lingala broadcasts from the Congo, but neither FBIS nor the BBC could provide them. 220/ Other exotic languages FBIS later was asked to monitor were Uighur, Quechua, and Creole from Moscow, and Tagalog from Peking. The DDP was especially anxious to get

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Uighur broadcasts from Tashkent in 1964. FBIS contracted with a former Mongolian-Uighur monitor from Okinawa who had immigrated to the United States to translate the recordings for a time. 221/ Eventually the Panama Bureau was able to hire monitors on contract to handle Creole and Quechua. 222/

Another insurmountable handicap to complete radio coverage was the erratic nature of reception, especially over long distances. ECB could hear important Havana broadcasts very well during much of the year, but in certain seasons reception became too poor for intelligible monitoring. When Cuban broadcasts became vital, new posts were a necessity. WCB could monitor Peking's NCNA very well a great part of the time, but for long periods coverage had to be assumed by Okinawa. Many important broadcast programs could be heard by only one bureau. When they faded they were lost. Thus there was always the possibility that a vital broadcast, through bad reception, might be lost completely.

Other broadcasts, though monitorable, often were so unproductive that they were given a low priority. That was true of Chinese regionals for years. Many could be heard, and interest in them was recognized. Yet the hours spent monitoring produced such a small volume of significant information that FBIS bureaus were reluctant to cover them at all. Okinawa, the largest Chinese monitoring bureau, found other Chinese programs much more

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productive. As the Chinese staff could never monitor and process all information available, Chinese regionals were slighted. It was estimated in 1961 that Okinawa could easily double its coverage of Chinese regionals, but only at the expense of other broadcasts. 223/ The problem of covering Brazil was also difficult. Brazilian press, but very little voice, could be monitored at ECB and WCB. With new demands for Brazilian information, FBIS was faced with a coverage gap. 224/ In fact, essential concentration on communist broadcasts left numerous coverage gaps. An FBIS study late in 1966 listed a dozen Asian countries, most of Latin America, half of Africa, and Western Europe as inadequately covered -- just about all of the non-communist world. 225/

FBIS involvement in press scrutiny served further to expose some weaknesses. While combining radio monitoring with press scrutiny eliminated most duplicative material, it broadened the information base too greatly for small bureau staffs. The Embassy in Saigon pointed out as early as 1957 that the rush of events made information gleaned from the Hanoi press vital, but FBIS was not adequately staffed to exploit it. 226/ As no other unit was in a position to provide the service, FBIS continued to do the best it could. In 1965 it was filing nearly 8,000 words a day of press scrutiny to supplement its broadcast information, but

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nobody claimed it was providing exhaustive coverage. 227/ Similarly, the Austrian Bureau found it was unable fully to utilize both press and radio. An effort was made in 1959 to eliminate all marginal coverage, but continuing textual requirements could not be met without a growing backlog. 228/

Special requirements levied on FBIS sometimes accented coverage weaknesses. Late in 1960 the DDP asked for tape recordings of Castro's speeches in January and February 1959. FBIS had no recordings, as it had not covered Havana broadcasts prior to 3 April 1959. 229/ In 1961 State asked for a compilation of Hanoi statements from 1957 showing evidence of subversion and aggression against South Vietnam. FBIS simply was unable to comply as its coverage was not that extensive. 230/ A similar request from State in 1967 called for a full record of Taiwan broadcasts to the mainland, but FBIS, through concentration on mainland China broadcasts, had neglected most Taiwan transmissions. 231/

Measures Taken to Improve Coverage

In addition to the continuing effort to add personnel and the setting up of new monitoring posts, FBIS constantly sought other ways to improve its service. As limitations on personnel became less strict for foreign nationals, one obvious solution was to transfer more responsibility to non-staff personnel. As early as August 1957 consideration was being given to replacing American

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engineers with non-staff personnel at Cyprus and Okinawa. 232/

Okinawa already had

25X1

All code

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monitoring, mechanical work, and much technical work was done by non-staff personnel. 233/ It also was noted in 1957 that editors at some bureaus, notably Okinawa, spent a great deal of their time on tabulations and clerical listings, primarily for RPB, while at London much of this work had been turned over to non-staff employees. 234/ Okinawa soon was instructed to seek a native with U.S. college training to take over some editorial duties, but finding a suitable candidate proved difficult.

Late in 1959 CIA management authorized a flexible non-American T/O, allowing FBIS to shift positions from bureau to bureau without prior approval. Only the overall ceiling remained rigid. 235/ No non-Americans had yet been placed in watch officer positions because of security problems, but the matter was under active consideration. 236/ The FBIS Chief Engineer also recommended that more bureau maintenance work be turned over to native employees, and this was done. 237/ A year later an FBIS administrative official further urged declassification of much correspondence and other Headquarters material so that more bureau administrative work could be handled by non-staff personnel. 238/ In the years that followed, much of the

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correspondence was made available to local personnel in "sanitized" form. The position of chief monitor in each of the larger bureaus still was filled by an American, but the new African Bureau Chief suggested in 1962 that he be authorized to seek a suitable native candidate for this position and his request was approved. 239/

As the personnel ceiling for non-staff employees went up and that for Americans declined, the trend toward assigning more responsibility to non-Americans continued and was stepped up. Late in 1965 the classified engineering position was removed from Panama, leaving all engineering duties there in the hands of Panamanians. 240/ The Tokyo Bureau Chief recommended that the positions of engineer and teletype supervisor in his bureau be changed from classified to non-staff. 241/ In planning for reconstitution of the Mediterranean Bureau, the bureau chief asked Washington to make a decision regarding use of non-staff engineers as watch officers, supporting such a move as "a feasible and desirable economy." 242/ London by 1966 had non-staff editorial assistants at work. Okinawa had electronic technicians. Total non-staff personnel at Okinawa had increased since 1957, while the number of Americans remained the same. 243/ The classified engineering position at Vienna was eliminated with the completion of the

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incumbent's tour. 244/ Use of non-staff watch officers was authorized for Cyprus, opening the way for similar action at Okinawa, though the Engineering Staff had become concerned at the constricting T/O for American engineers while the increasing technical sophistication of monitoring equipment made skilled engineers more necessary than ever. 245/ In September 1966 the search for non-staff watch officers for Okinawa started, with the only controversy being whether they should be Chinese or Japanese. 246/ After three months the Okinawa Bureau Chief decided no Okinawans were available. However, the FBIS Administrative Officer reported that replacement of staff personnel with non-staff was growing "more feasible each day with an increase in Far East expertise," though better pay would have to be offered. 247/ With the replacement of watch officers, it appeared that the process might have reached its limit, but consideration already was being given to hiring more local editorial assistants in London and assigning them more responsibilities. 248/

Closely related to the greater use of non-staff personnel was a reduction in domestic bureau staffs and responsibilities. Any possibility of duplication in domestic and foreign bureau coverage was watched carefully, even outside FBIS. In January 1957 a budget examiner at WCB made an unusually careful check of coverage, explaining that he wanted assurance that FBIS needed

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both WCB and the Far East posts. WCB then was requested by Headquarters to make a thorough review of its coverage with the idea of possibly transferring some to Far East posts. 249/ Three Chinese programs were shifted to Okinawa. When the need for a cruising monitor in Panama was confirmed, the radio operator staff at WCB was cut by one to provide the position. 250/ The next position needed at Panama, that of a Spanish monitor, was taken from the ECB T/O. 251/ Several Soviet programs were transferred to the BBC and Russian monitors at ECB were assigned to other work. In 1959 Arabic monitoring was cut at ECB and a position transferred. 252/ Reduction also continued at WCB. The bureau chief acknowledged in 1961 that the bureau had excessive executive manpower and suggested elimination of the GS-14 deputy chief's slot. 253/ The FBIS Chief agreed that WCB probably was over-staffed, particularly in Russian monitors, but felt that the bureau's capabilities should be preserved. 254/ In an effort to maintain WCB as a viable entity the sending of Chinese regional belts from Okinawa to WCB for processing was put on a regular basis. 255/ However, Panama continued to take positions from WCB and, with plans for Puerto Rico developing in 1964, it was decided to close out Latin American monitoring there, leaving WCB with

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 256/

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In August 1965 WCB transferred its last Soviet regional program

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to Hokkaido and discontinued the Brazilian press, its last program from Latin America. 257/ In November 1965 ECB lost [redacted]

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[redacted] -cutting its monitors to

25X1

[redacted] 258/ A Headquarters review in 1966 showed that 25 percent

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of ECB's press coverage was unproductive, so it was dropped,

freeing several radio operator positions. 259/ In 1966 ECB,

originally a major bureau, had the same number of monitors as

25X1

the African Bureau and fewer than Saigon, Panama, or Frankfurt.

WCB, [redacted] had the same number as Panama [redacted]

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fewer than Vienna. 260/ Illustrative of the extent to which the

bureau had been reduced, a report in August 1966 showed [redacted]

25X1

receivers still at WCB, [redacted] for each city monitored. 261/

25X1

Normally one receiver would serve for many cities.

With the opening of the Puerto Rico Bureau in 1966,

the final demise of ECB was in sight. On the other coast,

WCB, which had been described for years as the bureau with

the fewest personnel problems, was now plagued by low morale

on the heels of rumors that the station soon would close. 262/

Wordage filed to Headquarters continued to drop, reaching a low

point in September 1966, despite assumption of Kyoto coverage

formerly handled by Tokyo. The bureau supplied only six percent of

the FBIS Wire file, and during 1966 crated [redacted]

25X1

equipment for shipment to other bureaus. 263/ Suggestions from

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1965 on for transfer of Chinese responsibility to Okinawa were strongly opposed by WCB Bureau Chiefs. It was pointed out that this would reduce the bureau staff -- with a file of about 2,500 words daily. With such a reduction, it was doubtful that the bureau should continue to operate. 264/

25X1

Search for Shortcuts and Improvements

The search for quality and efficient production, given considerable emphasis in FBIS during the previous decade, was continued after 1957, not just because this was good management, but because it was a necessity. The problem was presented succinctly by the FBIS Chief in 1959. Noting that FBIS was commissioned to cover a rapidly expanding field of foreign radio broadcasting on a "relatively fixed T/O and budget," he pointed out that this required a "frequent evaluation of services rendered and the cutting of any marginal service." 265/ Bureaus were asked to examine carefully each request for lateral services and to seek ways to streamline FBIS service. 266/ For example, early in 1957 a West German Economic Report prepared at Frankfurt was using 15 to 20 Daily Report pages each week. A survey showed that only nine users wanted the material, so arrangements were made to obtain nine copies in the teletype room and to delete the item from publication. In 1959 the ADO authorized discontinuation of the report. 267/

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The belief that the most efficient practice was to have editors select all items for processing from monitored summaries had been an article of faith in FBIS since early FCC days. Yet it was apparent that the BBC, with a different procedure, was doing a creditable job of monitoring. There was considerable discussion within FBIS on the practicability of transferring some selection responsibility from editors to monitors, but the preponderant opinion for several years was that this would be a mistake. An RPB analyst with no experience in the editorial end of FBIS, after visiting the BBC in 1962, endorsed the traditional FBIS system. 268/ The argument persisted, however, and late in 1963 domestic bureaus were instructed to give some experienced monitors responsibility for selecting and filing copy. 269/ In 1964, with the temporary transfer of FBIS monitors from Cyprus to Caversham, the extra load created for London Bureau editors made it almost necessary to leave much selection to the monitors, all of them foreign nationals. 270/ At Key West experienced monitors handled selecting and filing from the start. The preparation of monitored summaries for file records was adopted in 1964. 271/ On 24 October 1965 WCB abandoned its midnight editorial shift, leaving all selection and filing to the monitors. ECB had been following a somewhat similar practice for several years. 272/

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The need to cut corners convinced some that FBIS should consolidate London Bureau operations at Caversham, closing the joint FBIS-USIA wire room in London despite USIA opposition.* After preliminary studies, the Chief Engineer, making an on-the-spot examination in the autumn of 1957, approved the plan in principle. The next step was to placate USIA. 273/ Final agreement was reached late in 1959, with 3 January 1960 chosen as the time for the change. FBIS absorbed the USIA personnel, and the London Embassy provided USIA with communications. Several non-staff positions were freed, and a considerable gain in communications efficiency was noted. 274/

Another consolidation was that of RPB publications. On 3 July 1958 the Far East Survey and the USSR Survey were combined into one bi-weekly book, relieving the printing problem somewhat and eliciting user approval. A similarly combined Trends and Highlights was issued each week. 275/

Undoubtedly the most important effort, aimed both at more efficient use of manpower and service facilities and increased value of FBIS material to recipients, was the continual drive to improve selection and to reduce bureau wordage files. Bureaus were cautioned late in 1957 that the size of a

* See page 216, Part II of History.

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bureau file was no indication of the bureau's value. They were asked to reduce the files by "judicious summarization, excerpting, or improving the criteria of selection" and never to expand a file except because of a crisis or additional coverage. 276/ Further guidance along this line went to the bureaus from time to time for several years. One such message late in 1958 caused considerable discussion at Headquarters, with one official professing to see a change in FBIS "editorial philosophy." 277/

Late in 1958, the bureau files averaged 225,000 words daily, selected from seven million monitored words. This was a selection of 3.2 percent, contrasted to more than 10 percent in 1947. 278/ It was pointed out that it was possible that the process was going too far. Okinawa complained in 1959 that its compressed file was not satisfactorily serving lateral users. As an example, the BBC was regularly asking for more Far East material. 279/ Editors in some other bureaus were frustrated by continued instructions to compress, feeling that this deemphasized the importance of their product. 280/ Early in 1960 FBIS management became concerned at the increase in press scrutiny, suspecting that some radio monitoring might be suffering neglect because press material could be processed more easily. Headquarters editors were instructed to limit press scrutiny in the Daily Reports to 20 percent of the total, and field bureaus

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were cautioned to give first preference to radio broadcasts. 281/
In a few instances the bureaus insisted that press material
definitely was of more value than radio broadcasts. 282/ Also,
in a few instances Headquarters issued specific instructions to
individual bureaus outlining categories of information that
should be curtailed. 283/

Yet, despite scrupulous allocation of resources and
increasing productivity per person, FBIS was unable to keep up
with the demand for its product and to fully perform its mission.
The FBIS Chief warned in 1963 that FBIS could no longer add any
coverage or fulfill any new requirements without sacrificing
other commitments. Its crying need was for more personnel. 284/
FBIS also vigorously rebutted the claim made in some intelligence
offices that their own analysis staffs had remained constant while
the quantity of material they had to handle had markedly in-
creased. FBIS had condensed, spot analyzed, expedited delivery,
shifted coverage to meet special requirements, and provided
special support. There had been a "significant increase in
quality" but not in quantity. 285/

Summing up for the Bureau of the Budget in 1964, FBIS
declared: "Because the volume of world broadcasting grows at
a faster pace than FBIS resources, a constant reappraisal will
be made to devote attention to areas which require it." 286/

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Various studies were carried out over the next three years to review FBIS monitoring techniques, editorial procedures, and reproduction and dissemination in order to make the most efficient use of manpower and resources. Other offices of CIA joined in these studies. 287/

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Chapter 3 NEW MONITORING POSTS FOR WORLDWIDE COVERAGE

Worldwide political changes, pressure for better coverage of particular areas, and shortcomings in established sites all contributed to the drive for more FBIS monitoring posts. In 1947 there were six monitoring stations, all but two scheduled for closure or relocation. It was then believed that the addition of two major overseas stations would enable FBIS to carry out its mission. By 1957 the number of posts had expanded to ten. In 1967 five more were in operation or being constructed, and it was not at all certain that the trend had been halted. It must be emphasized, however, that the increased number of monitoring posts was not indicative of FBIS growth. The size of staff and amount of final product had not increased in proportion to the increase in monitoring locations. Rather than expansion of FBIS, the growing number of locations represented a redistribution of resources for better fulfillment of the mission.

Better Latin American Coverage

Before 1957 it had been decided to set up a very small monitoring post in Panama, but the exact location was still in doubt.*


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* See page 265, Part II of History.

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The matter was debated throughout the summer of 1957, and after the DDP agreed to support FBIS and the DDS had approved establishment of a cruising post, [redacted] experienced in Latin American cruising, was selected to choose a site and to get the work started. He arrived in the Canal Zone on 20 September 1957 and talked with various officials. 289/ He selected a site at the Army Signals Depot in the Canal Zone, seven miles from Fort Clayton, and started work. 290/ By April 1958 it had been established that Latin American coverage could be improved from the post, and a classified Spanish monitor was added. By July 1958 monitored information from Panama was being filed and published, and [redacted] was authorized to hire a local teletypist to relieve the Army of this support. 291/

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The additional Latin American coverage afforded by Panama proved valuable immediately, but the location was thought unsuitable for an expanded staff. It was decided in February to move to the [redacted] and to accept DDP support, with the move completed on 25 June 1959. [redacted] of FBIS/FOS was sent to Panama to determine the potential of the new site. 292/ By March 1960 the Panama Post, originally planned only for cruising, had become a full-fledged

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monitoring station. Its operations building had room for []
monitors, and a recommendation that the staff be expanded to
capacity was approved. 293/ Engineer [] was sent
to Panama in September 1961 to make a thorough survey of the
location prior to further expansion. 294/ Serious drawbacks,
mainly at the site involving interference from local power lines
and terrain prohibiting adequate expansion of the antenna field,
were acknowledged. Consequently, tests were scheduled for a
Fort Randolph location early in 1962, but before they were made,
the site became unavailable. 295/

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In October 1962 the post was described as "a bureau in all
but name," with primary responsibility for 13 Latin American
countries and local U.S. military offices enthusiastic about the
station's product. Headquarters recommended that Panama take over
all West Coast Bureau Latin American coverage as soon as site
improvements could be made and the staff enlarged. 296/ By
November 1963 the Panama Bureau had []
Panamanian employees, was working two full shifts five days a
week, and was monitoring broadcasts from 17 countries. Army
communications were completely satisfactory, and the demand
for lateral services in the area continued to grow. 297/
Housing was a problem, so early in 1964 consideration was
given to use of Agency housing in the Canal Zone. 298/ The
operations building was remodeled in 1964. In April 1966
Panama was filing nearly 9,000 words a day to Headquarters

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from 18 Latin American states. The approved T/O was [redacted]

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[redacted]

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more than the East Coast Bureau and approximately the same as the West Coast Bureau. 299/

Castro's takeover in 1959 made it imperative that FBIS get better coverage of Cuba. FOS promoted extensive surveys in Florida and recommended in March 1960 that a Spanish monitor be sent to Key West for the six months of the year when Havana reception was unsatisfactory at the East Coast Bureau. This move would call for Navy support and Navy communications to handle 2,000 words a day to Headquarters. 300/ With Navy approval,

engineer [redacted] and monitor [redacted]

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arrived at Key West on 30 April 1960. [redacted] was filing

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Cuban copy by 11 May. The post operated at minimum cost, with no charge for office space, communications, or routine support, a fact that had considerable influence on the decision to make it a year-round rather than a six months operation. Another advantage was the ability of Key West to monitor Havana television. An FOS recommendation in the summer of 1960 that the post be retained indefinitely was accepted, and [redacted]

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was sent to Key West in 1960 and again in 1961 to test reception during varying seasons. It was decided that the post was of little use in monitoring anything but Cuba but was essential

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for that purpose. 301/ In February 1963 expansion of the staff [] was approved. 302/ The bureau chief acted as the only editor, and there were [] Spanish monitors, who selected and filed copy, a teletypist, and an engineer.

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25X1

Late in 1964 a new Key West operations building was approved, with construction by the Navy started in June 1965. A hurricane in September forced a temporary evacuation, but aside from that the new facilities were quite satisfactory. 303/ In January 1966 Key West monitored 36 hours a week, with a file to Headquarters averaging about 3,000 words daily. Naval satisfaction with the operation was evidenced by the signing in January 1966 of a formal support agreement guaranteeing continuation of the post. By the end of the year the hours monitored per week had increased to 53. 304/

After the 1954-1955 surveys and abandonment of the idea of a Puerto Rican cruising station, plans for monitoring from Puerto Rico were revived in May 1961 when a three-man survey team, which Army units ably assisted, was sent to Puerto Rico. 305/ The team recommended construction of a station on the south coast of Puerto Rico but felt that both Panama and Key West had to be retained. Reception of African and European broadcasts was called at least as good as at the East Coast Bureau, perhaps better. 306/ It was acknowledged, however, that even combined with Panama, Puerto Rico could not give satisfactory coverage of the southern part of South America. 307/

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By this time it was evident that encroachment at the East Coast Bureau might make that station less effective before many years, and the idea of a major bureau at Puerto Rico to replace most East Coast Bureau monitoring and to improve Latin American coverage was informally accepted by the end of 1961.

The eventual need for [redacted] to finance a Puerto Rican Bureau was footnoted in budget estimates for Fiscal 1963 and again in the following year's budget. 308/ In April 1964

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[redacted] were sent to Puerto Rico for further surveys. The Puerto Rico project was quickly approved, with planning for land acquisition, bureau construction, and staff requirements underway in the summer of 1964, after a site in the southwest corner of Puerto Rico was selected in November. 309/ FBIS engineers worked closely with GSA in New York, and progress on the station was rapid. 310/

25X1

[redacted] selected to oversee construction, went to Puerto Rico in April 1965, getting office space in the Post Office at Mayaguez. 311/ He made a survey of living conditions, including housing and schooling, and got the project underway with GSA help. Funds were made available at once to the extent

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of [redacted] 312/ By 14 June 1965 the contract for construction of the Puerto Rico antenna had been signed, and plans and specifications were near completion. 313/ [redacted] was joined

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by an engineer from Real Estate and Construction in July 1965. By the end of July material was arriving for construction of the antenna. 314/ Bids for construction of the operations building were opened on 20 December 1965, and a contract with the Arden Construction Company was signed on 18 February 1966. 315/ Stockpiling of equipment for shipment to Puerto Rico was underway early in 1966. 316/ Considerable enthusiasm was recorded for the new-type wire grid lens antenna used in the new bureau, the third one of its type built by the U.S. Government. Most antenna construction had to be completed before the operations building could be built. The operations building was scheduled to contain monitoring positions, more than the East Coast Bureau. 317/ The first completion date projected for the Caribbean Bureau was 21 March 1967, but by December 1966 construction was only 30 percent complete. 318/ More land was purchased in January 1967, bringing the area to 588 acres. Completion of the operations building was finally projected for July 1967, but work on it ran several months behind schedule. 319/

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Monitoring operations at Puerto Rico started long before activation of the bureau. Local advertisements brought 350 applications for monitoring positions, and in December 1966

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[] candidates were approved for processing. 320/ The plan was that [] bureau employees should be non-staff, but as Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens, this led to difficulties. Some non-staff employees were scheduled for transfer from Panama, but those from the East Coast Bureau were of course staff personnel. 321/ Transferees from the East Coast Bureau arrived as early as January 1966, the first ones on temporary duty. [] positions were transferred in September 1966. By then a considerable amount of monitoring was being done in the first FBIS Transportable Monitoring Unit (TMU) and in temporary quarters at Mayaguez. 322/ Complete replacement of the East Coast Bureau took place in 1967.

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Puerto Rico, however, could not effectively monitor some areas of southern South America. A monitoring survey by [] in Uruguay to supplement Puerto Rico led to nothing. [] arrived at Montevideo on 1 June 1964, decided after five days that monitoring from the U.S. Embassy was impossible, and made further tests at a location between Montevideo and Buenos Aires. His report indicated that such a site could cover the areas not monitorable from Puerto Rico, 323/ but this was never followed up.

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Monitoring African Broadcasts

Following the 1956 African surveys, FBIS was uncertain of what priority to place on the area.* Principal users seemed rather indifferent, resulting in postponement of any action. The DDP wanted monitoring at Asmara, but FBIS was convinced a West African or North African site was preferable. 324/ In the meantime the DCI encouraged State Department talks with Ghana on monitoring there. 325/ With an increase in Moscow broadcasts to West Africa in 1958, user interest became more apparent, and State sought an active response from the Ghanaian Government. 326/ Ghana responded coolly at first to the State initiative, saying that the time was "not propitious," but late in 1959 its attitude changed, and [redacted], a former BBC official working with Ghanaian broadcasting, complained at FBIS inaction. 327/ The Ghanaian plan, as described by [redacted] was for a joint monitoring post, with FBIS sending all personnel and equipment needed and sharing the cost. After five years, if Ghana were capable of continuing, it would take over the management and FBIS would retain only a liaison staff.

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In the meantime [redacted] was sent to examine other suitable sites, with Liberia or Nigeria favored.

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* See page 268, Part II of History.

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Arriving in Monrovia on 27 July 1959, he found prospects poor there, but he liked what he found at Kaduna in Northern Nigeria and recommended that it be considered. The BBC had offered no objections to a Nigerian post. 328/ Nigeria, still a British colony, was in the process of gaining independence, and both the British and Nigerian Governments had approved [] survey trip. 329/

25X1

The project for a West African post was approved by the ADO and passed to the DDI in September 1959, though a final choice had not been made between Ghana and Nigeria. The primary objection to the Ghanaian proposition was that Ghana wanted global monitoring, while FBIS was interested only in coverage of the African region. The DDI and the Project Review Committee in November 1959 approved an African post and selected the Nigerian site. 330/ The U.S. Ambassador in Ghana complained that rejection of the Ghanaian offer was a source of embarrassment to him. 331/

By January 1960 the DCI and the Bureau of the Budget had approved the African post, and the draft of an agreement was forwarded to the British and Nigerian Governments. 332/ []

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[] was named to head the African team, his main support being [] of Real Estate and Construction Division, who would assist in directing construction. There was some

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concern over the status of [redacted], as FBIS had not been identified in Nigeria as a division of CIA, and the British Government had withdrawn, leaving negotiations entirely with the Nigerians. 333/

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The Nigerian Council of Ministers at first rejected the project, but the Prime Minister, who had been convinced on a London visit that the station would not be a clandestine operation, succeeded in reversing the Council's decision. 334/ In June 1960 the Nigerian Government accepted the FBIS proposal, with the proviso that the post would not be part of the Consulate at Kaduna and staff members would not enjoy consular privileges or duty-free shipments of goods. FBIS had to accept these terms. 335/

[redacted] arrived in Lagos on 20 October 1960, going on to Kaduna on 4 November. 336/

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Early in December a site was selected five miles from Kaduna, and working arrangements were discussed with Northern Region officials, who made available the desired tract of 36 acres. 337/

Housing promised to be a problem, and [redacted] recommendation that FBIS find a contractor to construct houses for lease was approved. In the meantime, some apartments were located for FBIS use. 338/ [redacted] local employees were hired by

25X1

9 January 1961, including one monitor, and the brother

25X1

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of a Northern Region Minister had contracted to construct four houses. 339/ Headquarters approved the hiring of [] local employees, half of them monitors, at local wages agreed to by Northern Region officials. It was estimated that houses could not be completed in less than seven months and that the earliest possible date for completion of an operations building would be September 1961. 340/ In keeping with local practice, FBIS accepted, instead of outright purchase or a standard lease, a certificate entitling the U.S. Government to hold the land for 40 years with annual rental payments. 341/

25X1

The first monitored copy from Kaduna, a Garoua broadcast, was filed on 3 February 1961, even before the contract was let for an operations building. One monitoring position had been set up in a temporary site and two more were being prepared. 342/ The first monitoring proved of greater interest to the Northern Region Government than to Headquarters. 343/ Late in February, also, [] arrived as the first bureau editor. 344/ By May 1961 monitoring was being attempted in French and several African languages.

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[] was given a relatively free hand in making purchases for the bureau, being assured that if the allotted [] proved insufficient an effort would be made to cover the deficit. 345/ Bids for operations building construction were

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received late in March 1961, with [] recommending on 7 April 1961 that the Italian company D'Alberto & Bogialla be awarded the contract. 346/ Before the end of April construction was under-way on the operations building and two residences. The actual contract for construction of the operations building was not signed until 10 June 1961, though work had been in progress for nearly two months under a letter of intent, a common practice in Nigeria. 347/ Among other concessions to local conditions, authority was obtained to provide the bureau chief's office with executive furnishings because of anticipated frequent visits from Nigerian officials, the need for their respect and good will, and the importance of "pomp" in the area. 348/ The U.S. Ambassador from Lagos, visiting the site in August 1961, was alarmed at the security fencing being constructed, which he considered out of place in Nigeria. Changes were made to make the fencing appear less imposing. 349/ By 15 January 1962 the last of the four houses was finally ready, and the operations building 90 percent complete. Monitoring was transferred to the operations building early in March. The FBIS operations building when completed was described as "the finest example of Western construction in the region." 350/

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Following a recruiting trip by [] in May 1961, plans to seek monitors outside Nigeria were abandoned. 351/ In

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September 1961 the monitorial staff being trained had capabilities for English, French, Arabic, and half a dozen African languages, but no Spanish or Portuguese monitor had been found and training was proving rather onerous. 352/ The station also found it difficult to monitor Accra, which was most urgently desired at Headquarters. Problems in communications also were serious and delays frequent. All communications to London were commercial, with Nigerian Posts and Telegraph (P & T) controlling a line from the FBIS station to Lagos. Other early problems were caused by the poor writing in the African press and the radio reports of press comment. 353/ The bureau had to give up on several monitor trainees but others were found to replace them.

[redacted] left Washington on 27 July 1962 to replace [redacted] as African Bureau Chief. By then it was recognized that the African Bureau would be plagued by administrative, personnel, and communications problems for some time to come, but its product was considered essential. 354/ The bureau file was about 5,000 words per day. With the BBC monitoring at Nairobi, the only important African countries completely outside the range of the two posts were Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa. In 1966 the African Bureau had [redacted]

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employees, not counting three additional guards hired on contract. There were [] staff personnel. A 1967 survey showed that the small African file was highly regarded by such users as OCI and State -- and by USIA, which called the information "indispensable." 355/

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Increased Interest in Southeast Asia

While the Saigon Bureau always was considered essential for monitoring Vietnam, its handicaps as a monitoring post for other Southeast Asia states were readily acknowledged. In 1958 a small post in Malaya or Singapore was considered, perhaps in cooperation with the BBC. 356/ In 1961, with better coverage of Laos needed, neither Saigon nor Okinawa was adequate and some FBIS staff members felt that monitoring should be attempted at Vientiane. 357/ Since monitoring at Bangkok seemed more practicable, that project, dormant since 1954-55 when it was feared that Saigon would have to be abandoned, was revived. 358/ The Saigon Bureau Chief was sent to Bangkok for a preliminary survey and he reported reception and living conditions promising. 359/ As the need for Laotian copy faded in 1962 after the Geneva Conference on Laos, and with the temporary easing of Saigon conditions, the FBIS Chief assured the bureau that plans to move to Bangkok had been dropped. 360/ However, this did not

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mean that an additional bureau site was not required for coverage of the area, and a few months later the ADO endorsed a new Southeast Asia monitoring post by Fiscal 1966. 361/ New terrorist attacks on Saigon early in 1964 again brought the idea of a move to Bangkok to the forefront. The FBIS Deputy Chief, on a trip to Saigon, was instructed to prepare contingency plans for removal of both monitors and staff personnel. 362/ Conferences with State officials indicated that the Embassy in Bangkok almost certainly would welcome FBIS, but State vigorously opposed deserting Saigon, where FBIS material was valued highly. 363/

However, when the State Department queried the Bangkok Embassy, plans to transfer from Saigon received an unexpected setback. Although the Embassy in 1955 and again in 1962 had been enthusiastic and certain that Thailand would offer no objections, the new Ambassador in Bangkok was opposed to increasing U.S. operations there and forecast a rejection by the Thai Government. 364/ A Philippines post was again considered. Then State reported a reversal in the Bangkok attitude, and plans went ahead for a new Bangkok survey in September 1965.

[redacted] Saigon Bureau Chief, and engineers [redacted] and [redacted] made reception tests at Bangkok and other Thai sites. 365/ In January 1966 CIA initiated a formal request for

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authorization of a Bangkok monitoring post. With assurances that the monitored product would be made available to Thai officials, the Thai Minister of Information visited Okinawa and the East Coast Bureau and added his endorsement of the move. 366/ It was understood that Saigon would continue to monitor Vietnam, while Bangkok would cover the remainder of Southeast Asia. 367/ []

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[] arrived in Bangkok on 1 November as the first bureau chief. Monitors were transferred from both Okinawa and Saigon and, with preparation of an operations building already underway, interim monitoring started on 31 January 1967. 368/ Communications with Saigon were established on 24 March, and the first monitored copy for publication reached Headquarters on 19 April 1967. 369/

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Use of Hong Kong as a location to monitor Chinese regionals had been discussed by FBIS and the BBC for years, but in 1961 FBIS suggested that the Hong Kong Government be enlisted as a partner to examine monitoring possibilities. 370/ Visiting Hong Kong late in 1961, RPB Chief [] recommended an FBIS survey there, as it seemed the BBC would never get the necessary funds. 371/ [] suggested reception tests from aboard ship, but this idea was rejected and FBIS made it clear that the BBC must be informed of any tests made. 372/ The Consulate General in Hong Kong agreed to support a two-man

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survey team. Reception tests started on 26 September 1962 by [redacted] exceeded expectations, despite interferences in the congested area. 373/ Belts recorded in Hong Kong were sent to the West Coast Bureau for processing. The team found [redacted] [redacted] with good reception, and listened to several stations unheard on Okinawa. 374/

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Results of the Hong Kong tests aroused enthusiasm in 12 major intelligence offices and increased insistence on regular monitoring. 375/ [redacted] of the BBC acknowledged the need for Hong Kong monitoring but insisted that funds still were unavailable. 376/ However, by the middle of 1964 the British Ministry of Information was doing some monitoring in Hong Kong, and U.S. officials felt that the FBIS survey had induced the British Government to act. 377/

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BBC Cooperation in Closing Coverage Gaps

Despite different interests and orientation, BBC and FBIS officials continued to cooperate as a team to overcome worldwide monitoring deficiencies. Contributions to the joint effort changed radically. In 1946 the BBC was doing more monitoring than FBIS; by 1957 FBIS was listening to at least twice as many broadcast words daily as was the BBC. FBIS personnel at times suspected that the BBC was dragging

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its feet in the belief that FBIS would take up the slack, but for the most part they recognized that BBC officials had to cope with serious financial handicaps. In 1957 the BBC moved into Teheran, covering some Soviet regionals unsatisfactorily heard on Cyprus.

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BBC officials also cooperated with FBIS in an effort to get needed material from Malaysian monitoring, though the British government had limited resources there. 380/ In the summer of 1958 BBC's [] visited all FBIS posts in an effort to improve BBC-FBIS coordination, and while in Singapore he made arrangements for a visit by the Saigon Bureau Chief. 381/ [] also announced BBC's intention to set up a monitoring post in East Africa. 382/ In July 1959 [] went to Nairobi to establish a small monitoring station with two editors and four monitors, influencing considerably FBIS selection of a West African monitoring site. It was planned from the start, of course, that Kaduna and Nairobi coverage would be

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carefully coordinated, but the BBC post, which opened two years earlier, had already established its coverage schedules before the FBIS station began to operate. In the spring of 1962 the Nairobi post was monitoring Kenya, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Tanganyika. It had no Portuguese capability and very little English, and no hopes whatever for expansion. 383/ When arrangements were made in September 1962 to send London editor a former cruising monitor, to Africa to explore African monitoring potential, the BBC was enthusiastic about having him visit Nairobi for better coordination. 384/

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With crisis conditions prevailing in Africa in 1964, the State Department urgently requested FBIS coverage of the Stanleyville radio, which could not be heard from Kaduna, but could be monitored from Nairobi, though the BBC staff there did not have the required language capabilities. FBIS offered to send a monitor to Nairobi, but the British felt that at the time this would not be prudent. It finally was agreed that the BBC would send one of its own monitors to Nairobi for special coverage, with FBIS paying the cost. 385/ When the BBC was allowed to withdraw its monitor on 7 December 1964, the DDP was not happy at the decision. 386/ In 1965, partly because of pressure from a member of the Kenya Parliament who had been rejected by the BBC for a monitoring position, the Kenya Government made tentative threats

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to take over the monitoring post, thus causing the BBC some temporary concern. 387/

On 10 December 1965 the BBC, in the midst of the Rhodesian troubles, sent a three-man monitoring team for temporary operations at Francistown, Bechuanaland, reducing FBIS dependence on press reports from Rhodesia itself. 388/ During the 1966 Nigerian coup, with the Kaduna station largely useless, Nairobi was able to assume part of the FBIS coverage schedule and to provide valuable information. 389/

Early in 1961 the British Government, like U.S. intelligence offices, wanted more Chinese regionals. FBIS took the position that the BBC should accept responsibility for Hong Kong monitoring but, though it accepted this viewpoint, the BBC could do nothing because of lack of funds. A suggestion by of the Propaganda Analysis Division that FBIS subsidize the BBC was rejected by the Director of FBIS. 390/ A year later, after FBIS had initiated its own Hong Kong reception survey, there was a slight misunderstanding as to the FBIS intent, but this was cleared up when FBIS insisted it was merely preparing the ground for a BBC operation and positively would not undertake the monitoring. 391/ The British Ministry of Information monitoring operation proved inadequate, and the U.S. Consulate was unhappy at FBIS' refusal to move in. 392/ Finally, in July 1964, reported some progress and said he hoped to have a BBC man in Hong Kong before the end of the year. 393/

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In March 1965 [redacted] of the BBC visited Okinawa to plan the Hong Kong monitoring, and an FBIS-BBC agreement was reached on ultimate coordination of Chinese regional coverage. 394/ Immediately after the [redacted] visit, [redacted] named to head the BBC operation in Hong Kong, made a coordination visit to Okinawa, en route to Hong Kong. 395/ By early 1966 a monitoring staff of four was at work in Hong Kong, turning out about 3,000 words daily. Starting on 1 November 1966, copy was delivered once each day to the U.S. Consulate for wirefiling to Okinawa on a deferred basis. 396/ FBIS was under immediate pressure for better service, and in turn pressured the BBC to provide teletyping in its own office. [redacted]

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[redacted]

Most developments arousing controversy and friction between FBIS and the BBC were related to the original jointly exploited monitoring areas of Europe and the Middle East. Headquarters reported embarrassment in 1957 because an important Pravda editorial article had been delayed for seven hours.' After considerable discussion the BBC was persuaded to revise its handling of the Pravda articles it monitored. 398/ Headquarters was pleased at the rapid handling of a 32,000-word Khrushchev speech

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When it became necessary in 1964 to evacuate quickly most Mediterranean Bureau monitors from Cyprus, BBC complained that it was not kept fully informed, but it apparently accepted the explanation that events moved so fast that decisions were out of the hands of FBIS. 406/ One FBIS official, visiting Caversham in 1962, wrote that the BBC had come a long way toward understanding and sharing the FBIS interest in intelligence and was fully cooperative. 407/ Another wrote in 1965 of the "nearly perfect cooperation" between the two units. 408/ Early in 1966 Headquarters and the BBC concurred in a Vienna Bureau suggestion

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that two BBC monitors be sent there on temporary duty to help cover a communist congress. The results were later described as "gratifying" and "beneficial to both FBIS and the BBC." 409/ A minor development illustrating FBIS-BBC cooperation and recognition of each other's problems was the building by FBIS of an elevator in the BBC Caversham building. The tiring climb to the third floor had long been a problem, and though the BBC offered space on the first floor, FBIS did not consider this change desirable but instead built an elevator which was turned over to the BBC. 410/

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Chapter 4 INTRA-AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

By 1957 FBIS had been fully integrated into CIA for a number of years but still preserved much of its identity because of the high degree of specialization in its activities. Although it received considerable agency guidance and direction, it had its peculiar problems to be solved by FBIS management. FBIS had frequent contact with some components of CIA but scarcely any with others. To administrative and service components, FBIS was just another division of CIA, though some peculiarities were obvious. [redacted]

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By 1957 FBIS


relations with administrative and service units were routine and unabrasive.

FBIS depended heavily upon steady and rapid communications to make its operations effective and, as a service of common concern to non-CIA as well as CIA offices, it had its independent problems of collection and dissemination. The further fact that FBIS was almost wholly concerned with current information separated it from some units and brought it closer to others. Most FBIS work, furthermore, was done outside the United States -- unusual in CIA for an overt unit. Finally, while primarily a collection organization, FBIS

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also was charged with analysis of communist radio and press
propaganda, an activity that puzzled the proponents of complete
separation of functions.



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
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Agency Guidance in Dissemination

Dissemination of the FBIS product was never placed completely in the hands of another Agency component, as was envisioned in 1947, but remained a joint operation, with many decisions made by FBIS. High-level approval was usually required prior to changes. Forms of dissemination were pretty well established by 1957. The Editorial Branch published the White Book, four Official Use Only Daily Reports, and "Significant Radio Reportage" five days a week; operated the Wire Service full time; and exercised some control over the 1,000 economic card stencils supplied weekly by the field bureaus.* The Branch also published Supplements to the Daily Report on occasion and Reaction Reports in collaboration with RPB. RPB

* See pages 111-112, Part II of History.

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in addition issued the Trends and Highlights weekly, the Surveys bi-weekly, irregular Radio Propaganda Reports, Special Memoranda upon request, and analytical articles for the Wire when the occasion demanded. Field offices prepared economic card stencils, commentary lists and other items for RPB, several roundups for the Daily Reports and the Wire and handled lateral needs. BIS prepared information on broadcasting and broadcasting stations, with publication of the major compilations assumed by the GPO. These were all operating smoothly in 1957 and only minor changes were made during the ensuing decade.

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Frequent arguments were presented for lower classifications on FBIS publications to allow wider distribution. A field bureau request that portions of RPB publications be declassified so foreign national monitors could see them was rejected, but Security approved allowing a veteran monitorial supervisor in one bureau to see classified publications. 441/ The FBIS Liaison Office found in 1957 that the most common complaint among Far East lateral users was overclassification of FBIS materials. 442/ Late in 1957 authority was granted to decontrol Chinese press material, making it eligible for the White Book. A little later all communist material except point-to-point transmissions was decontrolled. 443/ Frequent requests for removal of the Official Use Only control on Daily Report items had to be rejected with the explanation that it was used because of copyright and libel laws, not for security. 444/ Soviet and Chinese regional broadcasts were removed from Official Use Only control on 27 October 1958. 445/ Security in 1962 rejected a request that certain Radio Propaganda Reports be declassified, but with ADO endorsement it approved declassification of portions of the books. 446/

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Authority was obtained late in 1960 to make the Official Use Only control apply to an individual Daily Report item rather than to an entire page. 447/ In 1964 the control Official Use Only was changed to For Official Use Only. 448/

The Pink Sheet, designed as a list of highlights for the Daily Report, was found useful in the bureaus and by 1957 was being sent to 15 field addresses from which it was in turn distributed to 27 other users. In 1959 a new pre-printed heading for the Pink Sheet, more prominently displaying the FBIS source, was approved. 449/ In 1961 the Pink Sheet, normally only one printed page, was expanded as needed to cover important developments. 450/ As an economy move the Pink Sheet was dropped from the Daily Report on 14 February 1964 though it was still carried on the Wire and distributed by courier. 451/ In 1965 its official title, "Significant Radio Reportage," was changed to "FBIS Bulletin." 452/

In 1957 it was pointed out that FBIS information on Africa and the Middle East was steadily increasing, while the amount of West European material remained static. A redivision of the Daily Report was suggested, with Middle East-Africa, and West Europe-Latin America books. The issue was debated and consumers consulted with no apparent consensus. 453/ One argument against the

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change was that the 270 users desiring only the Latin American book would have forced on them much West Europe copy they did not want. Another suggested change was substitution of "propaganda" for "broadcasts" in the Survey title, but it was feared State and OCI would be "unnecessarily annoyed" if the term "broadcasts" were dropped. 454/ A decision was approved, however, to change the color of economic cards at the end of each year to facilitate handling. 455/ In 1958 the DDI approved the combining of RPB publications. The first combined Soviet-Far East Trends and Highlights was scheduled for 25 June and the combined Survey for 3 July 1958. 456/ A 1960 suggestion that the Daily Report be changed to legal size paper was rejected after a survey of consumers. 457/ To provide for more economic items, the maximum number of words per item was reduced from 150 to 80. 458/ In November 1963 the title, "Economic Abstract," used on the cards was changed to "Economic-Technical-Geographic Abstracts." 459/ On 7 February 1961 a Table of Contents was added to the Latin American Daily Report, the last one of the books to begin to carry such a table. 460/

The question of FBIS services to news and radio correspondents came up for frequent review in CIA offices. In 1958 a request by Col. Stanley J. Grogan of the Public Affairs Staff for 50 additional copies of a Daily Report Supplement to allow

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correspondents to send extra copies to their newspapers led to an investigation and the discovery that FBIS service to correspondents was costing 461/ This was no doubt a conservative estimate, for extra copies of Supplements sometimes ran into the thousands. In 1963 and 1964 Supplements ran as high as 252 pages in one month. 462/ The Supplement carrying Lin Piao's Red Flag article in September 1965 was reprinted twice and nearly 3,000 copies distributed. 463/ In 1963 the possibility of the GPO publishing the White Book for public sale was widely discussed. 464/ The authority of FBIS to distribute the White Book to private users also was questioned, but research revealed that the Bureau of the Budget had approved the practice as late as 20 March 1962. 465/ Queries by the Superintendent of Documents showed that many recipients were willing to pay, some as much as \$100 a year, but there was little GPO enthusiasm to take over the publication and the idea was dropped. 466/ Instead, the DDI issued a set of regulations for handling the White Book, setting priorities in distribution, limiting each book to 96 pages and 850 daily copies, and establishing prohibitions on the use of certain material, such as noncommunist press service and defamatory material. 467/

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In 1957 FBIS requested that it be authorized to publish items concerning CIA and its personnel, as elimination of such

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material was prompting questions among foreign national employees. 468/ FBIS also argued that foreign attacks on U.S. officials, even the President, were of intelligence value and should be published. 469/ FBIS recommendations were accepted with one exception: scurrilous items attacking personally the DCI or other high CIA officials should merely be passed on to the DCI.

The distribution of monitored material showed few changes in the period 1957-1966. Africa was added to the West Europe-Middle East book, and a Cuban Propaganda Report series was inaugurated by RPB in 1962. The FBIS Chief noted that there had been no new publications initiated since the Trends and Highlights in 1950 and, though the number of pages and printed copies increased some, a continuing examination of consumer needs made certain that the total printed was held as low as possible. 470/ Early in 1967 a new Daily Report was added by separating Communist China from the rest of Asia, and several minor changes were made in Daily Report format. A record number of Daily Report pages was printed on 19 April 1967, when the total went to 376. The White Book carried only 74 that day. 471/ Daily wordage in the Reports still averaged only slightly more than 130,000, while the Wire Service carried 25,000.

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Mutual Interests of FBIS and OCI

As handlers of current information, FBIS and OCI had frequent contacts and the need for close coordination between the two offices was obvious. In this regard the decade following 1957 was little different from the preceding one, though contacts were more regular and cooperation better.* OCI produced a daily publication which carried significant highlights obtained from all sources. As OCI received daily all FBIS copy -- the Wire Service, the Daily Reports, and even some categories of discards delivered by courier -- it was natural that FBIS information should make a significant contribution to the OCI Daily Digest. In 1957, 19 percent of Daily Digest items could be traced to FBIS. In the following four years dependence on FBIS steadily increased, with 29 percent of the items received from FBIS in 1960 and 31 percent in 1961. After that, OCI apparently expanded its other sources of information, for by 1965 only 18 percent of the Daily Digest items came from FBIS. The actual high point for one month was April 1961, when 39 percent of Daily Digest items were contributed by FBIS. 472/ The low point was in August 1965 -- only 13 percent. 473/ By

* For FBIS-OCI relations in the previous decade, see pages 176-180, Part II of History.

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1965, however, OCI seemed to be making fuller use of FBIS contributions in its preparation of special reports. In April 1965 a note of appreciation for the complete FBIS reports on the death of the Romanian leader Gheorghiu-Dej was sent by OCI analysts. 474/ In 1965 the Wire Service started forwarding to OCI all unused items from the Middle East. Similar material from some other areas already was being sent. 475/ In FBIS consumer surveys, most OCI analysts noted their appreciation of the extent to which FBIS contributed to their production. 476/ In 1962 OCI pressed for a change in the handling of point-to-point information in order to make it possible for FBIS to copy more of it. 477/

In addition to supplying OCI through regular operations, the FBIS Wire Service maintained around-the-clock contact with the OCI Watch Officer. In 1958, with interest high in Soviet space activities, the Wire Service initiated hourly contact with the Watch Officer. On 25 August 1961 a field bureau intercepted an AP dispatch from Montevideo reporting the Quadros resignation in Brazil. Although not published by FBIS, the item was sent at once to the OCI Watch Officer. A USIB meeting was interrupted for the report, and U.S. intelligence officers had the information before it was made public in Brazil. 478/ In numerous

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instances the Watch Officer reported that FBIS reports helped to put in the proper perspective information received from other sources. 479/ Material that FBIS could not publish because of copyright restrictions was filed to the Watch Officer to keep OCI informed. 480/ The Wire Service Network was revised in 1963 so that items could be filed to the OCI Watch Officer only, and frequent use was made of this arrangement. 481/ During crisis periods the Wire Service frequently prepared special roundups of events for OCI. 482/

OCI was deeply interested in the requests that FBIS give more attention to indications of hostility, especially the 1961 USIB action charging FBIS with indications analysis.* When a study showed that the OCI Watch Officer would be the key figure served, OCI officials joined in advocating that FBIS be allowed the additional staff to undertake indications analysis. Had the plan been put into operation, it would have provided for an FBIS propaganda watch for indications of hostilities and a special flagging system to pass crucial information immediately to the OCI Watch Officer. 483/

OCI officials sometimes criticized FBIS services and support. For example, some OCI analysts, citing the

* See pages 18-20.

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Daily Report of 24 December 1959, complained about the "deterioration of FBIS reporting on Soviet domestic affairs" and its concentration on "obscure articles from the military press" which should have been handled by FDD. 484/ FBIS in reply pointed out in 1960 that it served 21 departments of government outside of CIA and that non-Agency recipients of the Wire Service accounted for 27 teletype outlets. 485/

It was propaganda analysis work that most closely aligned the fortunes of FBIS and OCI and led to the more serious differences. Some OCI officers questioned the value of propaganda analysis and the ability of FBIS to handle it, while others called upon RPB for more analyses and were high in their praise of the RPB effort.

The primary concern of some OCI analysts was that RPB studies might contain inferences based on insufficient evidence. They thought such inferences should be based on all-source material, whereas FBIS analysts based their positions entirely upon material distributed by the mass media, although they did read large numbers of classified documents as background. An RPR in 1963 showing the possibility of divergent views in Soviet military leadership aroused some skepticism among several OCI analysts. 486/ At the time the RPB caveat on its publications pointed out

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that any inferences were based solely on communist propaganda. In 1966 the question of FBIS handling of propaganda analysis again was brought up for discussion in a committee set up by the DDI. One recommendation to the committee was that FBIS analysis work be transferred to OCI, especially the production of RPR's. The OCI representative on the committee, though agreeing that RPD should remain in FBIS, continued to insist that some RPD publications were influenced by factors other than propaganda and should be coordinated before publication. 487/ This course was adopted.

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
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Maintaining an FBIS Identity

A continuing question in FBIS management after 1946 was: How could FBIS retain an individual identity and a degree of autonomy while being fully integrated into a larger intelligence agency? It was felt that without some degree of autonomy and individual identity, it would be impossible for FBIS to fulfill its mission; yet without integration into CIA it could not even continue to exist. The tool most frequently used to defend an individual identity was the FBIS charter, which made FBIS a service unit charged with supplying foreign radio material to all branches of the government. NSCID 2 was described as making the FBIS obligation "broader than most services of common concern." 530/ FBIS asked for recognition of the fact that it was obligated to serve offices outside CIA and for its overt status to be carefully guarded at all times. Otherwise its usefulness would be compromised and its mission would remain unfulfilled.

This defense of the overt status of FBIS played a part in numerous controversies. One took place in 1957 in Saigon, where the Chief of Station was anxious to have FBIS, which advertised

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for employees openly, refer to his office linguistic candidates who failed narrowly to fill FBIS requirements. The Saigon bureau chief consulted Headquarters and was at first told to avoid any commitment. Later an agreement to make some referrals was reached, but with certain safeguards for FBIS' overt status. 531/ By 1957 the practice of having the FBIS bureau chief sit in on CIA meetings had been adopted in London and was recommended for Okinawa and other bureaus, but the ADO accompanied his recommendation with a caution that it was felt the FBIS bureau chief "should remain in sole operational and administrative control" and, except in emergency conditions, should be directly responsible only to the FBIS Chief. 532/

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
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FBIS personnel as a rule welcomed seminars giving them a better insight into CIA operations, but in 1958 an administrative official recommended that FBIS personnel not be invited to future logistical seminars designed for the DDP, as they were of little benefit. 534/

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On 11 August 1962 FBIS obtained authority to set up its own post office box to receive incoming mail, as use of 2430 E St., N. W. carried "certain implications." 537/ In February 1964 FBIS objected to the automatic distribution to other CIA offices of its classified messages, as most of them were administrative items of interest only to FBIS. A system was approved allowing distribution of such messages to FBIS only. 538/

A major facet of FBIS policy, made clear in reply to a Congressional Committee in 1963, was that FBIS did not conceal its relationship to CIA but merely avoided unnecessary publicity about it. 539/

FBIS also remained firm in its refusal to publish in regular FBIS books material not monitored by FBIS or the BBC.


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One exception was a 6-page Austrian press summary prepared by USIA, but even then FBIS translators checked doubtful passages. 540/

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
A 1966 development placed in some jeopardy the FBIS policy of maintaining a separate identity. FBIS publications, except for a period in 1946-1949, had always carried an FBIS rather than a CIA identification. DDI officials recommended that all publications under the DDI bear a notation of their origin in the Directorate of Intelligence. FBIS opposed being included in this, arguing that FBIS publications had a large circulation outside CIA--even among press correspondents and in foreign countries--and that none of them were finished intelligence and therefore should not be identified as CIA publications. 542/ After considerable study, the ADDI, Paul A. Borel, accepted the FBIS viewpoint in regard to most FBIS publications. The DDI retained the option of publishing selected RPR's as CIA

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publications when this seemed desirable. 543/ It was suggested that FBIS review its cover designs with the idea of making them more similar to those of CIA publications, and new cover designs were approved by Borel. 544/



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Chapter 5 MAIN FBIS CONTACTS OUTSIDE AGENCY

As a service of common concern needing some outside support, FBIS maintained close relations with government groups outside CIA. In the 1957-1967 decade, maintenance of these contacts involved largely a continuation of trends already well established. The Governmental departments that FBIS depended upon most consistently for support were the Defense Department and the State Department, both of which already had accepted their responsibility. Apart from these large governmental units, the most noteworthy outside contacts of FBIS were with the press, universities, and groups interested in technical information on foreign broadcasting.

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
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State Department Support

In 1957 all overseas bureaus except Okinawa, Cyprus, and Hokkaido were affiliated with Embassies, which were reimbursed

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annually for support rendered to FBIS.* On Cyprus the first direct move toward closer relations with the State Department resulted in the Consulate's providing Marine guards for FBIS on a reimburseable basis. The guards were assigned on 7 February 1957. 582/ Ominous political developments on Cyprus increased the tempo of consultations between FBIS and the Consulate and encouraged closer relations. In 1958 the British Colonial Government granted the Cyprus Bureau "*ex gratia* consular status," in effect the same diplomatic status as other Agency facilities on the island. 583/

The withdrawal of the British from Cyprus in 1959 and the establishment of an independent Cypriot Government created considerable unrest among FBIS foreign nationals. FBIS felt that the best way to protect the bureau and its personnel was to make it an annex of the Consulate. 584/ State agreed and in December 1959 formally announced through the DCI that the FBIS Mediterranean Bureau was an annex of the Consulate General and should have its buildings appropriately marked. 585/ The first U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus, Fraser Wilkins, in August of 1960 recognized the FBIS bureau as part of his responsibility. He agreed that in future talks with the Cypriot Government on the status of U.S. facilities, all FBIS facilities would be considered an integral part of the diplomatic mission. 586/ As communal dissension

* See pages 211-215, Part II of History.

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between Greek and Turkish Cypriots approached crisis proportions in 1961, relations between FBIS and the Embassy became still closer. FBIS monitoring, especially of Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia, was considered vital to Embassy operations. 587/ During this period country team meetings were held every day, making it necessary for FBIS personnel to make daily trips to Nicosia, a considerable drive. The FBIS station at Kyrenia became known as Embassy Annex 3. For 1965 FBIS payments to State for shared administrative costs on Cyprus were more than . 588/

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With Hokkaido and Okinawa not affiliated with Embassies or Consulates, the dominant position of the military at these locations made unlikely any increased State Department participation. However, relations were close between FBIS and the U.S. Consulate at Sapporo despite the lack of any formal affiliation, and in 1960 the DCI signed a letter acknowledging the support which the departing Consul had provided FBIS. 589/ Country team meetings to coordinate work of U.S. units in Hokkaido were started on 29 December 1964, with the FBIS bureau chief attending. 590/ Still, Hokkaido remained one of the few overseas bureaus not directly served by State on a reimbursable basis.

Despite the condition laid down by the Nigerian Government that the African Bureau should not be affiliated with the U.S.

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diplomatic corps, the Lagos Embassy and the Kaduna Consulate played a vital part in construction and operation of the station. FBIS requested their support on disbursements, pouching facilities, security checks, medical services, communications, contracting and leasing, and the fixing of wage scales, and, despite overworked staffs and personnel shortages, the needed assistance was provided. 591/ The Consulate arranged contacts with Northern Region Government officials and helped with housing and contract problems as soon as the FBIS team arrived in Kaduna. 592/ Contacts with the Federal Government and Nigerian communications offices were handled by the Embassy. 593/ When FBIS communications were set up between Kaduna and Lagos, messages between the Embassy and Consulate were handled without cost by FBIS as a matter of courtesy. 594/ Advice by the Embassy played a substantial part in the FBIS decision not to reveal to the Nigerian Government its affiliation with CIA. 595/ A visitor to Nigeria in 1965 found FBIS relations with both the Consulate and Embassy much more relaxed than in the earlier days and the original misgivings apparently evaporated. 596/

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Of course, relations between FBIS and the Embassies generated some friction and disagreement. Saigon, for example, complained that the Embassy had overcharged it in computing shared administrative costs. 598/ FBIS learned early in 1957 that plans to include FBIS space in the new Saigon Embassy had been inadvertently dropped, and action had progressed too far to allow changes. 599/ Eventually FBIS was offered space on the second floor of the Embassy, but OC transmitting equipment on the roof made monitoring doubtful and FBIS rejected this offer. Space which was finally provided in the Embassy Annex was quite satisfactory, and later visitors to the Saigon Bureau reported Embassy support excellent. 600/ In 1963 FBIS housing in Saigon was contributed to the Embassy housing pool in the hope of obtaining better maintenance and possibly a better house for the bureau chief. 601/

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Embassy support in Tokyo was always good. In 1957 FBIS employees carried identification cards from the Embassy, the Japanese Foreign Office, and the Army. 603/ Adequate space was provided in the Embassy Annex, and when new needs arose in 1963 additional space was provided. 604/ By contrast, at Vienna in the early years something seemed to be lacking in FBIS-Embassy relations. When a new Ambassador, H. Freeman Matthews, went to Vienna in 1957 a special effort was made to brief him fully on


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FBIS operations and needs, and later when the FBIS Chief and the DADO visited Vienna they spent additional time with him. 605/ In 1962 the FBIS Chief commented on the good relations between FBIS Vienna and the Embassy, adding that it "had not always been up to standard, but had improved in the past few years." 606/ At the invitation of the Ambassador in 1964, the FBIS bureau chief started attending weekly staff meetings. 607/ In 1966 Vienna complained that FBIS had been billed [redacted]

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The primary complaint in the London Bureau was that FBIS personnel, most of them stationed at Caversham, did not get full Embassy privileges. 609/ [redacted]

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Services to Press and Universities

Direct FBIS contacts with the press were practically non-existent before 1957. A London *Daily Mail* correspondent asked in March 1957 that he be allowed to write articles on FBIS Cyprus for publication in the *Daily Mail* and the *Saturday Evening Post*. Considering the publicity potentially harmful, FBIS enlisted BBC

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aid and the story was successfully throttled. 610/ In 1966 the African Bureau was visited by 20 radio and press correspondents who were fully instructed on FBIS operations with the understanding that they would write nothing, to which they "reluctantly agreed." 611/ AP in 1957 sought from FBIS proof that the Cairo radio was distorting its dispatches for propaganda purposes, but FBIS declined to assist the news service. 612/

The main FBIS service to both the press and the academic world was through distribution of the White Book, which carried a warning against attribution of items to FBIS. The books were mailed directly to authorized press correspondents in Washington, and also were distributed through the State Department and the Library of Congress. Occasionally FBIS was surprised and even chagrined to learn who was getting the White Book. 613/ In 1959 a man claiming connections with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked that a White Book be mailed to his home. A check revealed the man had once worked with the committee, where he had access to the White Book. [redacted]

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[redacted] It was suspected that he obtained the information from the White Book. 614/

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User surveys continued to query White Book recipients, and there was no hesitancy to cut off the subscriptions of those not enthusiastic about the publication. 615/ There was no direct

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contact between the recipients and FBIS personnel. Other offices of CIA spoke for FBIS, but perhaps the government department handling the most contacts regarding FBIS services to the public was the State Department. In 1959 a request that a Radio Propaganda Report be downgraded for release to the *Baltimore Sun* was approved, provided State handled the contacts with no attribution to FBIS or CIA. 616/ Some concern was expressed in 1959 at the use State was making of the White Book, especially the eight copies made available to visitors at the State newsroom. 617/ The following year State asked for an FBIS Wire Service outlet in the newsroom, but the request was quickly rejected on the ground copyright and Official Use Only material was included in the wire file. 618/ In 1960 FBIS was publishing 660 White Books daily, of which 110 went directly to press and radio representatives. 619/

Misunderstandings about the content of the White and Official Use Only Daily Report continued to be brought to the attention of FBIS.


In 1964 information was requested by a Congressional Committee to answer charges by newsmen that the White Book and the Official Use Only Daily Reports were "contradictory." An effort was made to refute the charge and to explain the Official Use Only control. 620/ In 1965, at the request of the DDI, FBIS deviated from regular practice to supply directly to Chalmers Roberts of the *Washington Post* information on Chinese and North Vietnamese broadcasts. 621/ FBIS personnel were puzzled in 1966 at the publication in the *New York Daily News* of

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material from a clandestine Vietnamese radio monitored by FBIS Saigon. A query to the field brought assurances that there had been no direct contact with FBIS, and since the material was not attributed to FBIS, there was no further discussion. 622/



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Among other suggestions for disseminating the FBIS product was the creation of an FBIS Wire Service for news agencies, to be paid for by the users. A special committee also was set up by Intelligence Support Services Director Borel to consider possible expansion of FBIS services to the press and radio. It included representatives of FBIS, OC, PSD, and the General Counsel.

Chief of the FBIS Executive Staff, represented FBIS. 625/

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No expansion of services to the press was recommended by the committee.

FBIS contacts with the academic world were also mostly indirect. In 1960 universities and libraries were getting 115 copies of the White Book, including 34 distributed on a subscription basis by the Library of Congress. 626/ The caveat to protect FBIS against attribution aroused some misunderstanding among research students in universities. 627/ In 1959 there was some discussion of plans by the State Division of External Research to honor a request from American University in Beirut, Lebanon, for regular mailing of the White Book. Eventually it was decided that the books should not go to universities outside the United States. 628/ Passage by Congress of the Depository Library Act of 1962 caused some FBIS concern, as it seemed the White Book might have to be sent regularly to 700 depository libraries. It appeared that the only practical way to provide the copies would be to turn White Book publication over to the GPO, but no immediate action was possible. 629/ Distribution to depository libraries remained at former levels.

One factor encouraging FBIS contacts with universities was the need to recruit well trained FBIS employees. When the Field Recruiting Branch in 1962 suggested trips to university campuses, FBIS, especially RPB, was immediately interested. 630/

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The RPB Chief visited four West Coast campuses, interviewing students and acquainting faculty members with FBIS analysis activities. 631/ Contributions by RPB analysts to academic journals were approved in 1960 with the proviso that CIA not be mentioned. 632/ In 1964 an RPB analyst, was given permission to take part in a University of Chicago panel on Soviet studies. 633/

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Nevertheless, the consensus in 1966 was that, despite the increase in White Book distribution to 200 universities and colleges, FBIS actually had very minor direct contacts with the academic world. 634/ Some FBIS services were provided indirectly through higher echelons of CIA. For instance, in 1964, at the request of the DDP, the DDI ordered that the Far East Daily Report be sent for three months to a Cornell professor for use in a seminar. 635/

Demand for Broadcasting Information

One byproduct of foreign broadcast monitoring--technical information on foreign broadcasting stations and programs--was also in demand by outside groups. In 1957 the Broadcast Information Service (BIS) of FOS had a staff of half a dozen devoting full time to gathering and disseminating this information. They depended to a great extent upon the cruising monitors in field bureaus. The information was essential to FBIS operations, but it also proved interesting to other groups and individuals, both inside and outside government. Because of this wide interest,

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the GPO was willing in 1955 to take over publication and sale of the four volumes of *Broadcasting Stations of the World*, returning to FBIS 125 copies for its own use. BIS continued to publish within FBIS the *Station and Program Notes*, as well as *Operational Developments in Foreign Broadcasting*.

For several years after 1955, letters continued to come to FBIS requesting copies of BIS products, and most were simply passed on to GPO. The annual *Broadcasting Stations of the World* made available in November 1957 contained 1,017 pages, compared to 782 in 1955. It was sold by GPO at \$5.25 a copy. 636/ The 1959 edition was raised to \$6.75 because of its larger size. In September 1961 GPO printed 900 copies, reporting a year later that 600 had been sold at \$8.25 a copy. 637/ In 1963 one of the four volumes, listing broadcasting stations by call letters or slogans, was discontinued, leaving only three volumes. By 1965 Volume III had grown so large that it was divided into two books, one covering FM and one Television. 638/



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In addition to the fairly

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regular reports on radio schedule and operational changes, BIS also prepared special studies when needed. Two such documents

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prepared in 1959 for FBIS internal use had to do with African broadcasting south of the Sahara and with monitoring potential in Panama. 640/ Such studies went outside FBIS when appropriate, and in 1961 USIA sent a letter of commendation to BIS Chief James G. Wedewer and his staff for their "excellent service over many years in supplying information about worldwide radio broadcasting to members of our staff." 641/

At USIA request, a study of Cuban radio and television broadcasting was made in 1961 for background use by VOA. 642/ Another report--on communist broadcasts to Western Europe--was prepared at State Department request for eventual use in a *U.S. News & World Report* article. 643/ Queries from USIA, State, and the Commerce Department in 1961 prompted a BIS survey on the number of radio transmitters in each country of the world. In a letter of appreciation, State said this survey had enabled it to cancel 120 country reporting assignments at a great saving. 644/ In 1963 BIS stopped publication of *Operational Developments in Foreign Broadcasting*, including the pertinent information in *Station and Program Notes* 645/

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Transfer of *Broadcasting Stations of the World* to the GPO did not relieve FBIS of correspondence regarding broadcasting information. In 1963 a General Electric Company brochure directing people to write FBIS for further information led to

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an avalanche of mail that should have been directed to the GPO. 646/ Unauthorized advertisements in amateur radio operator publications also caused some problems for the GPO, which reported in May 1963 that with the supply of 1961 books exhausted, excessive demands in response to advertisements had forced it to publish the new edition earlier than planned. 647/ In 1965 BIS reported that increasing requests for information had induced it to invite USIA to send its own representatives to do research in the BIS files. As requests continued from as many as 20 offices, other units were asked to do their own research. Among offices recorded as having made requests were State, USIA, HEW, OCI, DDP, DDS, ORR, DIA, and the Library of Congress. 648/

Duplication of FBIS Effort

Convinced of its exclusive responsibility to provide the U.S. Government with information broadcast by foreign radios, FBIS watched jealously any threatened duplication of its work. As part of CIA with a formal National Security Council directive, FBIS saw less danger of duplication, but even after 1957 the threat several times seemed real. Early in 1957 a close watch was mounted on USIA in Austria, which seemed to do more monitoring than was necessary, in violation of at least the spirit of NSCID's 2 and 6. The Vienna Bureau Chief was "less and less inclined" to cooperate with USIA because of its apparent desire to build up

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"a giant news gathering organization." Recalling the old wartime conflict with OWI, he belittled USIA monitoring as not only unnecessary, but also "amateurish, haphazard, and inaccurate." 649/ A similar watch was kept on USIA in the Far East. In Tokyo USIA was monitoring Japanese broadcasts for use by itself and the Embassy. 650/ Later in 1957 the FBIS Chief queried Tokyo concerning USIA plans and indicated that he felt USIA activities "bordered on infringement" of the FBIS charter. 651/ A year later he stated flatly that USIA operations in Tokyo were "a matter of official concern" to FBIS, as there was ample evidence that USIA was monitoring and distributing intelligence information. Tokyo was asked to remain alert and to report any changes. 652/ Liaison Officer visiting the Far East in 1957, reported in detail on the USIA operations in Tokyo, as well as alleged monitoring in Munsan, Korea, where 19 USIA monitors were said to be at work. 653/ In May 1957 FBIS cautioned Saigon not to accept the proffered services of a USIA translator without reimbursement, as FBIS did not wish to weaken its case by becoming obligated to USIA. 654/

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USIA was not the only organization suspected by FBIS of duplicating its efforts. An FBIS message to OCR in 1957 asked for regular submission of Air Force monitoring requirements, as Air Force reports from the Far East seemed to indicate that it

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was duplicating FBIS monitoring. 655/ A year later an Air Intelligence Information Report, after careful FBIS scrutiny, was said to indicate unwarranted duplication of effort. Further investigation disclosed that the report had a much wider distribution in the Air Force than the FBIS Daily Reports, and on that basis might be justified. 656/

Some monitoring operations by State also were examined by FBIS. The Press Monitoring Unit in the Hong Kong Consulate acknowledged in 1957 that it was duplicating FBIS coverage, but it was agreed that this was justified because of its inability to obtain FBIS material rapidly. 657/ In 1961 a representative of the FBIS Mediterranean Bureau conferred with Cairo Embassy officials in an effort to get FBIS materials to Cairo. It was brought out in the discussion that Embassy monitoring was costly, inefficient, and a definite duplication of FBIS operations. 658/ Monitoring at the Cairo Embassy still was under discussion in FBIS the following year. 659/

Though jealously guarding its prerogatives, FBIS was ready on occasion to acknowledge that apparent duplication might at times be necessary. FBIS issued on 6 August 1964 a reaction report on the Gulf of Tonkin incident, and the next day USIA published a similar report. The ADO ordered a study of the two. It was found that the FBIS report, prepared after a re-

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quest by Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy, gave 90 per-
cent of its attention to communist reaction. The USIA publi-
cation dealt primarily with non-communist reaction, using FBIS
material for what little communist response it carried. It
was decided that the two publications actually complemented
each other. 660/

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Chapter 6 ADMINISTERING A WORLDWIDE ORGANIZATION

With the steady growth in the number of overseas bureaus and the high proportion of personnel working in foreign lands, efficient administration of this empire increasingly became the primary concern of FBIS management. Many problems faced in 1947-1957 remained of major concern in 1957-1967. Just treatment and wise direction of the non-American majority manning field bureaus formed a first essential, for their loyalty, industry, and properly directed skills were basic to FBIS operations. The need for proper staffing and coordination of bureaus remained and became more complicated. With additional field bureaus, chances for overlapping in coverage and wasted effort became more serious. Supplying able and properly trained individuals with the temperament and personality to direct intelligence and skilled foreign nationals was a delicate management problem demanding continual recruiting and training. Overseas problems in housing, schooling, transportation, and health did not dissolve, but became more variegated as FBIS moved into new areas. The need to build trust and cooperation among local authorities in host countries also became more complicated. Each bureau had its peculiar problems; an ideal solution in London or Tokyo might not work at all in Nigeria.

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Despite the continuity in FBIS management, there were differences in the 1957-1967 decade. First, FBIS management was considerably more sophisticated. Directing foreign posts was a new experience in 1947, but with ten years of experience, FBIS officials were better equipped to anticipate and counter developing difficulties. Some overseas installations also were more matured and firmly established. The inexperienced non-American employees in 1947 were hesitant and uncertain. By 1957 many of them had ten years of experience, and 20 years by 1967. Frequently they were able to give valuable advice to new leaders from Headquarters. Matured and aging foreign posts also encountered new problems. Encroachment from developments that interfered with radio reception, for example, was known domestically but offered no serious threats overseas prior to 1957. Political and social changes also began to influence operations and to force consideration of possible revision or resiting. Sophistication and experience alone failed to provide all the answers.

Handling of Non-American Employees

The 1957 FBIS work force was		25X1
[redacted] The comparable figures in 1966		25X1
were		25X1
. Non-Americans had become a majority.		

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FBIS early in 1957 took a special interest in proposed legislation affecting foreign employees in U.S. Government installations. The proposed bill did not provide for education of foreign national dependents but did allow for permanent employment and a retirement system. 661/ Considerable pressure for these provisions had been reported from foreign national employees at the older bureaus. 662/ The legislation was adopted and application to CIA was approved by the DDS on 3 December. To be eligible for an "excepted appointment" or foreign career status, a fulltime foreign employee needed only to have worked for three years and to plan to continue with FBIS. 663/ Bureaus were informed on 31 December 1957 and asked to present recommendations for excepted appointments by 3 February. On 9 April 1958 the number of names approved had reached

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Retirement age was set at 62. Some foreign employees did not want to retire that early, and in England they had to pay into the British social security system until they were 65. Bureau chiefs were instructed to consider these points and to retain capable employees past the retirement age if they wished. 665/ By August 1966 all overseas bureaus had employees in the retirement system.

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Another need at the bureaus was health protection for employees. In May 1957, after several months of negotiation, arrangements were completed in CIA for making group health and

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life insurance available overseas. 666/ By the end of 1957 most bureaus reported employees enrolled in the insurance program. Late in 1960 Headquarters announced a new insurance plan, with the Government sharing part of the cost, available to overseas non-American employees. 667/ Another regulation discriminating against non-staff employees was the one on leave accumulation. With a relaxation in 1960 sufficient to allow Americans overseas to accumulate 45 days, FBIS insisted that foreign nationals receive the same treatment and won approval. 668/ The ruling benefited third country nationals, but not indigenous employees, and was not initially applied in Africa. 669/

In some instances it was difficult, through lack of coordination or absence of another comparable group of foreign nationals, to keep pay scales in line with those of embassies or the military. In most bureaus, because of inflation, the need for ever increasing rates was apparent, and frequent adjustments had to be made. The FBIS Chief, following a field trip in the fall of 1957, declared wage scales "adequate" at all bureaus, though a few inequities needed to be adjusted. 670/ Yet by August 1958 Cyprus rates had to be raised, and before the end of the year raises were reported from London, Tokyo, Hokkaido, and most other bureaus. 671/ Again in the fall of 1959 the FBIS Chief found pay scales adequate at all stations and noted that during

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his trip he heard not one request for a pay increase. 672/
There was no further pressure for nearly two years, but more increases were considered necessary in 1961. 673/ In London, increases of 13 percent were granted, a much higher than normal increase, and in 1963 pay of Okinawan employees was increased as much as 20 percent. Increases were approved in 1965 and again in 1966, with no suggestion that the trend could be reversed.

Since many non-staff personnel were third country nationals, often refugees from their own countries, they were highly desirous of permanent employment status. Even after removal of the temporary appointment stigma, many still felt insecure. Subsequent legislation making it easier for CIA foreign employees to enter the United States offered new hope for these personnel. The ADO thought immigration might even be too easy and recommended that the "broad interpretation" of the new law be ruled inapplicable in the case of FBIS employees, as an older act making them eligible for immigration after 15 years was "quite satisfactory." 674/
Though Okinawa had been operating only seven years, already several foreign employees there had arranged for emigration to the United States. It was found possible to allow these employees to immigrate, establish U.S. residence, then return to the Far East and continue working for FBIS, though some new difficulties arose. 675/ During the 1957-1967 decade more and more FBIS

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foreign nationals obtained U.S. immigration visas, but the status of those who did not remained a problem. It was pointed out in 1966 that many employees on Okinawa had lived there and worked for FBIS for nearly 20 years. Their children had been educated in U.S. schools. Many in this younger generation would be "complete misfits" in their native lands. 676/ The DCI decision in 1966 to allow foreign nationals to receive travel allowances for dependents in college in the United States was well received in FBIS bureaus. 677/

Morale of third country nationals sometimes suffered as a result of local discrimination. The question of local taxes was a frequent threat. FBIS Tokyo employees, affiliated with the Embassy, were not required to pay Japanese income tax, but as Hokkaido was not so affiliated, there was a continued threat that its personnel would be served with orders to pay back taxes. 678/ On Okinawa the danger that FBIS foreign nationals might be denied such privileges as commissary purchases was constant, and the struggle for equal treatment reopened every few years. 679/ The question of foreign nationals registering with host governments and paying a fee every year also had to be argued frequently. 680/ The military command on Okinawa ruled periodically that foreign nationals were ineligible to attend the American school. 681/ Because of political upheavals, some Cyprus employees did not

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wish to return to their own countries during vacations, and travel to other points was rejected by CIA prior to a General Counsel ruling in 1960. 682/ The most serious morale problem on Cyprus involving foreign nationals, however, resulted from crisis conditions and the necessary evacuation of most third country nationals. Some employees were dissatisfied with the policy of return to the hiring point or with the treatment they received, while those who remained on Cyprus were even more dissatisfied. 683/ Bureau recommendations for extra pay allowances for those remaining on Cyprus were rejected by Headquarters. Some monitors from Cyprus had been transferred temporarily to Caversham or Vienna and some permanently to Vienna. All seemed to have complaints. 684/

Clearance procedures and security practices at the bureaus were fairly well established prior to 1957, but questions continued to arise. Headquarters explained in 1957 that there should be no restrictions against any FBIS employee seeing Official Use Only publications, as this classification was for dissemination control, not security. 685/ A few selected foreign national employees were cleared by I & S to see certain Confidential or Secret materials, and FBIS in 1959 urged a further relaxation, pointing out that much material appearing in classified books had been handled originally by these same foreign nationals. 686/ In 1963 efforts were made to seek clearance for additional selected

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foreign nationals to see classified documents, but there was difference of opinion among bureau chiefs on the question and the plan was abandoned. 687/

Maintenance of adequate work standards for foreign national professionals was usually no problem. Applicants of superior ability were available and unsatisfactory employees were easily eliminated. Okinawa reported in 1957 that evaluation tests of the bureau's monitors showed that most of them scored high. Only two were inadequate. 688/ The general rule was that each employee should serve a six-month probation period, although in practice this often was insufficient; the limit was fixed because it was necessary to move a new employee's dependents to the area within six months. 689/ By 1961 the supply of capable monitorial candidates was becoming less plentiful, both in Asia and Europe, and more active recruiting was necessary. 690/ Establishing adequate work standards in Africa was more difficult than at other bureaus. It was decided early to staff the bureau with Nigerians, and promising candidates were available. A veteran monitor from the United States, Henry Krieger, arrived in September 1961 to train the African monitors, and later his work was described as "extremely valuable." 691/ Yet progress remained slow, and the consensus was that the monitorial candidates in Nigeria simply did not have sufficient educational background. 692/ In 1964 African monitors still were

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"substandard," and an FBIS official in 1965 called African production the "poorest" he had "ever observed" in FBIS. In his opinion only one monitor at the bureau could qualify in any other FBIS bureau. 693/

Just treatment for foreign nationals bore fruit in many instances. In 1957 an Okinawan paper carried an interview with [redacted], an FBIS electronic technician forced to stop work because of active tuberculosis. The article, "Friendship in Military Office," praised FBIS for the absence of discrimination at the bureau, where employees were raising 3,000 yen a month to support [redacted] family while he was hospitalized. [redacted] felt he was "extremely lucky" to work for such an outfit. 694/ A 1960 visitor found Okinawa morale "good to excellent," with American, foreign national, and indigenous staffs remarkably free from any "clique antagonisms." 695/ The Panama Bureau Chief, urging a pay raise for a locally-hired cruising monitor, declared that "only loyalty to FBIS" had prevented the man from accepting a higher paying army job. 696/ On Cyprus during the 1964 difficulties, observers marveled at the fact that Turks and Greeks in FBIS stayed on the job, working side by side with no antagonism. 697/ The Okinawa Bureau reported in 1966 that some U.S. visitors outside FBIS were "amazed to find important work

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in an organization such as this being done by foreign nationals and Okinawans." 698/

In this category also, the African Bureau was an exception. Bureau employees continually complained, and in early 1965 sent a list of grievances to the Federal Minister of Labor, who called for an explanation from the FBIS bureau chief, who had not seen the list. The document spoke of "long standing grievances" and "irregularities that have been allowed to hang on too long" and charged individual discrimination, poor medical attention, inadequate transport allowance, and unfair annual leave payments. The Minister of Labor agreed that a U.S. installation was outside his jurisdiction, that the pay rates at the bureau were liberal, and decided to make no representations to FBIS on behalf of its employees. 699/

Staffing and Coordinating Bureaus

Visiting bureaus in the fall of 1957, the FBIS Chief observed "no major deficiencies" and expressed a belief that all operations were being conducted "on a generally efficient basis." 700/ Among acknowledged problems were excessive work loads at Okinawa, Vienna, and Frankfurt. With the increase in the number of FBIS bureaus, problems of staffing and coordinating naturally grew more complicated, but changes in methods after 1957 were rare.

The monthly Letter of Instruction remained a standard vehicle for bureau guidance, but its use to criticize practices of

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individual bureaus was frequently resented. After a lengthy disagreement with the Austrian Bureau in 1957, the FBIS Chief agreed that in some instances general statements of evaluation and performance in the Letter should be supplemented by specific instructions to individual bureaus. 701/ Yet the Letter of Instruction continued to cite specific bureau shortcomings. 702/ It remained a valuable form of bureau guidance, but a 1962 recommendation for eliminating a serious time lapse by sending the unclassified portion by wire was rejected by Headquarters. 703/

Among Headquarters documents serving as guides for field bureaus was the revised 1957 Editorial Handbook, which was generally well received, but at Caversham aroused some problem involving BBC-FBIS coordination. 704/ In June 1958 ten revisions in the Handbook were sent to the bureaus and suggestions solicited for the next revision in April 1959. 705/ The Target List also underwent some revision. A study showed 75 percent of listed targets sent to the field to be repeats; with no special emphasis on new targets, field editors tended to pay little attention to this Headquarters guidance. It was decided that various offices should continue to report targets to Liaison, but only new items would be sent to the bureaus. 706/ The new format was inaugurated on 10 April 1959 and reportedly was read much more carefully by the editors. 707/

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Probably the most effective practice for keeping the bureaus properly coordinated was frequent visits by Headquarters officials and working personnel. A new engineer assigned to Saigon in 1957 first spent several weeks on Okinawa getting instructions in Far East cruising and Okinawa coverage. 708/ It was recognized in Washington that bureau personnel, after a year or more away from Headquarters, felt isolated and uninformed. The FBIS Chief visited the bureau frequently. Visits by engineering, editorial, administrative, and RPB personnel when possible were considered desirable. The RPB Chief, after a tour in 1959, recommended that more "middle level supervisors" make such trips. His recommendation was well received. 709/ A Daily Report section chief on a field trip in 1960 noted some field practices that might well have escaped the FBIS Chief. 710/ The Chief Engineer recommended in 1959 that inspection trips be limited to approximately one month. Previously they averaged about twice that long, and usually too much was attempted during a single visit. 711/ The African Bureau Chief, following TDY in London, recommended that succeeding heads of the bureau get the same experience. 712/ Visiting officials were in a unique position to compare operations at two bureaus within a few days, and thus make observations and recommendations of importance. A visit in 1962 made it apparent to one official that Chinese

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monitors at WCB had much more free time than those on Okinawa and should be able to do some processing of Chinese regionals monitored on Okinawa. 713/ Two years later Okinawa was regularly sending certain categories of monitored material to WCB for processing. 714/ The Editorial Branch Chief felt in 1965 that his inspection trip was unique, as he was concerned with editorial practices and guidance rather than policy, administrative and technical matters. 715/

FBIS administrative officials visited bureaus periodically to institute new procedures and to make sure the staffs followed established practices, as long distance administration alone proved difficult. For example, a bureau chief reported in 1957 that he had been giving administrative personnel considerable compensatory time because of an incorrect impression that they could not be paid overtime. 716/ An administrative representative visiting bureaus in 1960 recommended that administrative officers for small bureaus receive more training, and that the London administrative officer, because of separation from Caversham Headquarters, should have field experience prior to a tour in England. 717/ The possibility of relocating the London Administrative Officer in Caversham was considered, but this suggestion was rejected on the grounds that FBIS needed a representative in the Embassy. 718/

Despite recognition that Washington must at all times be the nerve center for bureau operations, it was felt that a certain

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amount of independently promoted coordination among the bureaus should be encouraged. In 1958 Kyrenia and Vienna were urged to experiment to determine how well Kyrenia programs could be monitored from Vienna. Information thus obtained proved valuable in future planning. Questions of divided coverage of particular programs were often settled by the bureaus, with ultimate endorsement by Headquarters. 719/ Coverage problems were particularly difficult when reception on certain programs was marginal at all stations, or when a program heard quite well at one bureau would be assigned to another because of its low priority. Coverage of the Vietnamese News Agency was assigned to Okinawa, though Saigon got the same material from South Vietnam Government monitoring. It was considered preferable that FBIS in this case do its own monitoring. 720/

Meticulous bureau coordination sometimes speeded handling of a particularly long and important broadcast, but Headquarters also had to be involved in the planning. 721/ Transferral of a program for improved coverage was acceptable, but only with Headquarters approval. For example, an Okinawa suggestion that it drop Peking international broadcasts for more productive transmissions was approved, but only after WCB demonstrated that it could handle the abandoned programs. 722/ The value of close bureau coordination was illustrated by a 1963

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incident. The U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur wired Saigon for broadcasts from an Indonesian station, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Okinawa,

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not Saigon, monitored the station, but there was no delay in getting the copy to Kuala Lumpur. 723/ In 1964, with monitoring at Cyprus curtailed by the political upheaval, there was little coverage loss because of the close coordination of London, Vienna, and Cyprus, though it was necessary to transfer personnel. Vienna eventually expanded its coverage to handle on a permanent basis a 28,000-word daily production. 724/ Coordination among the bureaus also led to other temporary transfers of monitors. In 1958 an Indonesian linguist was detailed from Okinawa to Saigon to get better coverage of rebel Indonesian broadcasts and Romanian and Russian monitors were temporarily sent from Cyprus to Vienna for better coverage of particular programs. 725/ Headquarters plans in 1964 to transfer a Saigon monitor to Okinawa were successfully opposed by both Okinawa and Saigon. 726/

One excellent example of bureau coordination was early operations at Key West, at first technically an extension of ECB. The two stations successfully cooperated through telephone communications, even on processing of a single broadcast speech. As ECB reception deteriorated with the season, Key West was expanded to take over temporarily more Cuban coverage. WCB and

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Panama also were brought into the coordination to maintain round-the-clock monitoring of Cuba. 727/ Gradually links between Key West and ECB were relaxed, with the former becoming an independent bureau. 728/

The FBIS Administrative Officer, following a 1964 field trip, strongly recommended more contacts among bureau personnel of a particular area, such as annual meetings of selected officials. In theory, rotation of staff personnel kept a bureau staff informed on problems of other bureaus, but frequently an official tended to consider another bureau in terms of what he knew about it seven or eight years earlier. 729/

The importance of rotation, fully recognized at Headquarters, obligated every staff employee, with rare exceptions, to divide his time between the bureaus and Headquarters. After 1948 all employees had been required to sign an agreement to accept overseas service, but the doubtful legality of the agreement caused its abandonment on 1 February 1957. The only remaining agreement was that a transferee contracted to stay at least two years at his new post or to refund his travel expenses. 730/ The reluctance of some personnel to accept overseas assignments led to adoption of a new agreement on 11 December 1957, which all new editors, analysts, engineers, and administrative personnel above GS-7 were required to sign before starting work with FBIS. 731/

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It recognized overseas rotation as a normal part of FBIS service, with separation from FBIS--and possibly from the Agency--the penalty for refusal to accept an assignment. 732/ With establishment of allocated channels the position of teletype supervisor also became a rotating position, with personnel rotating between Headquarters and WCB, Tokyo, and Okinawa. 733/ Two years remained the accepted tour for all transferees. In 1959 there was some agitation for lengthening the tour to three years, primarily to save money. After full discussion, the consensus was that the required tour should remain at two years. 734/ The policy of allowing a staff member to extend his tour or to return for a second tour after TDY at Headquarters was liberal, with some personnel even allowed to remain at one bureau five years or more. This aroused some dissatisfaction among staff members under pressure to go to posts they considered undesirable.

A shortened tour for stations suffering from local upheavals was a practice started during the Korean War, when dependents were denied entry to Okinawa and employees were offered one-year contracts. In 1964 authorization was sought to allow tours of 18 months with home leave privileges to men assigned to Cyprus who could not take their dependents. 735/ This was disapproved, though quarters for dependents were obtained in other areas of the Middle East. The following year a similar tour of 18 months

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was approved for Saigon. 736/ Aside from exposure to danger, there were other bureau characteristics that made some of them seem undesirable. The very small classified staffs at minor posts were subject to inconveniences, such as being called out of bed in the middle of the night or having to work split shifts. This was in addition to a certain amount of night work and irregular schedules common to every FBIS bureau. 737/

Keeping 15 field bureaus properly staffed for efficient operation involved many problems, such as selecting capable personnel and making them available for replacements. With the gradual relaxation on non-staff personnel ceilings, the primary concern in the bureaus was maintenance of a sufficient number of capable linguists. Right after World War II there was a rich supply of well trained linguists. As time passed the supply became thinner, but still FBIS was able to keep its bureaus fairly well manned. Vienna was expanded slightly in 1957 and to a greater extent in 1964. 738/ At Okinawa in 1960 the departing veteran Mongolian monitor and a Vietnamese were not replaced, as it was felt monitors in some other languages would be more productive, perhaps even at some other bureau. 739/ Saigon in 1965 was authorized to add new monitors. 740/ additional Chinese monitors were approved for Okinawa in 1966. The need to maintain the Hokkaido Bureau was again questioned, and a 1967 FOS

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study was intended to give a new estimate. It was agreed that the station's potential had never been reached, and that it might be of value in Chinese regional coverage, then in great demand. 741/ Tokyo, looking forward to better quarters

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in a few years, urged that it also be allowed to do some monitoring of Chinese regionals. 742/ The possibility of monitoring at Hokkaido and sending transcripts to Tokyo for processing was considered but opposed by the Hokkaido Bureau Chief. 743/ A cruising monitor sent temporarily to Hokkaido demonstrated that Chinese regionals could be exploited there. Early in 1967 a Chinese monitor was approved for Hokkaido, and also one for Tokyo. 744/

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Since most FBIS staff personnel had to spend considerable time in the bureaus, providing proper leadership there meant essentially the maintenance in FBIS of a full staff of capable editors, analysts, and administrators. A suggestion in 1959 that London, handling a tremendous bulk of copy, should get only the best editors elicited a Headquarters response that this was the attitude at all bureaus. 745/ Editors' grades were raised to improve the caliber of employees. In 1963 chief editors were approved at GS-13 for London, Cyprus, and Okinawa, while before that the highest grade for a desk editor was GS-12. 746/ Editorial staffs at Vienna and Saigon were increased to take care of

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heavier work loads. 747/ At Vienna the top editorial position was raised from GS-12 to GS-13 late in 1965. 748/ There also were some increases in grades for bureau chiefs. The number at the GS-15 level even with one assigned to the new Puerto Rican Bureau, but all smaller overseas bureau heads were raised to GS-14 by 1962. Assignment of bureau chiefs required considerable care and planning, with the rotation system maintained and a Headquarters slot provided for each returning bureau chief. Every year some bureaus were assigned new chiefs. In 1958 there were seven such transfers. This was the record until 1964, when ten bureaus received new heads. Most bureaus during the 1957-67 decade had four different chiefs, some five. This applied both to major bureaus and smaller ones. From 1958 to 1966 there were 46 turnovers among bureau chiefs, with 27 different individuals filling the 15 positions.*

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Problems in Living Abroad.

Difficulties involving overseas housing, schooling, transportation, living allowances, and other living arrangements were not by any means eliminated by 1957. It seemed that as one problem appeared solved another would arise on the other side of the world. Some apparent solutions to problems proved extremely ephemeral. One

* Chiefs of all bureaus from 1941 to 1967 appear in Appendix A.

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perennial problem at all bureaus was adequate housing, both for Americans and for non-indigenous foreign nationals.

Okinawa, the first bureau at which FBIS supplied housing, had building projects under way or planned during practically all of its first ten years. With houses available for [redacted]

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[redacted] the situation by the end of 1957 was considered well in hand. 749/ Inside of two years, however, the recognized need for more monitors was inhibited by "tight housing." 750/ The FBIS Chief spoke ruefully in 1961 of experience gained in attempting to meet Okinawa housing needs and in 1963 approved four new houses and the remodeling of several others. 751/ In 1964, for the first time, housing for an Okinawa employee was rented outside the FBIS area, and the need for a bureau chief's residence commensurate with those of other officials of his rank on Okinawa was being recognized. 752/ In 1966 all FBIS houses were occupied. One monitor was living outside the area, and no housing was available for new Chinese monitors. There was an actual need for six houses. 753/ [redacted]

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[redacted] and more leasing of off-base housing was considered. 754/

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FBIS still was leasing housing on Cyprus after 1957, but with bureau construction and a surplus of available houses, it was recommended in 1964 that the program be abandoned. 755/ By 1966 FBIS had virtually gotten out of the housing business there. 756/

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In England this trend was reversed. With houses growing more scarce and families forced to stay longer in hotels while house-hunting, authority was obtained in 1961 to lease houses. 757/ By October 1962 all London Bureau staff employees were in FBIS-leased houses, but a recommendation by London Bureau Chief

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that the bureau cut costs by buying houses was rejected because of the administrative and maintenance responsibilities involved in ownership. 758/ The situation was further aggravated by temporary transfer of monitors from Cyprus in 1964.

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In the smaller bureaus, each location presented its own problems. A second house was leased in Tokyo in 1957 because a staff engineer could find nothing within the range of his housing allowance. 759/ Later Tokyo was authorized to lease houses without prior Headquarters approval, making it possible to obtain quickly several scarce western-type residences. Most of these houses were furnished and this fact made shipping some household goods unnecessary. 760/ Housing was adjudged to be satisfactory everywhere in 1962, but with Tokyo the "underprivileged station in housing." 761/ Tokyo's five leased houses were inferior and expensive and rather far from the bureau. 762/ In Saigon the houses purchased earlier by FBIS were contributed to the Embassy pool, and the Embassy assumed responsibility for supplying housing to FBIS. Some Embassy housing also was available in Vienna, though

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usually FBIS personnel leased their own houses and were given an allowance. 763/ Government housing always was available at Frankfurt, and on Hokkaido the FBIS building program and agreements with military officials made adequate living quarters available. During the short period of Tel Aviv operations the primary problem was to find apartments with telephones. 764/ In 1964 the State Department obtained Bureau of the Budget approval of a policy to provide and furnish houses around the world for Government employees, which was expected to be of considerable help to FBIS by 1970. 765/

New FBIS bureaus introduced new housing problems. It was apparent immediately that housing at Kaduna would be difficult, and that FBIS would have to build houses or have them built for lease. 766/ By the end of 1961 four houses were ready or nearly ready for occupancy by staff employees at rather high rentals on longterm leases. 767/ By 1962 it was recommended that [redacted] houses be constructed for indigenous employees at a cost of [redacted] per unit, as such fringe benefits seemed essential in Nigeria. 768/ The DDS approved the program, with rental to employees set at six percent of salary. In the early days at the Panama Post the few employees were assigned Army housing, but with growth of the bureau very expensive housing had to be obtained in the Republic of Panama. 769/ In December 1962 the lease of two apartments in

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Panama City was authorized, but eventual housing in the Canal Zone seemed a reasonable goal, perhaps with FBIS having its own housing area. 770/ The political tension in January 1964 forced the issue, and employees moved out of Panama City and into expensive accommodations in a Canal Zone hotel. 771/ By 1966 all classified employees were but locally-hired people still had to commute from Panama City. 772/ Satisfactory houses in Puerto Rico were found in the city of Mayaguez, with rent running \$200 to \$300 a month. 773/ The FBIS demand encouraged contractors to build suitable houses in the area, to be taken over by FBIS as soon as completed.

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Closely tied to the availability of housing was the problem of living allowances. Those not receiving FBIS housing had a living allowance which presumably covered housing costs. In some locations cost-of-living allowances also were available. FBIS employees in Africa, denied diplomatic privileges, obtained Embassy support for increased cost-of-living allowances to offset this loss, the amount fixed above \$1,000 a year for families. 774/ There was some difficulty in deciding which FBIS employees were entitled to interzonal transfer allowances, but eventually the problem was clarified. Kaduna also was ruled eligible for a rest and recreation allowance, enabling an employee to travel to a recreation area once during his tour. 775/ Other special

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allowances were available in hardship cases, where hospitals or medical services were not available.

Schooling for dependents remained a problem in some bureaus, though usually this was part of the support package. On Okinawa the eligibility of dependents of non-American FBIS employees to attend the American school was periodically challenged by the military, but a crisis was always avoided. There also was concern on Cyprus at rumors that available schools would be closed. Local Puerto Rican public schools used Spanish, while good private schools in the area were expensive and inaccessible. However, an American school at Ramey Air Force Base was within reach and an agreement was made for its use by FBIS dependents. 776/ Regulations regarding transport were pretty well established by 1957, with the principle that FBIS had to supply vehicles for bureau transportation fully accepted. No new handicaps arose, though there was some question regarding shipping of employees' cars at government expense. Hokkaido also needed special permission to buy Japanese automobiles, as the bureau could not import American cars duty free. 777/

Maintaining and Resiting Bureaus

In addition to surveys and reception tests for new monitoring posts, a considerable amount of Headquarters time during 1957-1967 was given over to possible resiting of established

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bureaus. Some projected moves were essential; others were considered desirable; and some were merely advance planning in anticipation of possible developments. In 1957 alone resiting of five bureaus was considered -- Vienna, Saigon, Okinawa, Tokyo, and Hokkaido. By 1967 attention had been given to relocation of two domestic bureaus and every overseas post except Bangkok and Puerto Rico, which were just starting operations.

In February 1957 Vienna was under pressure to vacate its space in the Allianz Building, and Headquarters felt the bureau should locate where it would have room for expansion, in view of needed press monitoring and the possibility of taking over East European coverage from Cyprus. 778/ A three-story brick building with roof space for antennas was leased on 7 March 1957 for five years, with the Foreign Buildings Operations of the Embassy taking more than 15 percent of the available space. 779/ The move was made to the new location, [redacted] during a May weekend with no loss in coverage. 780/ Reception at the new site was considerably better on some broadcasts; yet two years later consideration was given to another move -- [redacted] [redacted] -- until reception tests showed the site unsatisfactory. 781/ There was some Headquarters concern over the fact that the building space was not all utilized, and some effort was made to find a site outside the city where adequate antennas could be installed. 782/

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There was little enthusiasm for this in Vienna, and later the extra space was a valuable asset when monitors were transferred from Cyprus.

Saigon in 1957 hoped to get space [redacted] 25X1
 and prepared estimates of requirements. 783/ It also was thought essential to do more planning for a Saigon fallback location, with both Bangkok and Baguio studied. 784/ In 1961 the bureau obtained more space [redacted], and the Embassy insisted 25X1
 that the bureau should not leave Saigon. 785/ The Tokyo Bureau, which was crowded with the addition of [redacted] employees after 1953, 25X1
 considered a concentration on communications, with transfer of most monitoring to Hokkaido. Otherwise, eventual resiting was considered essential. A move was tentatively set for 1966, at a [redacted] 786/ Construction of a joint FBIS-USIA antenna 25X1
 atop the Embassy Annex further postponed the move, but it was agreed that the bureau's physical environment was the worst possible, and that further building in the area might force a resiting. 787/

In the summer of 1957 the FBIS Chief and the DADO, on a field trip, learned in Tokyo that the Air Force had decided to leave Camp Crawford on Hokkaido 10 January 1958. This made resiting of the Hokkaido Bureau urgent. 788/ After assurances that FBIS could legally construct an operations building, antenna

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field, and family housing at Chitose, [REDACTED] and efforts were made to get the work finished before winter. 889/ The project was made more difficult by the uncertainty about the ultimate fate of Chitose, but tenuous guarantees of support by the military made it possible to continue. 790/ FBIS moved into Chitose housing in January 1958, but completion of the operations building was delayed. Continued use of the old Crawford operations site during the winter created a difficult commuting problem. In the spring of 1958, after Army Security made clear that it would remain at Chitose for a number of years, the operations building was finished. 791/ Operations started at the new site on 14 September 1958. 792/ FBIS had been confident of remaining at the Camp Strong site, Chitose, until 1965 at least, but it soon became apparent that Army Security would move to another site, Chitose III, making another FBIS move necessary. Funds for this were requested for Fiscal 1961. 793/ This change was delayed, but in 1963 land for construction was obtained at Chitose III, and plans made to build there about 1967. 794/ Army Security again made a sudden change, announcing that it would move within 18 months. There was considerable debate over whether FBIS should make another move, but it was agreed in 1964 that the bureau should be resited gradually at Chitose III. 795/ In 1966 the target date for the final move of all facilities was set for October 1968. 796/

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Military plans also threatened several times to force a resiting of the Okinawa Bureau, and long before 1957 the Sobe area, several miles from Bolo, was reserved for FBIS, though there was never any intention for the bureau to move unless forced to do so. It was recognized in 1959 -- the Bolo Point Battery being a permanent seven-million-dollar installation -- that more military installations were likely to be sited there and that FBIS should hold the Sobe area in reserve. 797/ Additional military installations did not develop, though the bureau chief suggested in 1966 that it might be well for the station to move before it was forced out. 798/ No action was taken. In the meantime, FBIS had spent a considerable sum expanding and improving its Okinawa property. The FBIS Chief had reported in 1959 that facilities at all stations except Okinawa were adequate. That station, constructed in 1949, needed both expansion and improvement. 799/ Expansion of the operations building and addition of one bedroom each to eight houses was approved and bids submitted before 30 June 1960. 800/ The next year an expansion of editorial and teletype rooms was also approved. 801/

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Cyprus was the bureau causing the most concern. Early in 1958 the deteriorating political situation led the ADO to present a project to the Project Review Committee for relocation of the bureau, perhaps in Turkey. A team headed by Chief Engineer went to Turkey for a survey. 802/ Plans were made to hold the

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project, with PRC approval, in a standby status, to be activated only if necessary. Consideration also was given to possible alternates in Italy, Libya, Greece, or Rhodes, but no extensive surveys were made. 803/

When developments finally forced evacuation of personnel from Cyprus, monitors were sent temporarily to Caversham to carry on monitoring of Middle East transmitters. With this transfer of personnel, FBIS for the first time was monitoring at the BBC plant. 25X1

The final fate of the Mediterranean Bureau remained in doubt, with relocation to the British army base on Cyprus considered, in addition to Iran. 804/ Some ambassadors from countries in the area discouraged transfer to their homelands. 805/ Lebanon and Iran were considered the most likely possibilities for a new major monitoring station, but State was pessimistic about Lebanon, while NSA, State, and Defense all were opposed to FBIS tests near Teheran. 806/ It seemed almost certain late in 1965 that Cyprus would have to be abandoned and that a suitable large replacement station would be difficult to establish. The answer might be several smaller monitoring posts in different countries, such as the one in Tel Aviv. 807/

The German Bureau in 1959 had adequate space and excellent support, but on 30 June 1960 the Consulate General vacated the building and turned it over to the Army. The bureau was instructed to seek a suitable location in South Bavaria where it might also

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take over Vienna coverage, but in 1962 plans were substituted to move to another building in Frankfurt. The move was completed on 2 December 1962. In 1963 the idea of a large South German station was revived, with some progress made in finding a suitable location. 808/ [redacted]

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Uncertainty concerning the attitude of African officials prompted talk of a fallback site for Kaduna before the bureau was more than a year old, with Liberia, Ghana, and Ivory Coast considered possibilities. 810/ No immediate move was necessary, but by 1966 Ghana was accepted as the most logical fallback site, [redacted]

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[redacted] 811/ The Panama Post was moved in 1959, but deficiencies at the new site prompted continued talk of another relocation. In 1963 the bureau chief sought to promote an agreement with the Army that would make possible a better site at Chiva Chiva, but he failed to get sufficient support from Headquarters. 812/ Visiting the bureau in 1964, the FBIS Deputy Chief was so pleased with improvements there that any further talk of resiting was discouraged. 813/ With Key West expansion, of course that post had to find more

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suitable quarters. A new site was occupied on the Naval Base on 2 September 1962. In less than two years another move became necessary because of Navy needs. Construction was completed before the end of 1965. 814/ Various moves were necessary in London, and in July 1964 work was completed on an alternate site in the BBC area at Caversham in case of a necessary evacuation because of fire or other calamity. 815/

Problems of Encroachment

Radio antennas for monitoring must be reasonably free from outside interference, especially electrical disturbances, if monitoring is to be effective. The first serious encroachment experienced by FBIS was at Reseda, where city growth forced FBIS to move away in 1954. The first threats to overseas stations came from powerful transmitters constructed by other U.S. Government units, primarily VOA, but at first coordination of operations supplied reasonable protection. After 1957 other threats of encroachment became serious at several overseas stations.

Early in 1957 FBIS became alarmed at plans for

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The project was well advanced before any coordination with FBIS was attempted, but later cooperation eliminated most of the danger. 816/ VOA was in need of a strong Middle East transmitter, with Rhodes appearing as the

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most logical site. FBIS was fearful of its effect on Kyrenia monitoring. 817/ By 1960, a definite deterioration in Kyrenia reception was noted, attributed primarily to growth of electrical installations in the area. Some Soviet regionals, originally clear, had become unmonitorable. 818/ By 1962 this local development was causing deep concern. 819/ It was projected in 1963 as one of the problems to be discussed with the new Cypriot Government, with realistic recognition that U.S. agencies would probably have to pay for protection from electrical encroachment. 820/ A new worry was created in 1966 by Cypriot plans for a main round-the-island road coming quite close to the station. Later it was learned that at least a year would elapse before plans could become firm for the project, and money for the road was not assured by any means. 821/

Okinawa faced dangers of encroachment from several sources in 1957. Tests at Bolo by the Navy and Air Force early in the year prompted queries which produced confirmation that both Navy and Air Force Security Services planned installations in the area, including a transmitter. 822/ About this time an Army transmitter at Okuma, which had not been coordinated with FBIS, was causing interference. 823/ Okinawan firms pushing power lines close to the monitoring post protested that restrictions demanded by FBIS would make the projects too costly, but a compromise was reached. 824/

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Navy and Air Force plans at Bolo remained a threat, and two years later FBIS still was considering a move to Sobe. 825/ Coordination with VOA also was considered rather tenuous. 826/ Then early in 1961 a new threat arose. FBIS learned that Army Broadcast and Visual Activities (ABVA) planned to install a fairly powerful transmitter on Okinawa but had not coordinated its efforts with FBIS. Future planned expansion, involving broadcasts to all of Southeast Asia, presented a serious problem. 827/ In Washington it was revealed that there was little coordination within the Army itself on the project, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unable at first to identify the broadcasting unit. 828/ Eventual coordination held AFRS interference to a minimum, but the threat still existed as late as 1964. 829/ Next came plans for a military hospital to be constructed at Bolo Point. FBIS objections received some Army support. 830/ Warnings from the bureau in 1966 suggested future problems by noting that development was moving closer and closer to Bolo. 831/

Danger of encroachment was viewed more seriously at Okinawa and Cyprus because of their extensive operations

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but the problem also affected the smaller bureaus.

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Tokyo was alarmed in 1959 by construction of a large hospital across the street. The builders were persuaded to take precautions that would minimize interference, but continued building there prompted

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FBIS to make tentative plans to move out of the city, perhaps to the U.S. Air Base at Chofu, by 1966. 832/ Reception at the German Bureau was reported deteriorating in 1965, primarily because of a new 13-story building nearby. 833/ Plans for a new Kaduna radio and television station were being watched carefully a year after the African Bureau opened. It was recommended that for future stations more land be obtained initially as a protection. 834/ In 1962 a Nigerian police communications center across the road offered a new threat, causing FBIS to lease an additional 32 acres near the bureau for protection. 835/

Of course encroachment also continued at home. WCB was fairly well protected by the large tract of FBIS land surrounding the station, but a 1961 study by the Office of Logistics forecast that encroachment could destroy ECB's usefulness within five years. 836/ Key West also suffered from local interference, though it was not considered sufficiently severe to demand a resiting. 837/ In 1966 some interference was traced to power installations in Havana which were not properly synchronized. 838/

Relations with Host Governments

With full realization that the good will of a host government was essential for continued operation of an overseas monitoring post, FBIS management prior to 1957 had established two primary principles: that the overt nature of the FBIS

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operation be made obvious; and that the host government freely receive the full product of the bureau. Moves toward more active cooperation were encouraged if this seemed feasible but the primary hope was that the host government would maintain good will, with toleration a possible but less satisfactory substitute. Authority is seldom completely divorced from public opinion, so FBIS personnel sought to build good will with the local citizenry as well as with government officials.

The area providing the most serious difficulty was Cyprus. Even when the British still were in control there were problems. Local authorities early levied a professional license fee on each FBIS employee, and the colonial Government acquiesced. Employees paid the fees, but later they were reimbursed by FBIS. 839/ Inconvenient restrictions on use of private cars, special taxes levied on foreign nationals, and a crackdown on sale of items brought into Cyprus free of duty all induced FBIS to push for diplomatic status, which was granted in 1958. There remained considerable apprehension over what might develop after Cyprus became independent in 1960. 840/ The reluctance of the new Cypriot Government to promote an early agreement increased this concern. It was during this period that the idea that a bureau chief should study the language of his host nation was promoted, and the Cyprus Bureau Chief was urged to learn Greek. 841/ Apprehension on Cyprus also prompted the ADO to suggest

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to the General Counsel the issuance of an unclassified NSCID to explain FBIS activities to foreign governments. 842/ This was never done.

Uncertainty continued at the Mediterranean Bureau for nearly five years, with an inevitable drop in morale. Staff personnel cultivating good will with local authorities obtained in return frank reports by the local police on rumors and unfounded charges against FBIS. Convinced that Andreas Catsellis of Kyrenia was the real local political power, the bureau chief stressed to him the local economic stake in retaining the bureau in the area and obtained Catsellis' continued cooperation. 843/ When deterioration of the political situation brought animosity and demonstrations against the United States, FBIS attempted to show complete neutrality between Greek and Turkish factions. However, steps to meet the developing crisis by reducing operations created additional local resentment. The Cypriot press was antagonistic, but FBIS succeeded in getting some favorable comment, while the local police did a creditable job of protecting FBIS property and personnel. 844/ By May 1964 little local antagonism remained, with the prevailing attitude being one of regret that FBIS had been forced to reduce operations. 845/

During this difficult period the Ambassador handled all relations with the central Cypriot Government. Early in 1965 he had to report that FBIS personnel no longer would be exempt from

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auto registration fees and gas and road taxes and that new FBIS arrivals would be given only 14-day visas. 846/ There was little progress in talks between the Ambassador and Cypriot officials aimed at a U.S.-Cypriot agreement, and it was emphasized that U.S. citizens would have no immunity from prosecution "for offenses against the security of the state," a stance considered ominous in view of Cypriot press articles charging U.S. "radio stations" with spying and with infringing on Cypriot security by monitoring broadcasts of "friendly Arab neighbors." The Cypriot Government also was suspected of monitoring FBIS channels into and out of the country, though the Cyprus Telecommunications Agency formally denied this. 847/ Some members of the Cypriot Legislature, especially the communists, pushed steadily for further restrictions on U.S. units. In June 1965 the "maintenance of American monitoring stations" was placed on the agenda for debate, and one newspaper published an attack on [redacted] for "espionage activities" and "recruitment of assassins." 848/ After that there was a slight relaxation of official restrictions on personnel and shipments coming into FBIS, though early in 1966 the Cypriot Government refused to recognize the bureau as part of the Embassy. 849/ Nevertheless, the Kyrenia District Officer, backed by Catsellis, agreed to support FBIS protests on the construction of a road close to the FBIS station.

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This was only one more illustration that good relations with the local populace were as important as good relations with the central government. Of course, efforts also were made to cultivate higher officials, including the Minister of Communications and Public Works. 850/ The main concern at the time was a formal agreement which would recognize the status of FBIS as well as that of other U.S. installations, and FBIS was willing to pay to remain on Cyprus. There was evidence that the issue was being fought out within the Cypriot Government, so there was little to do but wait. 851/ In June 1966 a new FBIS employee was awarded an indefinite visa, the first one since the start of the crisis, and there were other indications of relaxation. 852/

One factor influencing the determination to reconstitute the Mediterranean Bureau and to keep it on Cyprus was FBIS experience with the Israeli Government. With forced evacuation of personnel from Cyprus, [redacted] were sent to Israel to check on possibilities for a temporary FBIS operation there. They found Israeli radio monitoring handled by military intelligence, with what they considered an undue stress on security. One requirement, if the Israelis were to entertain an FBIS mission, was that all FBIS material sent from Israel be transmitted in code. They insisted on doing all of the recording, though eventually agreeing to allow FBIS personnel to maintain some equipment in an

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apartment for flash material. FBIS was not happy with the conditions, but approved an Israeli operation on 7 June 1964. 853/ By the end of July, FBIS personnel were in Tel Aviv. Israeli officials in Washington were invited to visit ECB in an effort to relieve restrictions in Tel Aviv, and this may have influenced the concession to permit moving some monitoring to a non-military area in order to allow FBIS personnel to offer instructions in monitoring techniques. 854/ FBIS personnel still were not allowed to visit the site of Israeli monitoring, and the Israeli Government at first seemed indifferent to an offer of the monitored file. 855/ Later Israel asked that it be supplied with copies of the Daily Report. 856/ Tel Aviv monitoring remained a sensitive matter, with no mention of the operation allowed in open messages.

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Another host government which caused a considerable amount of apprehension was Nigeria, but it appears that this situation resulted, at least in part, from the attitude of U.S. diplomatic officers. The Embassy in Lagos advised at first that all FBIS contacts should be with the Northern Region Government, and even discouraged FBIS interviews with Federal Government officials. 857/ FBIS induced the State Department to recommend to the Embassy that the FBIS connection with CIA be made known to the Nigerian Government, but the Embassy advised strongly against this and maintained its position. 858/ FBIS officials were never quite

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comfortable with this decision but refrained from opposing the Embassy stand. 859/ Early monitoring proved valuable to both the Regional and Federal Governments, which helped to get relations off to a good start. 860/ Washington doubted that Nigerian broadcasts derogatory to local officials should be given to the local government. 861/ The bureau chief wanted to discuss this with the Federal Government, but as such copy was already being monitored and sent to Nigerian officials, the Embassy advised against opening the issue. Realization of the differing viewpoints of Federal and Northern officials, coupled with the secret of the FBIS affiliation with CIA, created considerable apprehension among FBIS personnel. 862/ The bureau made every effort to please both Northern Region and Federal officials. Later the Northern Region came to depend on FBIS for special monitoring services, and thus created some FBIS vulnerability to possible charges of partiality. 863/ In 1964, at the request of a Northern official, an accident caused by a relative of his and involving an FBIS car was kept out of court, with a cost to FBIS of \$150. 864/ In spite of intervening political upheavals, FBIS in 1967 seemed to be maintaining satisfactory relations with Nigerian officials, who used and appreciated its product.


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At other FBIS stations in foreign countries, relations with the host governments were satisfactory in 1957 and there was little change during the following decade.

FBIS continued to supply local monitoring to organs of the Japanese Government and sent requested copies of Daily Reports from Headquarters. On 15 May 1957 the Japanese Cabinet Research Chamber also started getting economic cards from FBIS. 873/ FBIS had its own contract with KYODO, the Japanese news service, and was never asked to restrict distribution of its copy, though this contract ended in 1965 when KYODO signed an agreement with REUTER and AP. 874/



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At Hokkaido, which was not affiliated with the Embassy, a special effort was made to establish contacts with local Japanese officials. The bureau chief visited the Hokkaido governor and obtained pledges of cooperation. Later there was no difficulty in getting Japanese Government approval for land acquisition at Chitose III. 876/

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The South Vietnamese Government always received FBIS copy and reciprocated by providing FBIS with its own monitored material. 877/ Vietnam News Agency copy from Okinawa also was passed to the South Vietnamese.

There were never close relations between FBIS and the Austrian Government, but permission was readily obtained in 1958 to set up a Beverage antenna outside of Vienna to improve monitoring. 878/ An East European roundup concerning Austrian affairs was maintained by FBIS, largely because of its appeal to the Austrian Government. It was acknowledged that the sudden influx of FBIS monitors from Cyprus in 1964 raised problems with the Austrian Government, but the Embassy was able to handle the situation with no real difficulty. 879/

As the Okinawan Government was under essential control of the U.S. military, FBIS never had many direct contacts with local officials. It was concerned, however, over 1966 Okinawan press accounts critical of FBIS. These reports concerned an FBIS contract forbidding electrical installations in its antenna field, where 11 Okinawan families -- 72 people -- lived. Electricity allegedly could easily have been made available had it not been for this contract. 880/

The Caribbean Bureau, too, had some characteristics of a domestic station, as Puerto Rico is affiliated with the United

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States and all Puerto Ricans have U.S. citizenship. When the bureau was planned, however, visits were made to the Resident Commissioner in Washington and to various offices of the Commonwealth Government to promote good will. The new bureau chief visited Governor Sanchez, among other officials, and answered questions about the station, including an explanation of why FBIS chose such an isolated site for the bureau. 881/

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There were many international crises during the decade, and each one placed abnormal demands on FBIS. A few of them should be examined in some detail.

FBIS Coverage of International Crises

One of the best examples of a crisis that levied onerous demands on the FBIS staff was the Taiwan Strait crisis, which involved a communist attack on the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the summer of 1958. Complete coverage demanded extra effort and overtime in several bureaus, a heavy load on the Wire Service and the Daily Report, and a new concentration on the Chinese People's Republic by RPB analysts. By 20 September 1958 the RPB had prepared from Peking and Moscow broadcasts 19 special analyses on the crisis to be disseminated on the FBIS Wire. The total for September alone reached 24. These were primarily for OCI, though State, the National Indications Center, and other units depended heavily upon them. The State Department used the analyses as the basis for cabled reviews to the U.S. Ambassador in Warsaw, who maintained the only official U.S. contact with the CPR. 955/ When the crisis broke in early August, one RPB analyst was handling all Bloc propaganda on Taiwan. Both OCI and G-2 immediately requested filing of analyses by wire. By the time Moscow propaganda on the crisis was organized, about 23 August, both the volume and the complexity of the propaganda had so increased that two analysts were working full time, with

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supervisory personnel assuming a great deal of the added burden. 967/

In October, recognition of the mammoth job FBIS was doing on the Taiwan Strait issue brought a letter of commendation from NIC, followed by one from the DCI. 957/ The Peking ceasefire announcement of 5 October 1958 was handled so efficiently that the DCI was able to alert the President within ten minutes of the time it was made long before the information was available from any other source. This did not end concentration on the problem. The 24 October analysis on the Wire was No. 59 in the series. 958/ Abnormal demands were heavier on RPB than on any other FBIS component. Before the crisis ended, the handling of propaganda on Taiwan had expanded from the work of a single analyst to a project demanding one-fourth of the branch's effort. This was on a crash basis, requiring considerable overtime and forcing RPB to neglect some other areas. 959/

The Taiwan Strait crisis also placed a strain on other FBIS units. Most monitoring had to be done at Okinawa, with saturation coverage of Peking and coastal stations necessary. Despite considerable overtime, the Chinese backlog grew to 36,000 words and had to be reduced by elimination of marginal and outdated material, some of which would have been valuable at the height of the crisis. To handle this great influx of crisis copy, bureau editors were forced to be more restrictive in filing copy from

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other areas. 960/ Of course Daily Report and Wire Service staffs also increased discards from other areas in order to meet requirements of the Taiwan Strait crisis. A by-product of the period was an increased demand for Chinese regional broadcasts that induced FBIS to put new pressures on the BBC for monitoring in Hong Kong and influenced the decision to conduct an FBIS survey on Hong Kong monitoring possibilities. 972/

Another critical development radically affecting FBIS activities was the Berlin crisis of August 1961. Pressure for additional coverage of Berlin developments was so great that the DDI ordered Saturday and holiday publication of the Daily Report for the first time since the Korean War. 962/ The six-day publication continued until 6 October, when all except the USSR-East Europe book went back on regular schedule. 963/ The regular five-day week was resumed for the latter on 29 October 1961. There was considerable questioning later as to whether FBIS had any prior indications that the Berlin wall would be built. 964/ In subsequent handling of Bloc propaganda regarding Berlin, more attention was given to indications of heightened tension, with RPB making sure that all important data reached the OCI Watch Officer promptly. 965/ Among additional services performed during the crisis were preparation

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of a special memorandum for the President reproducing significant Khrushchev statements; publication of two special supplements on Khrushchev statements, with 300 extra copies distributed; and the issuance of a reaction report on world comment regarding the Berlin wall. RPB also prepared a special index showing 120 references by Khrushchev to Berlin after 1958. The Wire Service carried a record 32,200 words a day during September 1961. 966/

The Cuban crisis of October 1962, directly involving the United States and probably the most serious confrontation of the decade, found FBIS in an unusually fortunate position. In July 1962 the addition of three personnel to RPB for analysis of Cuban broadcasts was approved and a preliminary study on promises and fulfillment by Castro was published and given wide dissemination. 967/ Plans for expansion of the Key West Post already were being processed. The chief Cuban analyst started work there the week the crisis developed, and two additional monitors left for Key West immediately after President Kennedy's 22 October speech. Cuban domestic broadcasts and the PRENSA LATINA press service were given round-the-clock coverage. In November 1962 permanent expansion of Key West to a post was approved, and Panama also was expanded. 968/

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In spite of this increase in personnel, FBIS was under intense pressure during October and November 1962. On 23 October the Wire Service carried 57,000 words for a new record, while the daily average of 46,000 for an entire week was nearly double the previous six-month average. Emergency measures were taken to increase Wire Service outlets.

RPB personnel, working a seven-day week, prepared an average of four analyses daily for the Wire, including six on 26 October. Three RPR's were issued during November 1962. Two reaction reports were published--one on President Kennedy's 22 October speech and one on Khrushchev's 28 October statement--with advance copies prepared for a number of officials, including the President and the DCI. Panama became a 24-hour operation on 20 October, while Key West started regular recording of television video on 30 October. Spanish linguists were borrowed from FDD for work at ECB during the crisis. 969/ A survey in November 1962 showed FBIS covering 83 hours of voice broadcasts a week from Cuba, 308 hours of press, and 25 of television, as well as 28 hours of Spanish broadcasts from Moscow. Cuban material in the Daily Report increased from 11 pages daily to 19. The Cuban radio was being monitored to the extent of FBIS capability, but provincial broadcasts had only fragmentary coverage. Of 25 known

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provincial radios, six were covered regularly, five about half the time, and 14 only occasionally. 970/

Later discussion of the Cuban crisis emphasized the fact that FBIS was over-extended during the period, that better coverage could have been supplied during the crisis, and that valuable intelligence might have been made available prior to the discovery of the Soviet missiles, had FBIS been able to provide saturation coverage of Cuban radio and television. 971/ It was emphasized by key CIA officials after the crisis that the Soviet military presence in Cuba would give Cuban intelligence a continuing top priority, but no additional personnel were allocated to FBIS to handle the assignment. 972/

Initial Use of Transportable Monitoring Unit

The uprising in the Dominican Republic in the spring of 1965 found FBIS poorly prepared to monitor the low-powered Dominican radio. Factions within two opposing groups in the Dominican Republic were each presenting their own propaganda, and it was essential to know what was being disseminated. The most convenient first step was to send a monitoring staff to Puerto Rico. With the approval and promised support of Ramey Air Force Base, the Chief of the Panama Bureau, [redacted]

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[redacted] were sent to Puerto Rico in April 1965.

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Ramey support was good, but space and equipment were scarce,

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and it was difficult to organize an efficient operation. 973/
Reception was hardly satisfactory. With a Transportable
Monitoring Unit (TMU) at ECB thoroughly tested and ready for
use, FBIS recommended that it be sent to the Dominican Republic.
On 26 May 1965 the ADDI, Paul A. Borel, formally asked the DDCI
to approve sending the unit to Santo Domingo, provided suitable
support were available. 974/ There was some opposition in CIA,
but the Embassy confirmed on 27 May that an FBIS team would be of
value. [redacted] 975/

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With approval from the DCI's office, [redacted] was ordered
to Santo Domingo on 28 May to make preparations, while a message
to the Embassy gave detailed plans for the TMU team. 976/

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[redacted] found U.S. officials at Santo Domingo frustrated
in their efforts to get local information, although the Embassy
Public Affairs Attache had brought back four evacuated personnel
in an effort to monitor the rebel radio. He found considerable
ignorance concerning FBIS but enthusiasm for an FBIS presence
if it could deliver. 977/ By 2 June the FBIS team from Ramey
was at work in the Embassy at Santo Domingo. There was some
delay in getting the TMU to Santo Domingo. It was scheduled
for flight on 4 June but was delayed by plane trouble at Dover
Air Force Base, and then had to be held overnight at the air-
field in the Dominican Republic because of blackout restrictions.

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By 6 June it had been installed in the Embassy grounds and was operating [redacted] covering 85 hours of broadcasting a week. [redacted]

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[redacted] FBIS officials were understandably elated at the immediate success of the project. 979/ During June TMU monitoring expanded to 39 hours of broadcasts a day, with 8,000 words filed daily to Headquarters. [redacted] local employees were added to the staff. 980/

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Plans were completed in Washington to move the TMU to Puerto Rico when its mission in Santo Domingo was ended, hopefully before the end of the summer. 981/ Monitoring actually ended on 16 September 1965. Some of the staff already had departed. To engineer [redacted] fell the difficult task of moving the outfit out of the Embassy grounds and to the docks, where it was shipped to Puerto Rico. 982/ [redacted] ECB engineers left for Puerto Rico on 20 October to relocate the unit there for continued monitoring of weak Dominican broadcasting stations. With [redacted] in charge, the TMU was set up at the new Caribbean Bureau site, making use of some of the new antennas being constructed there. It was in operation by 13 November 1965. 983/ The TMU file to Washington at the end of November was only 1,000 words a day, but the Dominican copy was considered valuable, and in addition the unit was uncovering important cruising

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information on broadcasts from Haiti and Guyana. It was recommended that the operation continue, following a brief Christmas vacation shutdown, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] 984/ By the end of December production had been increased to 2,500 words a day, and in February 1966 the TMU filed to Headquarters more than 4,000 words daily.

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With rising unrest in Haiti, the unit started in April 1966 to give some coverage to that country, but when the value of Dominican broadcasts declined following the 6 June 1966 election, a decision was made to reduce TMU operations. 985/ By November 1966 TMU monitoring had been discontinued, all equipment was packed, including the emergency generator, and the TMU was in storage at the Caribbean Bureau ready for transport to a new emergency site in two or three days if necessary. 986/ Use of the big TMU was considered an unquestioned success. However, because the unit was large and difficult to transport, the Engineering Staff of FBIS recommended use of a smaller unit installed in a van or a Volkswagen bus, in addition to several light Man Transportable Monitoring Units. 987/

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Chapter 9 CHANGES INDUCED BY TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

In 1961 the Headquarters Engineering Staff still consisted of [] professionals, barely able to keep abreast of routine operational problems. Electronic developments made it apparent that new demands for electronic specialists in field bureaus soon would increase. 988/ FBIS budget requests began to reflect these needs. In 1961, a request for more staff engineers was rejected. The 1963 submission cited a need [] to modernize technical installations through 1964 and for an expanded engineering staff to plan improvements. 989/ This time the request received more serious study. The budget for 1964-65 provided for doubling the size of the Engineering Staff -- to [] full-time professionals. 990/ The expansion made it easier to rotate engineering personnel to Headquarters and to give the Engineering Staff an opportunity to anticipate changes dictated by a rapidly developing technology that affected various phases of FBIS operations.

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Despite the delay in getting a larger engineering staff at Headquarters, FBIS was able to achieve a number of technological transitions during the 1957-1967 decade. Far-reaching communications developments eliminated some of the earlier difficulties FBIS had. Monitoring equipment, from the antennas used to intercept distant broadcasts to the transcribers and recorders

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used by monitors, underwent considerable transformation. Technological improvements changed methods of printing and processing. At the end of the decade there was a promise of more radical developments to automate final processing, though it was recognized that much technological refinement would be needed before the new procedures could be fully adopted. In one area of FBIS responsibility -- television monitoring -- satisfactory methods and technical equipment with which to raise the technique closer to the high standards developed for radio monitoring were rapidly becoming available.

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Improved Monitoring Equipment

The Toho Denki facsimile page printer for Chinese characters put into use on Okinawa late in 1956 continued to give trouble. In March 1957 Okinawa Chief Engineer spent six days in Tokyo working with the manufacturer. After the printer was rebuilt,

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late in 1957, it gave fairly satisfactory service. 1011/ In 1959 engineers in the Far East were advised that one of their continuing duties was to keep abreast of communications equipment that might be utilized by Peking, so that no time would be lost in obtaining new equipment to meet with changes in any Peking transmission method.

Another earlier project still very much alive in 1957 was adoption of improved magnetic belt recorders and transcribers for use by monitors.* Approval was received early in 1957 to acquire this equipment, and in April 1957 agreement was reached on the production of magnetic transcribers, recorders, and belts by the Dictaphone company. 1012/ This included 58 recorders and 54 transcribers, with delivery to start in the spring of 1958. Members of the Engineering Staff visited the Dictaphone plant at Bridgeport, Connecticut, on 26 February 1958, inspected the equipment, suggested a few revisions, and requested the Office of Logistics to advise the company to proceed with production. Although the recorders performed well, the Engineering Staff considered them bulky and delayed procurement for other bureaus until a smaller version was produced. 1013/ There was pressure to speed up conversion, as the supply of parts for the

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* See page 319, Part II of History, for earlier discussion.

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old equipment was being depleted. It was decided to supply WCB and ECB completely with new recorders and transcribers at once, to ship available old parts to Okinawa and Cyprus, and to let the smaller bureaus get their replacement parts from there. 1014/ One new set also was sent to Okinawa late in 1959 for training purposes. 1015/ Funds for complete replacement in all overseas bureaus were included in budget requests for Fiscal 1965, a total of , 1016/ In June 1964 FBIS initiated a plan to put 400 new recorders and 200 transcribers in bureaus and by the spring of 1966 all bureaus were using the new equipment. 1017/

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Early in 1957 three FBIS engineers spent several days at the CGS Laboratories, Stamford, Connecticut, inspecting a new Morse code-teletype converter which FBIS wanted to test. 1018/ Two converters were purchased for WCB but were severely damaged in shipment and had to be returned. There followed prolonged discussions between representatives of the factory and the Office of Logistics. 1019/ The delay was of considerable concern to WCB, which had left several monitoring areas vacant for installation of the new automatic equipment. The converters were finally repaired and were operating satisfactorily at WCB in September 1957. 1020/

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The CGS Laboratories also were working in 1958 on a short-wave multicoupler produced under an Air Force development contract. Tests of the multicoupler at ECB demonstrated its definite value in bringing in weak signals. As FBIS had [redacted] available for 1959 fiscal year obligations, CGS was urged to hurry its tests and to be ready to deliver its equipment in 1960. 1021/ [redacted] had chosen a Westinghouse multicoupler, but FBIS demonstrated that the CGS product was better for its use and considerably cheaper per unit, and obtained authorization to purchase 83 to 110 units. 1022/ Later tests showed that a third company, Technical Materials Corporation, could better supply FBIS needs in medium and long-wave multicouplers, so CGS produced only the shortwave equipment. 1023/

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Improvement in antennas was another longstanding goal of the FBIS Engineering Staff. In January 1958 the staff announced that experiments in private industry had proved the feasibility of remotely tuned loop antennas. It said it would develop a prototype model which also would be valuable for direction finding. 1024/ Direction finding equipment was in short supply. Units already deemed obsolete cost [redacted] and lower priced equipment suitable for FBIS needs still was several years away. 1025/ A wire-grid lens antenna, which was installed at the new Caribbean

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Bureau, seemed to hold much promise, though it had to be built prior to construction of the operations building, which was immediately below it. 1026/

Other improved equipment getting the attention of engineers included a word counter that would satisfactorily meet FBIS needs. It was acknowledged that a universal counter sufficiently complex to meet all FBIS needs would be difficult to produce, but tests showed a Stelma Corporation transistorized counter to be remarkably accurate. Seventeen of these were purchased at a cost in 1960. The Engineering Staff promised the bureaus that eventually an FBIS-designed counter to meet all their needs would be available. 1027/ In 1963 a prototype of the counter had been constructed and turned over to Office of Communications for evaluation. Two prototypes were sent to field bureaus for tests. 1028/

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In October 1963 a radio receiver programmed for automatic tuning, developed by the Technical Materials Corporation, was tested at ECB. 1029/ The following year a multichannel receiver for multichannel press circuits was tested. 1030/ Further monitoring of the multiplex press circuits was abandoned for the time being, as equipment would have to be extremely sophisticated, and of 45 stations using the multichannels, only four ever carried press material. 1031/ In 1967 it was announced that the Engineering Staff

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had placed at ECB a new type of single channel radioteletype converter that made monitorable a number of circuits previously untouchable. 1032/

By 1967 developments in the broadcasting field had made it clear that much more engineering effort would be needed if FBIS were to maintain its monitoring standards. One emerging problem was the congestion in the high frequency broadcasting bands which made long distance monitoring increasingly difficult. Another serious problem was the growing number of foreign broadcasts to be handled by a decreasing number of people. Late in 1966 the FBIS Chief Engineer, in search of equipment to make possible "a more rapid aural scanning of voice broadcasts," placed a requirement on technical divisions of CIA to engineer production of such equipment. 1033/

Printing and Processing Developments

The 1957-1967 period was marked by a constant effort, usually in coordination with the Printing Services Division (PSD), to find new methods and equipment to reduce the time and labor involved in processing FBIS material for recipients.* An FBIS representative accepted a PSD invitation in April 1957 to

* For more discussion of FBIS-PSD relations; see pages 47-50 Part III of History.

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view a demonstration of new equipment by the Addressograph-Multigraph Corporation, which the latter claimed would save \$15,000 a year in publishing Daily Reports. Neither FBIS nor PSD was convinced. 1034/ Again in 1959 the Addressograph-Multigraph Corporation came up with an offset printing method which it claimed could produce huge savings. A committee from FBIS viewed the demonstrations but again was unconvinced. 1035/ FBIS did agree to test the system, which would mean renovating its 30 electric typewriters at a cost of \$115 each, but PSD vetoed the project. 1036/

In 1958, the RPB Trends and Survey were shifted from mimeograph to multilith, primarily for improved appearance. In August 1960 FBIS and PSD agreed to change from mimeograph to mechanical negative stencils for the Daily Report in an effort to speed up production, reduce costs, and improve its appearance. The experiment was soon abandoned because of difficulty in making corrections on the stencils. 1037/ FBIS management now was convinced that mimeographing was the best process available for the Daily Report and expressed an interest in an A.B. Dick Company plan for a four-page mimeograph machine. 1038/ PSD still hoped for a better method and in May 1962 expressed confidence that it would have an improved system within a year. 1039/

In early 1963 FBIS experimented with a flexowriter tape method of producing mats for offset printing. After Friden Company

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demonstrations, a pilot project was approved for the Latin American Daily Report. Response from recipients was favorable, but problems remained, the greatest one being excessive time required to produce the mats. In August 1963 a flexowriter, tape converter, mark-sensor assembly for semiautomatic production of offset mats from incoming teletype tape was delivered to FBIS, and typists and editors were given training in the new system. On 30 September it was possible to reproduce in the Daily Report a long Castro speech by the new method. Prospects seemed bright, but in December the system was abandoned as too inflexible and because it actually required more personnel. 1040/

In the meantime PSD started using offset printing, and on 18 February 1964 the Latin America Daily Report was converted to offset with multilith mats prepared on typewriters with small type. The system was extended to other Daily Reports a week later. This system made possible a considerable increase in wordage with no increase in pages. PSD agreed to convert all Daily Reports to the new method by 1 August 1964, but the changeover was completed on 24 July. 1041/ By the end of 1964 a new agreement with PSD was made, supplanting the one of 1957. The FBIS Production Unit received an incentive award from the ADO early in 1965 for its part in the change. 1042/

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Early in 1960 consideration was being given in FBIS to the purchase of a Xerox or similar reproduction machine, perhaps one being demonstrated by Addressograph-Multigraph, but it was argued that its infrequent use would make it too costly. 1043/

By 1963 the need for such a machine was recognized and, pending purchase, FBIS borrowed an FDD Xerox for making advance copies of RPB publications. 1044/ Xerox, Kodak, and Smith-Corona reproduction machines were tested in the fall of 1963 and the rental of a Xerox was recommended. 1045/ In less than a year a second machine was ordered and by 1967 FBIS Xerox machines were almost as busy as typewriters and teletypewriters. 1046/

In an age of increasing automation, the possibility also was being probed of mechanizing some routine operations such as translating and editing. Early in 1964 IBM representatives met with FBIS and other Agency personnel for discussion of a proposed stenewriter/computer system for Russian translation and of high-speed offset mat production. FBIS personnel were disappointed with the prospects. 1047/ Two years later FBIS was asked to investigate use of an editing machine being tested by the System Development Corporation of Santa Monica, California. Those seeing the machine were impressed but felt that many questions had yet to be answered before its use would be practical. 1048/ Final adoption of some such equipment seemed inevitable, and later in

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
The Engineering Staff continued its quest for satisfactory techniques for TV monitoring, while experimental monitoring was being done in Tokyo, Cyprus, and Vienna.

Bratislava television could be watched from Vienna, but extended tests were disappointing. Moreover, little of intelligence value was intercepted. 1052/ A Budapest station was added on 1 November 1957, but the photography of both transmitters was inadequate, and the aural summaries remained disappointing. 1053/

In November 1958 FBIS promoted a conference of 27 intelligence and engineering officials to discuss problems of television monitoring, but nothing helpful came from the meeting. 1054/ The ADO requested that intelligence users submit their television monitoring requirements by 16 January 1959. Only USIA insisted that experimentation continue, though ONI, ORR, and NSA said they still were interested. The ADO then obtained DDI approval for a series of pilot projects manned by FBIS personnel to develop efficient methods of video recording. 1055/

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Instead, new photographic equipment was sent to Tokyo and Vienna for continued experimentation. Reports that the Japanese were

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1966 FBIS called upon Research and Development to work on a computer system by which FBIS could process material already in "machine language" -- that is, teletype tape. 1049/ A five-year plan for development of a computer service to process intelligence information from FBIS field offices, with elimination of much routine editing, was given the approval of CIA higher authority late in 1967. The possibility of FBIS having its own computer was also considered. 1050/

Problems in Television Monitoring

There was some FBIS discomfiture at the rudimentary nature of FBIS television monitoring, which was considered by CIA higher authority to be an FBIS responsibility.* Except for television monitoring from Embassies within communist countries, only the perimeter of European communism had been covered by 1957. To make even a start on anything more comprehensive, FBIS officials felt that posts would need to be established in Berlin and Helsinki to assist Vienna. They estimated that within five years television would become an important source of domestic information, and even for perimeter monitoring FBIS would need new teams in such places as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Korea, and Hong Kong. Monitoring by Embassy staffs, with tapes pouched for processing, also was discussed. 1051/

* For earlier discussion of television monitoring, see pages 225 and 320, Part II of History.

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working on television monitoring equipment much less expensive than that obtainable in Europe encouraged prospects for further tests. 1057/

Frankfurt reported in 1960 that East Berlin television was being viewed satisfactorily from a point in the area and asked for monitoring equipment. Vienna also reported improved prospects. 1058/ NSA on Hokkaido responded to an OCI request that it test reception of Siberian television as a first step toward FBIS monitoring at the Hokkaido Bureau, but tests were disappointing and the Hokkaido project was postponed. 1059/

Tokyo, Vienna, and Frankfurt continued to do some television monitoring. Pictures were sent to the Graphics Register, OCR, for processing, but this was considered strictly a low-level operation. The first real breakthrough in television monitoring came in 1962, with coverage of Havana from Key West. Arrangements were made for Key West to monitor one program daily, and three of the first four tapes received in OCR were called valuable. 1060/ A Frankfurt request for to provide multilith processing for lateral distribution was rejected pending further experimentation at Key West. The fact that Frankfurt's television monitoring had to be done at Camp King, some distance from the city, prompted suggestions that the bureau be moved to exploit its television monitoring potential. 1061/

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In 1963 a Key West video tape of the 2 January Havana parade was flown the same day to Washington, where Graphics Register reported that it aroused "tremendous interest." 1062/ Coordination with Graphics Register was necessarily close, and several times Key West failed to monitor scheduled programs because Graphics Register did not send tape. In December 1963 a second video recorder was sent to Key West. 1063/

East German monitoring at Camp King could provide only still pictures, but exhibitions by Graphics Register evoked sufficient interest that a second camera was sent there. The West German Government showed some interest in television monitoring. Tokyo also was producing worthwhile still pictures from Asian documentaries. Yet, actual results from television monitoring were relatively meager and the general feeling in FBIS was one of disappointment. During four months in 1964 Key West monitored only five programs worth sending to Graphics Register. 1064/ In 1965 FBIS television monitoring was called "a makeshift operation, but adequate at present." 1065/ With completion of a 100-foot tower, on 11 October 1965, Key West television reception was much improved, and the number of tapes requested by Graphics Register steadily increased. However, results still were insignificant when compared to radio monitoring. 1066/

Though acknowledging its responsibility for television monitoring, FBIS was losing its enthusiasm for it. The Air Force was

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doing some monitoring in the Moscow Embassy and considered expanding into East European capitals. As the Air Force interest was almost solely limited to military hardware, FBIS was only slightly concerned. FBIS representatives who went to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base to view Air Force television monitoring found it rather disappointing. 1067/

Some FBIS bureaus remained enthusiastic about their still photography, but at Headquarters it was believed that tape recordings rather than still photography offered the only promise. 1068/ Provision was made in FBIS budget drafts for expanded television monitoring, but some officials questioned the procedure. 1069/ There also was talk of relinquishing FBIS responsibility for television monitoring in favor of some other office, perhaps the Air Force. 1070/

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Chapter 10 EXECUTIVE CHALLENGES AND CHANGES

Significant executive changes came to FBIS in the 1957-1967 decade, but many management problems that had plagued the organization since its inception remained in 1957 and even in 1967 -- and of course there were new ones. Finding and retaining a capable staff rated high among the problems, though some of the earlier handicaps disappeared or grew less abrasive. Employees in some categories remained difficult to find or hold, but general manpower shortages disappeared and the time required to process new employees was reduced considerably. As the larger agency gained experience, personnel problems were less corrosive and more readily soluble. However, FBIS management learned that an older and more experienced staff was more difficult to please than a younger and inexperienced one, particularly as promotions became more difficult to obtain. Some aspects of FBIS work that interested young employees grew less glamorous after 10 to 20 years; and as a consequence the rate of attrition remained relatively high.

Keeping A Capable Staff

In January 1957 the FBIS T/O was filled for the first time in FBIS history, but this did not mean that all problems of recruitment were solved. 1071/ The fact that the T/O had been cut had something to do with it. Recruitment still was necessary,

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and FBIS officials had learned from experience that they could not depend entirely upon CIA recruiters. The DDI was informed that FBIS could enroll [redacted] personnel a year from the Junior Officers Training (JOT) program. 1072/ In the three years prior to 1957, FBIS had lost [redacted] and during 1957 [redacted] were scheduled to leave. It also was noted that FBIS classified linguists were fully occupied, with no reserve to draw upon in time of crisis. FBIS reported early in 1958 that it had a continuing need for new personnel. 1073/ For example, in 1960 CIA recruiters were urged to step up efforts to find qualified Spanish monitors; RPB complained of a delay in replacing [redacted] analysts lost from its staff [redacted] and the Editorial Branch noted the addition of [redacted] editors in the previous year, although it had a standing order for ten recruits annually. 1074/ There also remained three vacancies among the teletypists, as [redacted] recruits were rejected. 1075/

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A committee of three was named by the FBIS Director in 1960 to study characteristics to look for in recruiting editors. Experience disclosed that many apparently suitable candidates failed to achieve FBIS standards or were uninspired by the nature of FBIS monitored information. The committee,

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unable to establish firm standards, recommended further research.

The DDI was informed by the FBIS Director that FBIS should be assigned analytical candidates a year from

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the JOT program. 1076/ A set of qualifications eventually was drawn up by the committee, but the Office of Training also was asked to test proven FBIS editors to check the accuracy of the list of qualifications. 1077/ Tests for prospective teletypists did not

need to be so involved, but good teletypists were hard to retain because, in the view of some, grades were low and FBIS teletypists worked harder than those in some other offices. Security was urged

in 1961 to speed clearances on applicants, as FBIS had teletypist vacancies and more in prospect. 1078/ FBIS still was complaining at

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slow results obtained through CIA recruiting, a fact attributed primarily to an insufficient number of working recruiters at the time. 1079/ The contention that FBIS must do more of its own recruiting was given prominence. There were some later improvements, but recruiting remained a seemingly permanent problem.

As late as July 1966 editorial shortages still were reported both at Headquarters and in the bureaus. 1080/ The normal situation was a 30 percent shortage in teletypists. 1081/

Next to hiring qualified personnel, the main essential in maintaining a capable staff was thought to be careful orientation

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and training. Despite due appreciation of OTR services, the general feeling was that proper training for FBIS work remained essentially the responsibility of experienced FBIS personnel. 1082/ Basic courses by OTR, though considered worthwhile, were believed to be no more essential than internal FBIS training. 1083/ Errors in field bureaus emphasized the necessity of careful on-the-job training before new employees were entrusted with responsibility. 1084/

Training for FBIS employees took a variety of forms. In addition to formal OTR classes and FBIS orientation tours, FBIS encouraged other steps to improve background knowledge. Arrangement was made for the Editorial Branch Chief to obtain membership in the National Press Club, so editors and analysts could be admitted to hear foreign speakers. 1085/ A policy of selecting FBIS employees for foreign orientation trips was adopted in 1957, with [] the first recipient, touring half a dozen Middle East states. 1086/ The next tour, called a "familiarization trip," was made by [], veteran Spanish monitor, to Caribbean, Central American, and South American countries. 1087/ Editors at the Mediterranean Bureau also profited from attendance at the Near East Seminar in Beirut, Lebanon, which included a brief tour of area countries. 1088/

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In 1960 Norman Kriebel and [] were enrolled in the University of Chicago Summer Institute in Executive Development for Federal Administrators. 1089/

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Some FBIS engineers received more extensive outside training, several completing work for an engineering degree.

In September 1956, [] was sent to Tri-State College in Indiana to begin work for an engineering degree, and was followed in the same program by []. In September

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1960 [] returned from two years at Tri-State College with a degree in communications engineering, and []

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[] was approved to replace him at Tri-State. 1090/ In

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1961 [] was the last FBIS engineer selected for the same training. 1091/ A program of engineering training through correspondence also was attempted but proved less successful. 1092/

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Perhaps the most extensive training participated in by FBIS personnel was the foreign language program of OTR. 1093/ OTR was informed in 1960 that [] classified linguists could profit directly from language improvement, while it would be advantageous to have many others learn languages spoken in bureaus to which they would be assigned. Plans were made in 1961 to have OTR bring language classes to FBIS offices to insure wider participation, but the program was never successfully carried out.

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It was announced in 1965 that new OTR courses would stress languages spoken in FBIS host countries and that bureau chiefs were expected to participate. 1094/

Higher grades and better pay, the most effective tools for building morale and retaining capable employees, were regularly advocated by FBIS management. The visit of a senior officer of the Office of Personnel to European and Middle East Bureaus in 1957 was viewed as an opportunity for FBIS to urge the upgrading of several positions. 1095/ Later the position of Information Specialist GS-13 was changed to Information Officer GS-14, allowing the upgrading of at least half a dozen key FBIS employees. 1096/

Personnel Officer suggested an elaborate system for grading FBIS bureaus, with the chiefs of those scoring more than 300 points entitled to GS-15, 200-300 points GS-14, 150-200 points GS-13, and under 150 points GS-12. Most FBIS bureaus were in the two top groups, with Okinawa and Cyprus each awarded more than 400 points. 1097/ Only Hokkaido and Saigon failed to qualify for GS-14 chiefs. Bureau clerical and teletypist supervisor positions also were upgraded. FBIS pleas for higher monitor grades were first rejected by the Position Evaluation Division, but finally the upgrading of some monitors to GS-11 was approved in 1961. 1098/

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RPB also staged a breakthrough between 1958 and 1961, following long discussions and several studies to determine reasons for RPB's

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inability to keep capable analysts. Grades of three RPB analysts were raised to GS-13 in 1961 and this was followed by a general upgrading. The departure of analysts stopped, but three years later, with deletion of some of the higher grades, RPB faced the same problem. 1099/ The Wire Service Chief's position also was upgraded to GS-14 in 1961, and several administrative grades at Headquarters and in the bureaus were raised. 1100/

In 1964 FBIS was advised that its average grade, steadily rising, had to be cut back to that of June 1963. The average FBIS grade was 9.95, while the target figure was 9.82. It was also pointed out that any future upgrading had to be accompanied by a corresponding downgrading. 1101/

Promotions of individuals to higher positions were frequent, but here the effect on morale was not always positive. Considerable dissatisfaction arose concerning personnel selected for promotion, especially among the approximately 100 editors. The FBIS Chief sought in 1957 to counter "an apparent misunderstanding in some quarters," and assured editors that when a promotion was available, all eligible candidates, no matter where they were stationed at the time, would be considered by the career panel. Some editors, believing they had been passed over in favor of candidates with less experience and ability, remained convinced that being in the right place at the right time was important.

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This led to some effort on the part of editors to exact promises of promotion before accepting overseas tours. 1102/ In 1959 an Agency rule forbade the skipping of grades in making promotions, thus necessitating promotions to Grades 8 and 10, which long had been ignored in FBIS. This provided more editorial and monitorial grades, and therefore more promotions, but forced employees to spend a longer time in reaching the top grade. 1103/ To bolster morale, passage from GS-7 to 9 through grade GS-8, or from GS-10 to 11, was declared routine, but with length of time spent in the middle grades determined by the supervisor. More than one year in GS-7 or GS-10 was considered unsatisfactory. 1104/

The FBIS Chief insisted that promotions not be tied to training programs -- that a particular training course would not be a prerequisite for promotion -- and that promotions would not be speeded up by superior accomplishment in a training course. 1105/

Special awards were designed to build morale. Merit awards for significant achievements under dangerous or difficult situations were of course appreciated, and the granting of quality step increases proved very useful in building morale. 1106/

In 1957, FBIS employees were accepted for Career Service membership. 1107/ With the transfer in 1959 of Office of Communications administrative personnel to the DDS career service, a similar assignment of FBIS administrative employees was considered,

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but it was not until 1965 that such a transfer was made. It affected at once seven FBIS employees and eventually placed most Administrative Staff employees in the DDS. 1108/

In 1961 the ADO started awarding 10-year service certificates to FBIS employees who had been in CIA that long. These in many cases did not reflect the full number of years many employees had worked for FBIS. 1109/ Although hundreds of employees had come and gone since FBIS became part of CIA, a relatively large nucleus remained even in the 1960's who had served under FCC or the Army. 1110/

By the 1960's some of the glamour of working for FBIS had worn off, and for some the routine had become boring. Many employees wished to transfer to other divisions of CIA.

Rotation of personnel continued, though there were exceptions.

[redacted] remained in 1967 as Chief Engineer -- 20 years in the same position. [redacted], Chief of the Administrative Staff in 1967, had remained in the same position for 15 years. 25X1

[redacted] RPB Chief since 1952, was the first RPB Chief to be sent directly to head a field bureau. He was succeeded on 23 February 1961 by [redacted], a former field bureau chief. [redacted] replaced [redacted] as BIS Chief 25X1

[redacted] replaced [redacted] as BIS Chief on 6 January 1963 and was still in the same position in 1967. After [redacted] was named FBIS Deputy Chief on 6 August 1961, that 25X1

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position was removed from rotation. In other positions rotation was fairly regular.*

Organizational Changes Affecting FBIS

Organizational revisions within FBIS were few from 1957 to 1967. The FBIS Chief presided over two branches and four staffs in 1957, the branches being Editorial and Radio Propaganda, and the staffs Administration, Engineering, Field Operations, and Liaison. By 1967 an Executive Staff with three members had been added, and Liaison had become Liaison and Requirements. Otherwise the groups remained the same.

The Wire Service remained a branch in the Editorial Division; the Technical Information Unit (TIU) -- the library -- was also under Editorial. Other branches in the Editorial Division were Publications and the three Daily Report groups. BIS, which had become the Monitoring Operations Section (MOS), was in FOS.

The T/O of FBIS remained remarkably stable in the decade following 1957. In 1967 there were still [redacted] employees in the Chief's office; FOS, including MOS, had [redacted] in 1957 and the same number in 1967. Engineering increased [redacted] but the Administrative Staff actually dropped [redacted]. Liaison and Requirements retained [redacted] RPD had [redacted] personnel in 1957 and the same number at the start of 1967. Editorial, with [redacted] in 1967. 1111/

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* For a complete list of FBIS senior officers see Appendix A.

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There were a few minor changes in RPB organization during the decade. Late in 1958 the CIA Management Staff was asked to review the grades of analysts and also to examine the existing division of RPB into Current Analysis and Research, which had been described as unrealistic. 1112/ With approval for a reorganization obtained, some officials advocated the merging of RPB and Editorial research -- actually, absorption of TIU into the RPB research unit. A special study in 1959 produced a recommendation that the change not be made, since the two units had different objectives. 1113/

The new organization of RPB provided for three sections: Bloc Foreign Affairs, Bloc Internal Affairs, and Support, the last being the research unit. In October 1963, following inauguration of Cuban analysis, a fourth section -- World Communism -- was added to handle communist propaganda from areas other than Communist China and the Soviet Bloc. 1114/

The Liaison Staff was renamed Liaison and Requirements Staff on 3 August 1959. 1115/ The Executive Staff was officially recognized in 1964, though prior to that time an officer had been detailed from other duties to act as a special assistant to the FBIS Chief. The new office was headed by a GS-15. The position was added to the FBIS T/O 1116/

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After operating at 1717 H Street Northwest for nearly nine years, longer than at any other location, FBIS made the sixth move of its history on 7-8 May 1965, this time outside the District of

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Columbia to the Key Building at 1200 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia, in the section known as Rosslyn. The location had been selected long before the end of 1964, and the first plans were to move in February. Two floors, the tenth and eleventh, were assigned to FBIS, but eventually other space was taken over when FDD was merged into FBIS in 1967.

Almost immediately after FBIS was established in Key Building, the most far-reaching change in its status since coming into CIA was announced. The Office of Operations, of which FBIS had been a part for nearly 19 years, was abolished on 1 July 1965. 1117/ Rather than a division in OO, FBIS now became an office, with FBID abandoned and FBIS the *de jure* as well as the *de facto* name.

Editorial Branch became Editorial Division, and RPB was changed to Radio Propaganda Division (RPD). A Kirkpatrick- Working Group on Reorganization and Activities had recommended in 1961 that OO be abolished, but the DCI rejected the idea. When the ADDI for Management, Paul A. Borel, renewed the recommendation in 1963, Executive Director-Comptroller Kirkpatrick readily agreed.

One central idea in the reorganization was that the status of FBIS would be raised by direct dealing with the DDI. 1118/ Yet early in 1966 the new DDI, R. J. Smith, established an intermediate organization somewhat similar to OO. This was the Intelligence Support Services (ISS), created to direct the work of collection groups -- Collection Guidance Staff (CGS), FBIS, Domestic Contact

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Service (DCS), and Office of Central Reference (OCR). As FDD was transferred to OCR, the new ISS took over direction of all OO Divisions plus several others. 1119/ Borel, who had been ADDI since 14 December 1964, was named to direct ISS and started to familiarize himself with FBIS operations in March 1966. 1120/ One major aim of the FBIS Chief, now called the FBIS Director, in his 1966 inspection trip was to inform bureau personnel regarding the new setup. 1121/ At the same time the FBIS Director said that in future budgets each division or staff would have its own definite allotment. In the past, in the less complex FBIS a lump sum allotment had been made to FBIS. 1122/

The Agency in 1961 was under great pressure to give up positions and money, and shortly after ISS was created, it was directed to cut personnel by 15 percent before the end of the year and also to cut expenditures by about seven percent. The new DDI elected to take the cuts chiefly in support activity, rather than at the expense of intelligence production. This made inevitable some future reorganization involving FBIS along with other parts of ISS.

Complicated FBIS-FDD Relations

In 1957 two FBIS bureaus in Europe and two in Asia were filing a considerable number of translations from the press, which were carried in the Daily Report and on the Wire under the same selection criteria used for radio material. FDD personnel recognized that FBIS

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would continue to perform a certain amount of press exploitation. Although an effort was made to coordinate, there was some duplication in FBIS and FDD publications.

An FDD representative, [] was sent to the Far East in 1957 to review FDD operations and to work out more satisfactory arrangements with FBIS bureaus, especially in Saigon. The Saigon Bureau Chief was reminded beforehand that press exploitation was not a charter function of FBIS and that the exploitation of the radio must "take precedence." The bureau already was mailing newspapers it did not fully exploit to FDD. 1123/ [] was cordially received and some valuable suggestions for improved service were exchanged. 1124/ The [] tour did not reduce FBIS press activities but actually had the opposite effect. The Hong Kong Consulate, which supported a press scrutiny operation partially duplicating FBIS effort, requested the full Okinawa and WCB file by airmail. 1125/ The Saigon Bureau Chief and [] agreed that more translators were badly needed there and that it would benefit both divisions to have an FDD man assigned to Saigon. 1126/

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London suggested early in 1957 that with sufficient staff it could file British press comment to supplement monitoring. Headquarters advised London to stay out of the press scrutiny field. 1127/ Vienna, where press scrutiny was a major operation, was pushing for more translators, and plans for Frankfurt

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to drop its scrutiny of 35 German papers had been cancelled at DDP insistence. Headquarters desired no more press scrutiny than absolutely necessary. 1128/

Vienna found more and more communist publications obtainable, and its staff was inundated. 1129/ A coordination agreement signed by the FBIS and FDD chiefs on 12 June 1957 had as its main purpose a reduction of FBIS press monitoring. Vienna was to airmail Soviet dailies to FDD and to notify FDD by wire of any translations made from the papers. As 15 days was then the average time required for FDD receipt of publications, FDD agreed to notify FBIS of any plans for use of press copy less than 15 days after publication, while FBIS promised to advise FDD when it planned to publish any item more than 15 days old. 1130/ At a top-level FBIS-FDD conference on 5 August 1957 it was agreed that the best results might be obtained if FDD were to handle all Soviet and Satellite communist journals, leaving the daily press to be exploited by FBIS in Vienna. 1131/ It was estimated that two or three months would elapse before this division of responsibilities could be put into effect. In the meantime the ADO approved four more linguists for Vienna, with the added stipulation that if FDD failed to meet FBIS requirements in the exploitation of communist journals, the matter of further expansion at Vienna would have to be considered. 1132/ To provide for this expansion at Vienna, press scrutiny operations

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at Frankfurt were reduced. 1133/ Vienna dropped all work on communist journals on 14 February 1958. These became the sole responsibility of FDD. FBIS believed that with the elimination of the journals Vienna would be capable of meeting RPD requirements and of exploiting the press for current material of immediate intelligence value. It proved able to handle only half of the 80 dailies available. 1134/ A summary in August 1958 placed the number of Soviet and East European newspapers available at 81 and the journals at 224, thus showing that FDD had by far the greater responsibility. 1135/

Despite efforts at coordination, duplication continued in FBIS and FDD publications. FBIS management devoted considerable time to the press scrutiny problem and took every occasion to caution field bureaus that FBIS was authorized only to scrutinize publications unavailable to FDD or to file items so currently valuable that delayed exploitation by FDD would destroy the usefulness of the information. 1136/ The FBIS Chief made a thorough study of FBIS press scrutiny operations a major aim of his 1957 field trip. He decided that curtailment of operations was not possible at Tokyo, Saigon, or Vienna, though there could be some reduction at Frankfurt. 1137/ Neither FBIS nor FDD was pleased with developments, and late in 1958 the FDD Chief suggested a radical reorganization. Declaring that the source media no longer was a satisfactory way of differentiating between FBIS and FDD operations, he explained that FBIS was trained to handle

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current intelligence, much of it appearing in the press, while FDD was trained to provide basic intelligence, much of it broadcast. He recommended a division of responsibilities on this basis but with no change in physical organization. Such a division might admittedly require a higher degree of cooperation and understanding. 1138/

By 1959 RPB was complaining that it did not get the material it needed from communist journals and recommended that Vienna resume processing. 1139/ A survey of OO problems suggested closer relations between FBIS and FDD, including daily consultations. 1140/ The issue of FDD's assuming responsibility for economic information was discussed in joint conferences and referred to users. 1141/ The suggested change was rejected by the heaviest users of the economic cards, some of whom were strongly opposed to any change. 1142/ New efforts at coordination brought an FBIS promise to provide FDD with a daily list of press items being processed and to request items from the field only after FDD verified its inability to provide them. FBIS also agreed to turn over to FDD all press items it failed to publish. 1143/ A late 1959 study found that only six percent of the items and 14 percent of the pages in the Daily Report came from press scrutiny. With ADO approval, an arbitrary limit of 20 percent of Daily Report space devoted to press scrutiny was established. 1144/ Careful checks followed each month to insure that this limitation was observed, but usually, although the

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press material was considered extremely important, the figure remained well below 20 percent.

Early in 1960 an Agency Panel on Exploitation of Press Material was set up, with FDD and FBIS represented. [redacted] representing FBIS, was replaced by [redacted] on 27 July 1960. 1145/ FBIS complained to the ADO in June 1960 that Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) press reviews did not satisfy RPB requirements and suggested more elaborate briefing in RPB of FDD personnel. The FDD Chief reported hopefully to the ADO that he believed both FDD and FBIS were making a conscientious effort to properly coordinate activities, and with FDD transfer to 1717 H Street new methods of cooperation could be developed. 1146/

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FDD requested that FBIS refrain from publication of budget figures broadcast by Soviet republic regimes, as FDD was being called upon for verification. FBIS rejected the request. 1147/ Later in the year the FDD Chief listed procurement of publications as the main FDD problem and asked for expanded collection of publications in Vienna for pouching to FDD. FBIS concurred in this proposal. FBIS voiced approval of the press monitoring operation in the Hong Kong Consulate under FDD supervision, an operation which it believed helped demonstrate the need for high-speed transmission to Headquarters of press material. 1148/

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As a rule FBIS could get press scrutiny to Headquarters much faster than could FDD. However, this was not true in every case. It was learned in 1962 that some Hanoi publications were reaching Washington before Saigon got them, with a resultant change in handling and a need for even closer coordination between FDD and FBIS. 1149/ Overlapping of FDD and FBIS operations continued to plague both divisions, a fact that may not have been apparent to the DDI. The DDI, in promising regular material for William C. Foster, head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, noted that both FBIS and FDD would be involved, but said he was sure that they were "sufficiently flexible" to fulfill all special needs. 1150/

In April 1963, Vienna stopped automatic translation of *Pravda* editorials and editorial articles, with FDD assuming responsibility. In September 1963 FDD published more than 50 pages of FBIS-filed material. 1151/ On the other hand, FBIS in October 1963 published as Daily Report Supplements two long *Kommunist* articles that normally would have been handled by FDD. 1152/ With the forced reduction in Mediterranean Bureau operations in 1964, FDD immediately expanded its coverage of publications from that area. Cooperation between the two divisions seemed more

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satisfactory than in any previous period, and joint conferences were the order of the day. 1153/

FBIS had no desire to expand its press coverage, but requests for more press scrutiny continued. State urged in 1964 that FBIS file more press scrutiny from Saigon and that it be published in the Daily Report. 1154/ FBIS-FDD senior officers agreed that FBIS could get Saigon press material published in its Daily Report much more quickly than FDD could in its publications. Such an expansion by FBIS, however, would require an additional Saigon editor and several translators, and no slots were available. 1155/ FBIS Saigon was examining regularly 103 communist and 77 non-communist publications but this was small compared to the number handled by FDD. 1156/ In spite of the difficulties involved, Saigon did increase its press scrutiny, and by 1965 was filing 62 percent more press material and making a valiant effort to obtain more publications and mail them promptly to FDD. Of course, to accomplish this its radio monitoring was curtailed somewhat. To obtain additional space for publishing the Saigon copy, press material from Europe was turned over to FDD for publication. 1157/

Late in 1965 the question of FBIS and FDD duplicating economic information again arose -- for the third time. A joint conference examined economic material back to 1963 and concluded that the two services complemented each other in providing economic information,

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with only a minimum of duplication. It also was noted that a remarkably high proportion of FBIS economic data came from two bureaus, Frankfurt and Hokkaido, and that FDD had no ready access to this material. 1158/ A later study of Soviet economic information showed that much of the broadcast material was published only in the oblast press, which was unavailable to FDD. 1159/

FBIS continued to demonstrate the value of its speed in reporting political information. On 24 November 1965 a 12,000-word article in *Kommunist* was translated and filed within six hours of receipt of the publication in Vienna. It was possible to publish the article in the Daily Report the next day. 1160/ In August 1966, a 34,000-word *Akahata* article urgently needed by Headquarters was translated by the Tokyo Bureau and carried in a Daily Report Supplement days before FDD would have published it. 1161/ Yet though FBIS-FDD coordination in 1966 was better than it had been earlier, there still was duplication, as well as some breakdowns in coordination. When FDD changed its Soviet publication from a weekly to a daily, FBIS published several items that already had appeared in the FDD publications. 1162/

Reorganizational Plans Affecting FBIS

In 1966, as a part of the general streamlining of support activity and cutting back of personnel rosters in the DDI, revisions in organization vitally affecting FBIS were considered. Possible

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changes suggested included the transfer of RPD to OCI and the merging of radio and press monitoring. 1163/

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To consider the transfer of RPD, a Task Force was set up under [redacted] of OBI. Other members were [redacted]

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[redacted] of OCI, William Hyland of ONE, and [redacted] and

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[redacted] of FBIS. 1164/ Another committee was appointed to

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study merging of FDD and FBIS, with [redacted] Chief of the

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Resources and Industries Division, ORR, as chairman. On this

committee were [redacted]

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[redacted]

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One purpose of both suggested changes was to reduce manpower in FBIS and FDD through a more efficient use of personnel. It also was suggested in the proposal that the transfer of RPD to OCI would "foster a unified approach to political intelligence analysis" as well as reduce the staff.

[redacted] committee was to ascertain whether greater efficiency

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and substantial savings would be obtained by merging FBIS and FDD. The target date for completion of its study was 1 December

1966. 1166/ [redacted] was instructed to study possible organiza-

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tional effects of the proposed merger, to ascertain its impact on the Agency and on other government offices, and to try to determine whether greater speed and elimination of duplication

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could be obtained in addition to savings in money and manpower through the proposed changes. 1167/ Instructions from the ADDI expressed doubt that a single clearcut solution could readily be obtained, but asked for recommendations at the end of the study, with any exceptions to the recommendations fully explained. 1168/

The FBIS Director tried to remain neutral during the study, neither endorsing nor opposing a merger. He instructed the FBIS representatives to avoid taking a rigid position, but to try sincerely to get at the facts and to refrain from supporting a merger unless the evidence demonstrated forcefully that this would be desirable. If consolidation of FBIS and FDD was decided on, he suggested that sufficient time be allowed for integration, possibly with a 1972 target date for full reorganization. With the interests of the BBC in mind, he also insisted that there be no curtailment of radio monitoring. 1169/

The committee started its work by obtaining from each of the divisions an outline of its operations, procedures, functions, and products. FDD reported that it scanned regularly 850 newspapers and 2,200 periodicals and stressed the unique importance of its linguistic support program throughout CIA. 1170/ In later submissions, it indicated that it published about 150 million words a year of translations -- about 38 million in house and the remainder under the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS)

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system using contract translators. 1171/ FBIS reported that its daily monitoring encompassed approximately six million words in 68 languages. Of this, about a quarter million words were teletyped to Washington through FBIS's own telecommunications network. The most significant material was disseminated immediately by the FBIS 24-hour Wire Service and about 125,000 words were published in the Daily Report. 1172/

It soon became apparent that a unanimous agreement would be impossible. FDD representatives were opposed to a merger, and FBIS representatives, despite Seely's counsel of neutrality, were just as strongly in favor. The committee meetings became a battleground of opposing viewpoints. The principal arguments centered on the feasibility of doing press translations overseas using JPRS-type contract translators at FBIS bureaus.

At the first meeting, in August 1966, speaking for FDD, said that he would accept the idea of FDD doing some translating overseas but did not favor amalgamation of the two groups. The OCI representative said that FBIS rapid reporting was extremely valuable, and his office found that it made little difference whether information came from the press or radio. 1173/

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Subsequent meetings dealt with the importance of the JPRS program, the cost and quality of translations, the question of FDD-FBIS duplication, the speed with which press material was

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made available to the intelligence community, and the value to CIA of the FDD linguistic pool. The FBIS representatives noted that the transfer overseas of FDD's current information activities would free immediately classified positions and also increase the speed of production; the domestic JPRS could be left to concentrate on basic information. FDD defended its Headquarters scanning operation and questioned the capability of aliens recruited overseas, maintaining that many classified supervisors would be needed there as well. 1174/

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After many committee discussions and the submission in the fall of 1966 of position papers by the two offices regarding a merger, the FDD representatives remained opposed. They held that amalgamation would have an adverse effect on the CIA linguistic pool and that it would result in a marked drop in quality of production without providing any compensatory economies. They considered FBIS estimates of prospective personnel reductions to be "speculative and overly optimistic" and said that no logical basis for a merger existed, as FDD and FBIS were distinct intelligence collection systems "covering different sources of information." They also held that a transfer of translation operations overseas would further aggravate the US balance of payments problem.

The FDD position paper questioned the efficiency of some aspects of FBIS overseas translation activities, claiming in

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particular that its press scrutiny operations represented "overcollection resulting from lack of informed intelligence guidance" and pointing out that 75 percent of the items FBIS turned over to FDD were discarded. The paper said that FDD could do a better job of providing economic information and that overdue improvements in FBIS would save much more money than would a merger. It maintained that FBIS could easily drop [] positions with no loss of intelligence information. Among specific suggestions were a cut of [] monitors in Cyprus and elimination of the London Bureau entirely, with the BBC filing directly to Washington.

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Both groups also turned over to the committee lists of duplications of items published. FDD cited 13 instances during the period 1961-65 in which FBIS duplicated FDD, calling this an "abrogation of the agreement" between FBIS and FDD. 1175/ In presenting its own list of duplications, FBIS noted that it was not necessary to place blame, but that the amount of duplication was considerable in spite of efforts by both FDD and FBIS to avoid it. Among the items listed were 40 speeches made at the 23rd CPSU Congress, filed in full by FBIS and later published in excerpted form by FDD. 1176/ The FBIS Director also presented the ISS Director with a copy of the FDD-FBIS agreement and noted the continued duplication. 1177/ The ISS Director in response

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said that there was no problem which needed solving prior to completion of the Committee's work. 1178/

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The FBIS representatives continued to insist that to achieve economy in money and skills, to insure fast service to the consumers, and to avoid duplication, the distinction between press and radio material should be dissolved. They held that, with the adoption of this principle, the problem of reducing costs and personnel could be approached. They felt that FBIS experience had already demonstrated that press and radio could be exploited together, and that most of the work could be done more economically overseas.

As to location of the proposed overseas work, FBIS conceded that some of its bureaus were too isolated to do much effective press scrutiny, but it believed that most of them could start handling some press on short notice and that the operation could be built into new stations such as Bangkok and Puerto Rico. 1179/ To FDD countersuggestions that radio monitoring in Africa could be reduced or eliminated and the African press exploited more fully by FDD at Headquarters, FBIS insisted that a field bureau was necessary to handle the watch and alert function and lateral services to users outside the United States. It was agreed, however, that press scrutiny could replace some African monitoring. 1180/

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Throughout the committee debates, the FBIS representatives argued that the greatest gain from a merger would be consolidation of a common mission based not on media but on requirements. With such a consolidation, they held that a concerted attack could be made on coverage problems, with due consideration for timeliness, costs, accessibility of documents or broadcasts, and availability of talents and sites. This would call for new mental attitudes and a broadened outlook and, even more essential, for "a single chain of command with adequate authority for action." 1181/

Merger of FBIS and FDD

All arguments were in and discussions completed before the end of 1966. Chairman [] then prepared the committee report, which was issued on 1 February 1967. [] concluded that both FDD and FBIS were well managed and had honestly tried to work together but still had been unable to avoid a considerable amount of duplication. He clearly recommended, however, that the organizations and activities of the two divisions be merged under a single office-level management within the Directorate for Intelligence. 1182/ He also recommended testing the feasibility of achieving cost reduction through the exploitation of foreign publications abroad, using contract linguists and editors working under the supervision of U.S. personnel. For the initial test, the exploitation of Soviet and Eastern European newspapers in

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London was suggested. If this test proved successful, field exploitation could be extended over the next few years to include periodicals and related materials, as well as the allocation to the Press Monitoring Unit at Hong Kong of unified responsibility for exploitation of the China mainland press and periodicals on all but S & T subjects and the exploitation of the foreign publications of Southeast Asia and Latin America at FBIS bureaus in those areas. The report also proposed that provision be made for coordination of newspaper exploitation with radio monitoring and for the wire filing of the urgent intelligence from newspapers, with the less critical material from foreign publications being processed on mats and returned to Headquarters for dissemination through JPRS channels. It further recommended that an adequate language capability -- not necessarily limited to FDD personnel -- be maintained at Headquarters to translate classified documents and provide linguistic support to other Agency components. 1183/

Much of the reasoning behind recommendations involved costs and the use of staff personnel. It was clear that radio monitoring was more expensive than press monitoring. FBIS cost per 1,000 words filed was placed at \$81.12 and that of FDD staff translations at \$60.65. By use of JPRS at an average cost of \$13.51 per 1,000 words, FDD reduced its total production cost

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to \$25.58 per 1,000 words. When [] adjusted the figures to reflect scanning costs, however, FDD cost estimates changed to \$48.17 for staff translations and \$17.81 for JPRS. 1184/ The latter figure was roughly similar to estimated costs for the exploitation of press media abroad using contract personnel. 1185/ A major factor in the argument for transferring press exploitation abroad was FBIS's proven success in delegating scanning and editing responsibility to alien employees working with minimal staff supervision. The speed of handling accruing from processing material near the source and transmitting urgent items by wire was also taken into consideration. [] agreed with some of the claims made by both FDD and FBIS personnel that press and radio required different handling, but he believed that on the whole the similarities were greater than the differences and that assignment to different managements complicated performance of responsibilities. He recommended, therefore, that the two units be integrated regardless of whether translation of publications overseas proved feasible, adding that success in that aspect would make the logic of merging even more persuasive.

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With [] clearcut endorsement of a merger, the DDI approved the change without delay or prior testing. FBIS personnel learned on 14 February 1967 that the merger would take place on 1 March with the transfer to FBIS of all FDD's

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personnel other than its Acquisitions Branch. 1186/ Plans to hire new Chinese monitors for Okinawa were put off because of the possibility that JPRS operations in San Francisco might make it possible to relieve the Okinawa Chinese staff of some coverage. 1187/

In a memorandum to FBIS employees on 1 March 1967, the FBIS Deputy Director called the merger an "accomplished fact" but cautioned that several years might elapse before full implementation was achieved. Actual transfer of FDD personnel to FBIS was confirmed officially in an OCR memorandum dated 8 March 1967.

The total FBIS Table of Organization after the merger consisted of non-staff positions, plus independent contractors for JPRS. Field bureaus were advised that the relationship of JPRS to FBIS was a classified matter of a "sensitive nature" and that JPRS should be described as "a clearing house for federal scientific and technical information, Department of Commerce." 1188/ Tokyo was immediately authorized to hire contract personnel to further exploit Japanese press reports from Communist China. The Mediterranean Bureau also started press scrutiny; items from the Cairo press first appeared in the Daily Report on 2 July 1967. 1189/

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Though full integration was accepted as a project of several years, a start at reorganizing the merged office was launched at

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once. [redacted] former Chief, FDD, was named chairman of a committee to plan the London Press Monitoring Unit.

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[redacted] also was named to head the new Production Group component, and [redacted] former Chief, Executive

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Staff, FBIS, was named Chief of Operations. The Operations Group included the Wire Services Staff, the Field Operations Staff, and all field bureaus. The Chief of Production was in charge of five divisions: Propaganda Analysis (PAD), Publications, and three area divisions -- USSR, Asia, and Europe-Africa-Latin America. 1190/ The new organization was approved by the

DDI on 1 May 1967. FBIS now was responsible for monitoring both radio and press, as had been envisioned by FBIS Chief [redacted]

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[redacted] in 1946. Through the intervening two decades, FBIS and FDD had developed impressive capabilities that boded well for the future of the merged organization.

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APPENDIX A: Executive Personnel of FBIS, 1941 - 1967Headquarters: Executive

<u>Name</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Appointment Date</u>	
Lloyd Free	Director, FBMS	16 June 1941	25X1
[Redacted]	Acting Director, FBMS	April 1942	
	Director, FBIS	16 July 1942	
	Director, FBIS	25 July 1944	
	Director, FBIS	7 August 1945	
Col. L. K. White	Chief, FBIS	29 September 1947	
Alan M. Warfield	Chief, FBIS	14 December 1950	
Roger G. Seely	Chief, then Director, FBIS	5 September 1956	
[Redacted]	Assistant Director	May 1941	25X1
	Assistant Director	2 August 1943	
	Assistant Director	22 October 1944	
Col. L. K. White	Deputy Chief	9 January 1947	
[Redacted]	Deputy Chief	28 June 1948	25X1
	Deputy Chief	14 September 1950	
Roger G. Seely	Deputy Chief	10 April 1952	
[Redacted]	Deputy Chief	29 October 1957	25X1

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